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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an inquiry into the processes of social change in
Colombia. The paper is divided into four parts.
The first part is devoted to analyzing current ideas held by eminent
anal*sts of the underdeveloped world, in this case Albert Hirschman
particularly, that in the case of Colombia, in spite of the obsolescence
of the elites in power, and that even in spite of my country's lacking
of "certain institutions and capacities such as an adequate bureaucracy,
public participation in the governmental process, legitimacy, ability
of a political elite to mediate conflicts, and so on," peaceful social
change and economic reforms are occurring every day. This hypothesis
is viewed in the light of the land problem, one of the most important
and pervasive Colombia has, closely following Hirschman's observations
about the same problem, and arriving at totally different conclusions
from Hirschman, and demonstrating the total lack of occurrence of
change.
The second part is devoted to demonstrating how the rest of the
components of the Colombian economy reflect the same treatment as the
one given to the land problem by the elites. In this chapter I demon-
strate that Colombia has become a social, political and economic
colony of the U.S.A. This has happened because of the United States
interest in protecting its economic and political interests in
Colombia, threatened by the menace of popular uprisings because of
the failure of the elites, the allies of the U.S.A., to administer
the country. The reflections of the U.S.dominance are seen when
analyzing the different components of the economic sector of the
country.
The third part of the study is a look into the alternative when social,
political and economic change becomes a permanent frustration in a
country like Colombia: violence. The case of a priest, Camilo Torres,
who was killed as a guerrilla in 1966, is taken as a pretext for
analyzing the different steps a program of change through violence
would have to folilow in a country like Colombia.
The fourth part consists of my own ideas in order to implement social
change in Colombia by way of using pacific and violent means, based
on the experiences of Camilo Torres.
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to my parents
If only it had happened somewhere else, in some
other country, and we'd just read about it in
the papers, one could discuss it quietly, examine
the question from all points of view and come to
an objective conclusion. We could organize debates
with professors and writers and lawyers, and blue-
stockings and artists and people. And the ordinary
man in the street, as well - it would be very
interesting and instructive. But when you are
involved yourself, when you suddenly find yourself
up against the brutal facts you can't help feeling
directly concerned - the shock is too violent for
you to stay cool and detached. I'm frankly sur-
prised, I'm very very surprised. I can't get over
it.
Berger
Act Three
Rhinoceros
Ionesco
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This work is about Colombia. About the problems for change in
Colombia. I can say that I have developed this work, thanks to what
I have learned in M.I.T. Some of the crucial problems of change and
development in an underdeveloped country will be examined here.
Before starting this work I would like to thank all those wonderful
friends, my professors and my classmates, that have encouraged me
in my work. I have developed the main ideas of this work through
all the time I have spent in M.I.T.
The best thing I found in M.I.T. was the freedom for learning, a wide
camp for battles of ideas and the freedom for making mistakes, if
they were made while seriously looking for the truth. I am looking
for the truth about my country, and I have put a great passion in it,
and I still expect this work to have a lot of mistakes.
I examined and re-examined my main concepts about my country, and I
have tested them against very valuable data I have found. I have also
examined the contemporary studies and theories about development in
Colombia; I have made my own hypotheses and I want to open them to
debate.
The data I have found in this country has been very valuable; not
only have I been able to know through very long study data about the
socio-economic and political conditions of my country, but I have
also learned a great deal about the socio-economic and political con-
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ditions an organized society is able to sustain. I have been able
to experience life in this country; I can appreciate the gaps between
a country like mine and the U.S.A., and as a planner I have
questioned in this study the reasons about - the convenience of the
continuance of the explicit policies of imitation of the U.S.A. my
country has, as a model of economic development, of social equality
and justice; I have made some hypotheses about the future of my
country, based on its realities.
I want to state here my position as a planner; the only way I can
understand the city planner's role is when he identifies himself,
according to his values, with a determined social order he is
working for; I cannot accept the picture of a city planner that is
treated as an intellectual commodity, super-computer who can be put
to work in any socio-political or economic latitude. In developing
areas, where he finds himself as one of the very few in the country
who has some education for foreseeing the possible future ways the
country should take, the planner has a very wide range of functions
which in most cases get him into decision-making positions and situa-
tions; if the planner then, the non-attdched,i "technical advisor,"
is not in the capacity (strongly motivated by his values) of differen-
tiating and choosing among different systems of pushing economic and
social and political development, then what to plan for? Let us
remember that the question of who, when and how gets the products of
society is one of the most important and unavoidable considerations
when planning for development.
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After saying this, it is now easier for me to explain the different
approach I have followed through this study in which I arrive at the
conclusion that the objective basis for a redefinition of the
problems of Colombia, is a revolution in the social, economic, and
political systems and institutions of the country; this because:
1. of the tremendous injustices I find in the actual
system;
2. poor people in Colombia have waited literally for
more than four hundred years for any change;
3. given the actual conditions of the country, nothing
seems to indicate that the will of its actual lords
will change towards the needs of the majority of dis-
possessed people.
And besides these tremendously important factors that weigh so heavily
in my study, and to which I am able to arrive under the present
development of my study, there exist new developments not considered
in this study, that show to us as an example to follow that in
countries like Cuba, which in a decade have done more justice for the
people than centuries of colonial system, these changes occur after
drastic revolutions have evolved.
I hope to keep this study within the ambit of objectivity, but
nonetheless, in matters of political economy, and social organization,
my choice is socialism, marxism-leninism, and one of my main purposes
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will be to work towards building socialism in my country. But my
rule as I said, will be to approach the objective reality by all
means.
I do not expect to have, after I finish this work, a universal
formula for change in underdeveloped countries, neither do I
expect this formula to fit for the whole of Latin America. My
country has very special and particular problems, and this fact
will make us consider special and particular answers for them.
There is something, nevertheless, that I think could be used as a
general model for other countries, and it is the general framework
of thought I used, the general approach for analyzing the problems
of my country, through an analysis of the interior components of the
social, political, and economic structures and the relations of the
components throughout the different structures.
This work is going to be dividdd into four parts:
a. I expect to analyze in the first part the approach
followed by many scholars and technicians that have
analyzed my country, and see in the country a good
example of politics at work for the people, and of social
change being organized from above, even if the system
and the regime show chronic deficiencies and rottenness.
In this first part I will make some analysis about the kinds of change
that may occur in my country, pacific or violent, based on the actual
-18-
performance of change measures approved by the actual elites of the
country. I will advance an hypothesis about my country's status in
its international relations and the repercussion of these relations
in the structures of my country; this I consider one of the main
starting points of my study.
I will also examine in this part, taking it just as an example of
one of the elements of the social structure where change is expected
to be occurring faster, one of the most pressing internal problems my
country has, the land problem. I will examine the different changes
in the land problem within the context of pacific evolution, as an
example of the so-called change in Colombia.
b. In the second part I will examine the rest of the
main components of the Colombian economy in the light
of the status hypothesis I state in the first chapter,
and I will open the discussion about an approach to social
change using elements of violence.
c. The third part will consist of an examination of
the work of a brave priest, Camilo Torres, who was
killed as a guerrilla in Colombia, in 1966. This may
be considered as an analysis of a violent approach to
change. This is the opposite approach to change to
the one analyzed in Chapter One.
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d. In a last part I will give my own approach to
change in Colombia, based on my conclusions about
the possibilities of pacific social change and on
the experiences of those who have tried to implement
social change through violent means in Colombia.
-20-
Chapter One. Pacific Evolution in Colombia.
My country is one of the underdeveloped countries in Latin America.
My country is a violent, hungry and dispossessed one. By this I
mean the absolute majority of the people; there is a very small
minority that is tremendously overfed, wealthy and by word terribly
loving of peace.
We have national plans for economic development and the Alliance for
Progress, but in spite of these, the majority of the people have each
day less food, less schools, less opportunities for working, less
health facilities, less land, less clothing. Each day they become
more impatient; their environment is each day more oppressive for
them, the years pass by, their children become old, the same is the
same, and it is as if a tremendous and terrible electric storm were
taking shape, and as if the killings of people we have had especially
during the last twenty years, were the first and each day more inten-
sive sparks of this storm.
Until this moment the Gods of this storm have been the stubborn,
arrogant, educated, refined, and wealthy upper classes with their huge
provision of violence and dogma for pinning down the miserable, ugly,
and hungry people. But as we will see throughout this study, there
are some indications that their concerted storm of violence and
dogma may become too big for their hands, and that their heads that
so admirably were used to dominate the populace may in one not-distant
day be lost to the same ignorant and stupid populace.
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It has been said by many scholars, eminent scholars that have even
lived and worked in my country, like Albert Hirschman, that even in
underdeveloped countries, with rotten institutions, pacific social
change is occurring day by day. Hirschman in his book, Journeys
Toward Progress, Studies of Economic Policy Making in Latin America,
states, that if we, as political scientists, analyze the problems of
a country like Colombia, we would see the effects of good government
"as resulting from certain institutions and capacity such as an
adequate bureaucracy, public participation in the governmental pro-
cess, legitimacy, ability of a political elite to mediate conflicts
and so on. Hence the political scientist's advice to countries with
a defective political process is to acquire these institutions and
capacities much as economists advise them to step up capital forma-
tion or to generate a group of entrepreneurs."
But I assume that Hirschman as a very realistic and pragmatic
American scholar understands those words we have in Spanish: "It is
impossible to ask for pears from an apple tree." It would be
impossible to ask our elites in Latin America, where the differences
between wealth and poverty are so accentuated, to become efficient
and just lovers of the hunger, etc., etc.; they would have to give
1. Albert Rirschman, Journeys Toward Progress, Studies of Economic
Policy Making in Latin America, Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company,
Inc., Garden City, New York, 1965. P. 21.
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up with it, too much of comfort, and wealth, and privilege and status;
attempts to do so have proven futile. So Hirschman as a pragmatic
man who likes things to get done, goes on: "Our inquiry on the other
hand, takes the existing political framework with its defects for
granted and explores whether and how the weight and urgency of certain
economic policy problems can nevertheless lead to constructive action.
Our basic working hypothesis must be that, within rather broad limits,
the existence of defects in political structure does not constitute an
absolute impediment to progress in dealing with economic policy prob-
lems; by the same token, it is likely that problem solving will under
these conditions follow quite unfamiliar paths whose possible effi-
ciency and hidden rationality we must try to appreciate."2
I do not understand what Hirschman means when he states that "the
existence of defects in political structure does not constitute an
absolute impediment to progress in dealing with economic policy
problems." What is an absolute impediment to progress? Of course,
you will always be able to say that the country progresses, you will
always be shown new schools, new hospitals, and agrarian reform, and
hotels, and beaches, and American cars. Yes, but who gets them?
How many children do go to school? How many people have food and
jobs every day? Who rides those cars and jets, and who lives in
those beautiful houses? Who is able to pay for being served in those
2. Ibid., p. 22.
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hospitals? I do not understand when Hirschman goes into assuming that
economic policy problems have only relation to economic policy prob-
lems. As Professor Howard in his classes at M.I.T. used to say, in
society, who gets what, when and how -- that is the real problem; not
economic policy making as we are used to hearing, words that are just
a custom that covers in societies like mine the real group of oligarchs
that are sucking every day the blood of the people.
Economic policy making is a prbblem of politics. Otherwise, what is
politics? What is "the art of good government" in capitalistic
societies? In countries as rich as the U.S.A., we still have to
think of social class. Why? Because social classes are necessary
for the existence of "good government." Because it is necessary that
some people have less in order for others to have more. On the other
hand, is economic growth social development? If we were agreeing with
W. W. Rostow's theories that once modern technology is spread in the
society, the game is won because the aim of development is the adoption
of modern technology, we would not be seeing the riots we are seeing
in the U.S.A. Or is it that we do not consider the black people in the
U.S.A. as being part of this society? Am I going to be argued that
they have not been integrated into society? Isn't it better to state
that they have always been integrated into the American society, but
only on the side of the ones who have less in order that others may
3. Henry Bienen, Violence and Social Change, A Review of Current
Literature, University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 64.
-25-
have more? They are the ones that are left with nothing, in order that
this country may have rich millionaires.
But let us not interrupt any more. Let us see what Mr. Hirschman did.
Professor Hirschman in a way I really admire very much. He built a
whole system of ideas for showing how countries with rotten systems
actually progressed. He took three specific case studies for funda-
menting his studies: the case of inflation in Chile; the case of the
northeast of Brazil; and the case of land use and land reform in
Colombia -- all three very deep problems in each country.
In the case of Colombia, ours this time, he made a very elaborate
analysis of the ways land use and land reform measures have been
taking place in Colombia.
I really like very much his study and I will try to follow it throughout
the first part of this paper. What I cannot agree with are the con-
clusions Mr. Hirschman tried to draw:
a. that the bourgeois class in power in Colombia
is a responsive one to the needs of the people,
though in a rather lazy manner;
b. in the specific case he used in his book, the
land problem, that real change has occurred in
land use patterns in Colombia;
c. that changes in Colombia, if some, have been
of the evolutionary type.
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I really cannot agree with any of those things Professor Hirschman
has tried to show in his book, nor with the many that defend these
points of view, as I consider that land use and land reform problems are
of the utmost importance for my country. Half of the population lives
in the countryside, and my country depends heavily for its exports and
foreign currency earnings on an agricultural product, coffee.
I would like to elaborate on this problem, using Mr. Hirschman's
arguments and some other little data I have gathered these years, to
show:
a. how the land use problem is a chronic,
dangerous, and lethal one, caused by the greed
of the lords;
b. that in spite of the "Social Agrarian
Reform," and the Alliance for Progress,
nothing in land use patterns has happened in
the countryside;
c. that the few reforms, in literature, have
been hurried responses to the irate hunger of
the peasants in revolt;
d. that the rich people have been teasing
the population with promises of reforms for
years and years, but that the only things
these poor peasants keep are these mountains
of promises of reforms over reforms and their
hunger, which grows and grows;
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e. that after having lied and lied with
more and more promises to the poor people
by announcing each time more stridently
radical reforms that never happened, there
is nothing else to promise; and
f. that in view of their blindness, and of
their negativity to change, and that in view
of the growing impatience, and hunger and
dispair of the poor people, the only alter-
native is a violent, drastic and fast change
of those institutions and people dragging on
the lives of the majority of the population.
The analysis of the land problem which we will follow, is the same
type of analysis Mr. Hirschman followed, arriving at conclusions I
do not agree with. The problem of lands, so important in Colombia,
will be for us a specie of mirror, where we will be able to look
afterwards, to the rest of pressing problems Colombia has. The ways
in which the government reacts to this problem, will be found typical
in many other important sectors of the Colombian economy. This will
be a most detailed example of the frustrations in the processes of
social change in Colombia, understanding by social change, "the process
through which alterations occur in the structure and function of a
social system."4
4. Everett M. Rogers, Elementos de cambio social, Tercer Mundo, ed.,
Bogota, 1966.
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Background to our problem.
Since the beginning of the Spanish colonization in America, land
constituted an element that brought with its ownership wealth, poli-
tical power, and social status. I agree with Hirschman when he says
that in Colombia most of the land ownership patterns did not fit
into the common idea of feudal patterns; mainly because of:
a. the formation of many small plot holdings
with the liquidation of many indian communi-
ties and the formation of many small coffee
growing farms;
b. virgin lands that were held nominally by
grants given by the Spanish Crown were invaded
many times by settlers and squatters; the
important Colombian region of Antioquia was
developed in this way;
c. the existence of Spanish laws, making
the rights of ownership on previously public
lands, dependent upon their effective economic
exploitation. 5
''...private ownership was made conditional on morada y labor
(habitation and work), as early as 1513 by Ferdinand the Catholic, it
being of course understood that the work was to be carried out by the
5. Albert Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress, Studies of Economic
Policy Making in Latin America, Anchor Books, New York, 1965.
p. 140.
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indians under the supervision of the owner or his employees...This
requirement was later confirmed in considerable detail at the end
of the sixteenth century under Philip li.6
"In 1780 the viceroy of Santa Fe (Bogota), gave laws in the same
direction."7
It is evident the eagerness the "colonos," settlers from Spain, had
for the lands of Colombia. Hirschman says that by the end of the
sixteenth century the best lands in the valleys and the highlands
had been taken up already. In the nineteenth century, parallel to
the extinction of the indian communes -- lands that were generally
afterwards taken by big landlords, the same as lands confiscated by
the state to the Church -- many settlers squatted on lands belonging
to grantees of the Spanish Crown, mainly in the important regions
which today constibtute the states of Antioquia, Caldas, Quindio,
and Sucre. Hirschman says: "most frequently however some compro-
mise was reached after prolonged litigation, occasionally punctuated
by violence."8
6. Hirschman, Ibid., p. 134.
7. Hirschman, Ibid., p. 135.
8. Hirschman, Ibid., p.137.
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We should not believe that the times of the first settlements in my
country were peaceful ones. Politics has been used since those times
to protect rights of ownership. Virginia M. O'Grady, in the book,
Camilo Torres, His Life and His Message, puts it in a very few words:
"Independence was won in 1810. From that year until 1903 Colombia
suffered ten revolutions and seventy uprisings." The power factor,
economic power, was always one of the most important elements in
those wars. And we should not forget that the people that lubri-
cated those revolutions and uprisings were the ancestors of the same
ones we have as elites of the country now.
From now on we will see how power has been used by the elites in
government, under different disguises, in order to keep their
entrenchment in politics, in social life, and in the economic sectors
of my country. In this case, the land ownership problem, we will
see how different gadgets, civil wars, laws, counterlaws, time,
promises, fictitious agrarian reform, follow one after the other in
an interminable succession during the present century, in order to
perpetuate the power of the elites.
The Twentieth Century.
Let us go on then, with the account of how the elites in government
have completely disregarded the misery of the peasants and workers
during this century, and how they have reacted to the needs of the
people.
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In 1928, there was a strike at the United Fruit Company, because of
the miserable working conditions and economic extortions of the
company to the workers. The government, faithful to the United Fruit
Company, sent the soldiers to force the peasants to work, and as they
refused, to assassinate the miserable workers. Hirschman doubts the
number of people killed on that occasion; he agrees with the number
of one hundred killed given by Robert J. Alexander in his book,
Communism in Latin America,9 because he says that that number is like
the one which appeared in the newspapers. But we cannot forget that
the government was trying to hide the real numbers of the massacre and
that the newspapers in Colombia belong to the minorities in govern-
10
ment. V. L. Fluharty, in Dance of the Millions, gives as the number
fourteen hundred people killed and seven thousand wounded in that
assassination made by the government of Colombia. We cannot forget
either that the Army of my country was ordered at that time to do
agricultural work for the United Fruit Company to replace the workers.
And what was happening in the countryside in the thirties? The big
depression was going on, and we do know very well how depressions hit
on underdeveloped countries and we do know very well who is hit the
hardest in those countries: the workers and the peasants. The land-
less peasants were being beaten and chased like rats, by the police,
9. Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, Rutgers
University Press, New Brunswick, New York, 1957, p. 245.
10. V. L. Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1957, p. 37.
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the army, and the economic phenomenon they could not understand.
They started getting inside lands with absentee landlords and started
seizing them. For these miserable men, it was a question of deciding
between the "rights" of the fat landlords in the capital, or their
lives. And as those peasants working in the lands with permission of
the landlords were not permitted to have their own crops, but had to
give their work for miserable salaries to the lords, they fought back
the lords. And the government saw the danger inside these class con-
flicts and became aware, because this was dangerous for the interests
of the lords in government.
We have then, the Minister of Industry, Francisco Jose Chaux, saying
to the lords: "This torment of Tantalus which consists in always
harvesting the coffee of someone else without ever being able to
look forward to having one's own trees is bound gradually to affect
the psychology of the peasants. Generation after generation, the
possibility of improving their own and their children's economic and
social position through profitable seedling plantings has been before
their eyes but has been foreclosed by a prohibition which their con-
science is unable to understand and which makes their life and that
of their families insecure."1 1 But the landlords, with private
armies, killed the peasants, and appropriated their crops, and burnt
their houses; the peasants always fought their way back to the land.
And then, what did the government do?
11. Albert Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress, Studies of Economic
Policy Making in Latin America, Anchor Books, New York, 1965,
p. 143.
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This is the first step of those which Hirschman calls pacific and
evolutionary ones that the government of Colombia has taken to duck
the storms: it passed through Congress a radical law apparently
favoring the peasants in land disputes: the Law 200 of 1936.
As we saw in the introduction of the problem by Hirschman, great
quantities of this land held by the absentee lords could not be
defended as their property as it was taken by them from public pro-
perty lands and appropriated to themselves. The government,
remembering the old Spanish law, in this new law said that farms had
to be given an economic use in order to be held a private property.
And that the government could expropriate lands for public benefit.
The government then tried to make it difficult for landlords to
evict squatters, and in some instances bought land from the lords
and gave it to the peasants, and it said that private lands held
uncultivated for ten years would be expropriated. (Afterwards they
extended this period to fifteen years and finally they forgot about
the whole thing.)
This is how the government ducked the storm in 1936. But, we ask
ourselves, how did the Congress, part of that traditionalist Colombian
government, pass this radical law? Evolutionary pacific change?
Hirschman himself says: "As the landowning interests were always
generously represented in Congress, it may be surprising that the
law... Two elements conspired to force action. One was the anarchic
situation in the countryside and the fear of the owners that they
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would entirely lose control over their properties."12 He cites as
the other factor the abilities of the president. No doubt of that.
And how did the "landowning interests" always generously represented
in Congress duck the storm in 1936? Hirschman answers: "It is this
unforeseen effect of the law which has been described everywhere in
the subsequent literature on the subject: how the landowners expelled
tenants, burned their houses, replaced labor intensive crops by
cattle-grazing, hired only unmarried laborers for short periods and
housed them communally instead of giving them individual plots, and
so on...Thus the law had resourcefully attacked the problem of
unutilized land at the cost of making that of the underutilized
hacienda more untractable: the best lands of the country remained
firmly devoted to extensive cattle-grazing...in the Valle del Cauca,
one of Colombia's most fertile provinces, it used to be said that
only three lines of business promise success: (1) well-administered
cattle ranching, (2) poorly-administered cattle ranching, and
(3) cattle ranching without administration.,13
Moreover, as soon as-the worst of the storm seemed to be passing away,
the landlords in 1944 passed a law, Law 100, which reinvindicated
their rights, because certainly Law 200 of 1936 was an escape-law, a
duck-law, and now the time had come to turn around. Let us have
12. Ibid., p. 148.
13. Ibid., pp. 155 and 157.
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Hirschman: "An important concession was made to a long-disputed
claim of the landowners: the tenant was told that, in the absence
of explicit permission, he had no right to grow tree crops or other
perennials on his plot but only annual plants; if he grew such for-
bidden fruit he made himself subject to immediate eviction."
Here in this law was also included the article giving the landlords
five years more of time, lengthening their ten-year term established
in 1936 for cultivating their land once. As Hirschman very politely
puts it: "These were signals that times and power relationships had
changed." 15
Then it came 1948: the year in which Bogota was burned down on
April 9, two thousand dead and riots, when a populist leader,
Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, was assassinated. Once more the lords were in
action; this was the year in which what is called "The Violence"
started. Frantz Fanon, in "The Wretched of the Earth,' has written
of a parallel kind of conflict in colonial countries, where the people
from the colonist countries are the formal rulers; before the natives
have a clear conscience of what is happening to them, and before they
can recognize clearly the oppressor, as hunger and misery become so
acute, and as their dispair grows and each day is more terrible, they
start killing among themselves. In Colombia, as the peasants had not
14. Ibid., p. 158.
15. Ibid., p. 158.
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recognized their oppressors, and as they followed their oppressors'
commands, commands that were always given legitimacy by order of the
law, or the church, or the army, or the president, or the landlords,
and as the landlords of the country started fighting (orally) among
themselves for the spoils of the country, the peasants following the
landlords' commands started killing among themselves. Two hundred
thousand people were killed reckoning from 1948 till the beginning
of the sixties.16
They are still in power and have not paid for this crime. For the
people who read this paper, as for myself, the idea of having to go
on living in a "country" with these conditions must be repugnant; to
go on keeping our cold blood, and our objectivity, and our scholarism,
as a means to not engage ourselves in a fight for these miserable
peasants.
Let us go now to the subsequent period of the land history of
Colombia, from 1948 to 1960. As we saw before, with the peasants
being engaged in this civil war, and the landlords expelling them
from their farms, the country's huge bureaucracy wouldn't be able to
survive for a long time. As the country's process of inflation was
an accelerated one, and huge amounts of the food for the country had
to be imported because the lands were kept idle, the regime looked
for foreign advisors this time, in order to find the ways of ducking
the storm once more.
16. See: Guzman, et al., La Violencia en Colombia, Tercer Mundo, ed.,
Bogota, 1964, two volumes.
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And now that I am talking about inflation, one of the biggest ferments
of the Colombian economy, I want to transcribe here Mr. Hirschman's
findings, about the ways economists of Latin America look at this
problem with a very different approach than the one the International
Monetary Fund has imposed in Latin America for many years, attempting
to end inflationary processes in our countries through fiscal disci-
pline, bank credit restrictions, and salary freezings. The Latin
American economists, independent ones, see this problem as resulting
from the very basic economic relations of our societies: the land
problem being the main one. Their theory, called structuralist, is
revised by Mr. Hirschman in his findings about Chile:
The structural factors are essentially conceived to be
the following:
a. the low productivity of agriculture and
its lack of response to economic incentives
due to the latifundio pattern of ownership;
as a result, industrialization and urbani-
zation tend to lead to rising food prices;
b. the tendency to a deterioration in the
terms of trade which derives from the fact
that demand for imports (of equipment, semi-
manufactures and food) increases faster in
a country like Chile (N.B., or Colombia) as
development proceeds than does foreign demand
for its exports; this results in a tendency
for the price for imported goods to rise,
usually as a result of devaluation;
c. sometimes, the uneven distribution of
income is designated as a further structural
factor. It is argued that, instead-of
higher savings and investment, this distri-
bution leads to continuous pressures against
the two critical shortage areas: food con-
sumption on the part of the bulk of the
population and foreign exchange demands on
the part of Latin America's rich with their
weak stay-or-reinvest-at-home propensities.
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These structural factors exert upward pressures on the
prices of specific but important groups of commodities.
The pressures are then validated by the extension of
bank credit and permitted to affect the general price
level, and they are further amplified and perpetuated
by wage and salary adjustments and consequent fiscal
deficits. The later elements of the process make up
the "propagating" factors, one might say the super-
ficial as opposed to the fundamental underlying
structural ones.
Attempts to hold down the expansion of the money supply'
through bank credit restrictions, fiscal discipline,
or wage and salary stops, are in this view directed
"merely" at the symptoms of the disease, not at its
real cause. They may do more harm than good because,
with the structural factors continuing to exert their
influence on the price level, a decision not to validate
these pressures can lead to a decline in growth, output,
employment -- and to serious trouble in the streets.
...It should be noted that the structuralist critique
of the traditional "monetary discipline" is quite
different from the one that views inflation as the con-
sequence of the struggleof different social groups for
ever longer slices of the social product. Those who
hold this "sociological" view concede that inflation
would stop if the increase in monetary supply and
income could be restrained; but they point out to the
innocent foreign adviser that this is a taller order
than he realizes, that inflation results not merely
from irresponsible profligacy, from some isolated
failure of will power, but represents the difficult-
to-change outcome of group attitudes and conflicts.
The structuralist on the other hand affirms that, to
eliminate inflation, not only attitudes, ut basic
economic relationships must be altered.
And at that time in Colombia the regime, in economic trouble, sought
the help of foreign advisors. In 1949 the "World Bank Mission"
headed by Lauchlin Currie concluded that "the way in which agricul-
tural activities were carried on in Colombia were both absurd and
17. Albert Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress, Studies of Economic
Policy Making in Latin America, Anchor Books, New York, 1965,
p. 283, etc.
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unjust: ... land use follows an unusual pattern. As a rule the fertile
level valleys are used mostly for grazing, while the steep mountainside
slopes are cultivated...the cattle fatten on the plains while the
people often have to struggle for a bare existence in the hills."18
And then, these foreign advisors proposed a series of tax reforms that
would oblige the big landowners to cultivate their land or to sell it.
But once more, it was proved to be a utopia, to try to have the govern-
ment implementing hard measures against the landlords; the reason now
was the absence of sound cadastral surveys of the country which could
be used as a base for tax accounts.
In 1951, two U.N. experts tried to help and found the same problem:
the difficulties with the cadastral surveys. Hirschman says:
...the task of making such a survey and of estimating the
fair market value of every farm is a most difficult one
for an underdeveloped country where land is privately owned.
It presupposes a large corps of well-trained surveyors who
are incorruptible and courageous and a legislature that is
willing to make adequate appropriations for this work.
Moreover, it requires either an absence of inflation or
frequent revisions through re-surveys or escalator devices.
Rapid economic development and urbanization also affect
land values profoundly and differentially. Thus, in Colombia,
a country with powerful landowners (including not only the
haciendados but the numerous and politically influential
owners of middle-sized and small coffee farms), weak local
administration, considerable inflation and rapid economic
development, the establishment of realistic land values
for the whole country through cadastral surveys has long
been unattainable.
18. Ibid., p. 161.
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This is a most serious conclusion for it appears to rule
out the use of taxation as a means of coaxing landowners
into making full use of their land and therewith the
gradual, peaceful solution of the problem of under-
utilized latifundios.19
Here we see now Mr. Hirschman's chips going a little down in front of
the problems he was observing, and in spite of his general frame of
thought.
1953: Colombia under a military dictatorship. The Minister of Finance,
Carlos Villaveces, gave two decrees; one of them was Article 20 of
Decree 2317 of 1953, ordering the automatic upward valuation of all
assessments in accordance with the rise in the cost of living from the
date of the last assessment. The other one, in 1954, provided "that
the values of landed properties were to be set from now on by declara-
tions of the owners themselves to municipal cadastral committees. The
decree contained the threat that the value declared by the owner would
be the basis for payment by the state should the property at any time
come to be expropriated." 2 0
And, customarily, nothing happened.
Let us see Hirschman:
The idea of enforcing honesty through the threat of
expropriation at the self-assessed value is ancient. But
like the threat of future expropriation of Law 200, it
did not work, in both cases because of what our atomic
strategists call the lack of credibility of the threat.
When, as had long been the rule in Colombia, the state
19. Ibid., p. 167.
20. Ibid., p. 169. 
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has to pay cash for expropriated property, its ability
to acquire large tracts of land, even at bargain prices
is strictly limited and it is naive to suppose that the
landowners do not know this. Moreover, the individual
landowner is likely to rate as low the probability that
the government will single him out -- and, anyway, he has
a good, well-connected lawyer friend in Bogota -- so why
worry? 21
Then another foreign mission, in 1956, by the International Bank, and
the overthrowing of the military dictatorship in 1957, being replaced
by a military junta for a year. Now we have Decree 290 of 1957. A
complicated one, using land taxation as an instrument for agrarian
reform.
Now Hirschman says:
The heart of the decree was the requirement that certain
minimum percentages of these lands were to be cultivated...
Application of Decree 290 thus required first a classifi-
cation of farmlands and farms into the four land categories
and, secondly, a yearly inspection to ascertain whether the
various percentage requirements were satisfied. The measure
was obviously and utterly unworkable, far more so than the
Currie proposal which had been extensively criticized for
its lack of attention to the "ambiente." Clearly the
occasional passing of unworkable laws is very much part
and parcel of the ambiente and perhaps the foreign expert
only shows he is becoming assimilated when he takes part
in the game. 22
A more important reason for the lack of decisive and
consistent action was that everything depended in the end
on the quality of the cadastral survey or of some other
method of classifying and surveying land and land values.
It is perhaps the feeling that a realistic survey is
beyond hope that accounts for the byzantine discussions
21. Ibid., p. 169.
22. Ibid., p. 174.
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about various schemes, all of which are worthless without
good survey work. A typical vicious circle is faced here:
land taxation is ineffective without realistic land
values, yet the administrative effort needed to make a
reliable survey will hardly be forthcoming unless the
prospective yield of land taxation makes such an effort
worthwhile for the national authorities.. .23
...inadequate production and unnecessary agricultural
imports came to be gradually superceded as a principal
cause for concern by the continued low income, depressed
social status and unrest of the large mass of Colombia's
campesino population...24
. .The Colombian experience is by no means unique. Whatever
redistributive effects progressive income taxation has had
in the advanced industrial countries has been a by-product
rather than the primary motive. The latter was supplied by
some compelling need to increase revenue, usually during
wartime. External war, or the threat of war, is thus fre-
quently the condition for achieving a peaceful redistribution
of income within the country. Without such an external
threat and the consequent imperious need to increase total
expenditures, redistribution is far more likely to take place
directly, i.e., through the have-nots seizing the belongings
of the haves, than indirectly through taxation of the rich. 25
Besides this expensive wasting of precious time for the country spent
in passing all those laws for laughing and ducking at the unrest of
the poor people, the elites in government intended three times during
these years, to try to calm the hunger of the people with token coloni-
zation projects that as usual imposed serious sacrifices on the miserable,
but none on the rich. Let us see what Hirschman says:
A few colonies were established in the late twenties and
in the thirties with financing provided on an ad hoc basis
by the national budget and official credit institutions.
23. Ibid., p. 183.
24. Ibid., p. 178.
25. Ibid., p. 187.
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But the first ambitious effort in this field was
undertaken in May 1948 only four weeks after the
Bogota riots, with the establishment of an Institute
of Colonization, Parcelization and Forest Defense.
This action was one among several almost reflex-like
reactions to that sudden and awesome explosion of mass
violence. However, the outbreak was so extraordinary
that it was soon dismissed as an inexplicable accident;
this is perhaps the reason why it failed to lead to a
continuing active search for ways of relieving social
tensions in the country...
... The Institute of Colonization, once established
with the usual fanfare, was left to lead a rather
wretched existence, lacking both adequate financing
and personnel. Its principal activity was not in
colonization, but rather in "parcelization," i.e., in
the subdividing of privately held lands that were
already under some sort of cultivation or use.. .26
In 1953, under the military dictatorship, in order to appease the
hunger, a new "Institute of Colonization and Immigration" was created.
Under inexperienced management, with hardly any prior
study, the Institute plunged into several colonization
ventures, built airstrips, bought machinery to set up
sawmills, brought volunteer settlers to work poor soils
in inhospitable climates and...met with total disaster. 27
In 1959, under the first government of the actual National Front,
another colonization program under the management of the Caja Agraria,
was created.
The law was entitled "Parcelization Law," probably because
of the bad name the Rojas Pinilla regime had managed to
give to programs of colonization; the latter were clearly
included among the activities to be engaged in. As under
Rojas Pinilla, one of the principal purposes of the Caja's
26. Ibid., p. 188.
27. Ibid., p. 189.
colonization efforts was to resettle peasant families
that had been displaced by countryside violence and
guerrilla warfare and were living wretchedly as refugees
in provincial towns. Several colonization centers were
established in widely separated and outlying locations;
and the limitations and unanticipated difficulties of
this kind of effort soon became apparent once again.
The Caja avoided the reckless expenditures which had
characterized the Rojas Pinilla ventures, but as a
banking institution it committed the opposite mistake;
it aspired to set up the colonies as a fully reimbursable
basis, by apportioning its basic investments in roads and
services among the individual settlers. This policy led
to difficulties with existing and potential settlers and
the new colonization effort soon bogged down; the total
number of families that was settled from 1959 on did not
exceed 1,000 when in 1962 the Caja decided to abandon its
colonization activities... 28
And that is all for this period. The landlords and the oligarchs had
succeeded once more in temporarily ducking the storms.
And then 1958, the year when the National Front was organized -- a
division of the country between the two traditional parties' leaders,
that, since 1948, had been directing the killings among peasants. And
then in 1959, the takeover of Castro in Cuba and the fast agrarian and
urban reforms there. That factor, plus the hunger of the peasants of
Colombia, the fact that the elites in Colombia had proposed almost every
reform on earth without accomplishing it, and the hurried Alliance for
Progress in 1961 in front of the coming danger of more revolutions, all
led the elites in power to decree in 1961, in December, the law of
"Social Agrarian Reform" in Colombia.
28. Ibid., p. 190.
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This was recognized by Mr. Hirschman, with good faith, but with very
few precautions in front of the precedent periods of irresponsible
ducking of the reforms by the oligarchs, as a very advanced step of
change, pacific change by evolution. But wouldn't I be justified in
calling it better, "hurried proposals for change in front of a real
revolution"? *
We cannot believe that the leaders had changed their minds, from one
day to the other, and that now change was being implemented in
Colombia, from above, from the enlightened leaders.
My point goes further. I want to demonstrate that the "Social Agrarian
Reform" is another farce, and that it is being used as a facade for the
minorities in power to escape the rage of the people once more. I will
demonstrate that the problem of land tenure is many times worse now
than when the Alliance for Progress and the Social Agrarian Reform
started.
Hirschman says:
...it had become increasingly clear that the conversion of
some grazing lands to mechanized crop production, which was
one of the principal objectives and likely results of the
various tax schemes, would do little t6 improve the lot of
the mass of Colombia's rural population. As we have noted,
this conversion had been proceeding apace in some areas
during the late fifties; yet the levels of living in the
traditional mountarisnous areas of settlement had rather
deteriorated because of the natural increase in population
and the consequent further splitting up of already
uneconomically small holdings, because of the drop in
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world coffee prices, and because of the long-continued
and widespread insecurity and violence. 29
Although I do not care too much anymore about the causes for the passing
of the Social Agrarian Reform, I would like to bring Hirschman's
reasonings in here:
1. Social unrest in the countryside resulting from
living conditions acutely felt as intolerable is con-
tinuously signalled by spontaneous internal migrations
of landless peasants, by frequent seizures of land by
squatters, and by the ease with which guerrilla bands
find recruits.
2. Economic policy-makers facing inflationary pressures
and balance-of-payments deficits cannot help noticing
that low agricultural production and productivity share
in the blame for both these recurrent difficulties. 30
Let us see how the problem has developed since 1961. At this point we
will get for a moment into some statistics that will substantiate more
our discussion.
Colombian Natural Resources. Land.
Colombian geography is very important for understanding the actual
population distribution and land cultivated areas.
In the included maps we can observe where the people live and which
are the unexploited regions of the country. The size of the country
is 440,000 square miles.
29. Ibid., p. 192.
30. Ibid., p. 209.
The mountain chaines, the rivers' directions, and the altitude above
the sea level have determined certain regions of Colombia to hold the
actual population, and others which are by now just jungle.
Colombia may be divided into five natural regions:
(1.) The Caribbean region of flat land, and cattle raising,
and
(2.) the Andean region of high mountains and valleys of
cereal production are the most populated regions.
The Caribbean region has 17 percent of the national population and the
Andean 80 percent. All the rivers of these regions go to the Atlantic
Ocean.
The other three regions are:
(1.) The Pacific region: practically jungle with certain
scattered mine exploitations and one of the highest rain
precipitation levels in the world; the rivers of this
region go to the Pacific. It has two percent of the popu-
lation.
(2.) The Amazonian region with all the rivers going to
the Amazonas, and the lands are jungles where only 75,000
"civilized" men inhabit. I do not have data about the
indigenous population in any of the regions of the country.
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(3.) The Orinoquia region of flat lands, which rivers
go to the Orinoco and have floods every year, it has
one percent of the population (200,000 people).
Population and Climate.
Colombian climate varies according with the sea level, which makes the
kinds of cultives vary according with these changes in temperature and
altitude. We can divide the Colombian climate variations into four
categories which can be appreciated in the geographic map included
before:
(1.) Hot climate: from +0 to 3,000 feet of altitude
and with an average temperature of 75 F. In this
climate lives 40 percent of the population and repre-
sents 80 percent of the land.
(2.) Warm climate: from 3,000 to 6,000 feet with
an average temperature of 62.6 F. It has 9 percent
of the land and 37 percent of the population.
(3.) Cold climate: from 6,000 to 9,000 feet and
a temperature average of 53.6 F. It has 9 percent
of the area and 22.5 percent of the population.
(4.) Freezing climate: from 9,000 to near 19,000
feet and with temperatures under 53 F. In its
lowest level lives 0.5 of the population and it
includes 2 percent of the land.
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Land Use.
In Colombia, under the present circumstances of technological
development, land use is determined by the actual state of the soils.
In the populated regions, Andean and Caribbean, studies indicate
that more than 50 percent of the land is good for agriculture now.
(CIDA, P. 18) But in a recent land use census in 1960, only 16
percent of the potential land was under cultives, the rest was with
cattle (CIDA, p. 17); 84%of the potential productive land was for
grazing. This data is without considering the non-populated regions,
Orinoquia, Amazonas, and Pacific, that the country for geography,
climate, and deficiencies in capital investment is not able to exploit
under the present circumstances. In total, the country is exploiting
now in cultives, 4.5 of the national territory.
People in Agriculture.
The high proportion of people who live from agriculture are indicated
in the next table from 1960:
Agricultural Population
Region Pop. Percent Percent Percent
000's Total Active
Caribbean 11,949 83.5 6,400 82 2150 81.1
Andean 2,365 16.5 1,400 17.9 500 18.9
14,314 100. 7,900 100. 2,650 100.
Source: CIDA, p. 28.
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We can see in this table that half of the population of Colombia works
in agriculture. With respect to the population in the countryside, we
have to notice that the active population with respect to the total of
the campesino population is rather high by Colombian standards, because
Ramiro Cardona in Marginados UrbanosAl states that a Colombian worker
must sustain himself and three people more, while in an industrialized
country, a worker must sustain himself and less than another person
more. But with the low productivity of the Colombian agriculture,
these higher standards of occupation of agriculture, let us say when
compared with industry, only represent the high underemployment rates
in this activity.
The 7,900,000 people in the countryside form 1,370,000 families.
Land Ownership.
Land ownership embodies one of the most tremendous sicknesses of my
country. I have done for the present work a rather complete study
of land ownership in my country, with the help of Professor Rodwin
of MIT. The main resource of data has been a study of the CIDA,3 2
from 1966, and now I will try to resume here the main problems I found.
31. Ramiro Cardona, Marginados Urbanos, Tercer Mundo, Suplemento 50,
Decembre 68, Bogota, p. 3.
32. CIDA: Interamerican Committee for Agricultural Development,
Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., 1966.
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Land Use Classifications.
First of all, CIDA people making the work realized that the Caribbean
region has lower productivity than the Andean per unit of land; they
have classified the lands giving different extensions for both regions
in order to equiparate the differences in production, because the
landlords in the Caribbean do not care about irrigation and have lower
production. It does not imply that the Andean landlords care more, but
that they probably have more rains; in fact, pluviometric studies indi-
cate that 68 percent of the Caribbean and 90 percent of the Andean
regions receive enough rain. I do not agree with this arbitrary
classification, but I will use it for the present study, in absence of
better data; the next is the land classification we will use in the
study:
Farm Classes Andean Region Caribbean Region
1. Subfamiliar less than 5 hectares less than 10 hectares
2. Familiar from 5 to 50 hectares from 10 to 100 hectares
3. Multifamiliar-medium from 50 to 200 from 100 to 500
4. Multifamiliar-big over 200 over 500
Source: CIDA, p. 5.
The land ownership problem is very difficult to understand, because
if we look at the censuses of land in Colombia, over 1,370,000 agri-
cultural families in the Andean and Caribbean regions, (97 percent of
33. CIDA, p. 15.
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the total agricultural population of the country) "only" 175,000
agricultural families did not have land. But other things happen;
let us see this table of agricultural families according to land
extension that follows.
In this first table, we can identify how many agricultural families
hold the land, by size of the plots, in the two main regions; but
in order to analyze the problem a little, if we look at the next
table, Table B, we will find something which in the first table was not
indicated -- the effective land ownership of land occupied -- and we need
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Table A
COLOMBIA: DISTRIBUCION DE LAS FAMILIAS AGRICOLAS EN LA ESCALA
DE TENENCIA POR REGIONES, 1960
Escala de Region Andin.a Regin Caribe Total Colombia
renencia Miles Por- Miles Por- Miles Por-
ciento ciento ciento
Productores:
Multi-familiares 12 1,1 2 0,8 15 1,1
grandes
Multi-familiares
medianos 41 3,8 12 4,5 54 4,0
Familiares 317 28,9 44 16,0 361 26,3
Sub-familiares 644 58,9 121 44,1 765 55,8
Administradores y
trabajadores sinjierra 8o 7,3 95 34,6 175 12,8
T 0 T A L l095 1000 274 loo 130 100
Ftente: CIDA basado parcialmente en DANE (1962; 1954).
Nota: Los parciales no suman a los totales por razones de redondeo.
I
Table B
COLONBIAs DISTRIBUCION DB LA POBLACION AGRICOLA EN LA ESCALA DE T2EEUCIA
Fans14ma Poblaci~a Agricola
Ncaleares A T t i 
_ a T o t a l
Escala de Tenencia Por- Por- Por-
l ento Miles ciento Miles i
ultifamiliar Grande
Propietaries
Arrendatarios a/
Ocupantes
Otros
Sub-Total
Multifamiliar Mediana
Propietarios
Arrendatarios a/
Ocupantes
Otros
Sub-Total
Familiares
Propietarios
Arrendatarios a/
ocupantes
Otros
Sub-Total
Sub-Pamiliares
Propietarios
Arrendatarios a/
Ocupantes
Otros
Sub-Total
"Administradores" do Finoas
Multifamiliares
"Administradores" do Fincas
Familiares y Sub-amiliares
11,1
0,9
1,7
1,0
39,1
4,1
6,5
3,9
0,8
0,1
0,1
0,1
1,1
2,9
0,3
0,5
0,3
22,2
1,7
3,4
2,1
29,4
78,2
8,2
13,0
7,8
4,0 107,2
244,7
56,6
17,5
41,7
17,9
4,1
1,3
3,0
360,5 26,3
454,1
214,0
17,9
79,0
33,2
15,6
1,3
5,8
489,4
113,2
35,0
83,4
0,8
0,1
0,1
0,1
65,9
5,0
10,2
6,3
0,8
0,1
0,1
0#l
1,1 87,4 1,1
3,0
0,3
0,5
0,3
4,1
18,5
4,3
1,3
3,1
23195
24,5
38,6
23,3
3,0
0,3
0,5
0,3
317,9 4,1
1.456,2
338.3
10303
248,8
18,7
4,3
1,3
3,2
721,0 27,2 2.146,6 27,5
908,2
428,0
35,8
158,0
16,1
1,3
6,0
2.703,4
1.271,0
104,3
469,8
34,7
16,3
1,3
6,0
765,0 55,9 1.530,0 57,7 4.548,5 58,3
20,8
Trabajadores sin Tierra 118,4
TOTA6L8
1,5
2,6
31,2
53,7
8,6 177,5
1,2
2,0
6,7
83,2 1,1
343,2 1,8
473,6 6,1
7 800i 100 022t2 2d210 =020
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Fuente, CIDA, basado en los resultados del Conso Ag1opouarie do 1960. Vkse mtodoli-m
gia en el Ap6ndice Metodol6gico L-1.1.
a/ Incluye a los arrendatarios (pago fijo en efectivo o ospeoie), a los aparoeros,
y a otros arreglos do arriendo. Estas oategorlas son detalladas en el Cuadro 11-22.
it, to know how the real conditions of ownership are. This table is
interesting although it is expressed in terms of a differential farm
extension appreciation. Now, with this table of agricultural popula-
tion distribution, accordingly with land extension of the farms and
ownership rates, we can analyze case by case:
Case A: Multifamiliar Big Farms.
Accordingly with Table B numbers and Table A percentages of farm by
region, +12,500 of these 14,700 farms are of more than 200 hectares
and they are in the Andean region; and +2,700 farms are bigger than
500 hectares and they are in the Caribbean region.
These 14,700 farms, represent 1.1 percent of the number of farms and
they are worked by 11,000 landlords and 3,600 with rented land. The
extension of land these farms represent will be given afterwards.
Case B: Multifamiliar Medium.
Of the 53,600 farms in this category, 41,000 have between 50 and 200
hectares, and are in the Andean Region; and there are 12,600 farms,
between 100 and 500 hectares and they are located in the Caribbean
region.
The 53,600 farms represent 4 percent of the number of farms and they
are worked by 39,100 landlords and 14,500 families without the land.
-58-
Case C: Familiar Farms.
Of the 360,500 farms, 317,000 are between 5 and 50 hectares, they are
in the Andean region; and 43,500 between 10 and 100 hectares, and they
are in the Caribbean region.
The 360,500 farms represent 26.3 percent of the number of farms and
they are worked by 244,000 peasant owners and 158,800 families without
any land.
Case D: Subfamiliar Farms.
Of the 765,000 farms, 644,000 were less than 5 hectares in the Andean
region, and 121,000 farms less than 10 hectares in the Caribbean
region.
These 765,000 farms represent 55.9 percent of the number of farms and
they are worked by 454,000 peasant owners and 310,000 families without
any land.
Land Dispossessed People.
It is now not very difficult for us, to know how many families out of
the 1,368,000 agricultural ones, do not possess the land they work or,
if they possess it, it is so little that they have a starving life:
I will take them from this CIDA study; the estimative data they hold,
do not include rich entrepreneurs with rented land, as dispossessed
people:
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765,000 Subfamiliar, families operating with too little land
118,000 Working families without land
133,000 Arrendatarios, ocupantes and others, in multifamiliar
big and medium, and familiar farms
35,000 Administrators of familiar and subfamiliar farms
1,051,000 Families without land, of 1.368.000 agricultural
families
Source: CIDA, Table B.
This data represents more than 40 percent of the national population
and more than 76 percent of those families who earn their living from
agriculture. This data will increase with the natural growth of the
population, and in 1970, I have calculated we will have more than
7 million people without land, or 1,300,000 families.
Farm Size.
If we want to know what is the size of the farms, we have to see the
cadastral data for Colombia, which is in Table C., and some new data
received for landlords with farms of more than 2000 hectares that the
Agrarian Reform Institute asked of them with some threats in 1963.
These demonstrated that landowners with more than 2000 hectares were
smuggling more than 5,000,000 hectares from taxation. So, if we look
at Table C, we will find the apparent number and size of all farms in
Colombia. But after the Institute asked all those owners of farms
bigger than 2000 hectares to declare their properties, we found the
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Table C
COLOMBIA: NUMERO, SUPERFICIE Y AVALUO DE LOS PREDIOS CATASTRALES POR GRUPOS DE TAMANO0
Avalfio Catastral
Grupos do Predios Catastrales Superfoie. Catastral To t a 1 Promedios
Tamano Par Por
(HPtireas) Par-Pr- Par- (en miles Por- Predio Hootirea(Nmero oento Heotireas ciento do pesos) ciento (en pesos) (on pesos)
Menores do 0,5 292.679 20,40 51.894 0,24 435.855 3,35 1.500 8.400
Do 0,5 a 1 186.513 13,00 120.405 0,55 317.083 2,44 1.700 2.600
Do 1 a 2 254.935 17,73 324.338 1,48 610.938 4,70 2.400 1.900
Do 2 a 3 135.327 9,40 297.811 1,34 460.791 3,55 3.400 1.500
Do 3 a 4 93.291 6,50 299.555 1,36 428.186 3,30 4.600 1.400
Do 4 a 5 57.828 4,00 239.030 1,10 294.782 2,27 5.100 1.200
Do 5 a 10 148.312 10,30 976.876 4,46 1.140.877 8,78 7.700 1.200
Do 10 a 20 101.831 7,08 1.350.382 6,16 1.277.025 9,83 12.500 950
Do 20 a 30 43.545 3,03 1.001.089 4,57 769.804 5,92 17.700 800
De 30 a 40 26.439 1,84 867.662 3,96 579.427 4,46 21.900 700
De 40 a 50 17.245 1,20 734.425 3,35 470.509 3,62 27.300 650
De 50 a 100 39.598 2,75 2.623.309 12,00 1.426.106 10,98 36.000 550
Do 100 -a 200 21.670 1,50 2.860.004 13,05 1.382.581 10,64 63.800 500
De 200 a 300 7.665 0,53 1.777.606 8,11 777.461 6,00 101.400 450
Do 300 a 400 3.582 0,25 1.173.325 5,36 530.536 4,10 148.100 450
Do 400 a 500 2,009 0,14 854.896 3,90 348.652 2,67 173.500 400
De 500 a 1.000 3.217 0,22 2.155.092 9.84 899.932 6,92 279.700 400
Do 1.000 a 2.500 1.322 0,10 1.859.999' 8,50 552.184 4,25 417.700 300
Do 2.500 a 5.000 334 0,02 1.677.715 7,65 273.197 2,10 817.900 160
Mayores do 5.000 68 0,005 662.562 3,02 15.891 0,12 233.700 20
T 0 T A L 1 10,0 6000 2097.97 1000 129918 00 00 ,go040 
Puente: INCORA, basado en datos del Instituto Geogrifico "Agustin Codazzi* (febrero do 1963).
a/ Datos para 723 municipios sobre un total de 837 en los departamentose.
next additional data, Table D, which gives us the data about the
farms they were smuggling from taxation.
Then, for a final account of farm size and its relation to farm number,
we replace the data from Table C with the data from Table D in the
space for farms from 2,500 to 5,000 hectares and bigger than 5,000.
There is an overlap because Table D starts counting from 2,000 hectares
of extension, while Table C does it from 2,000 on; but I do not think
it makes a big difference, because the average extension in Table D
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Table D
COLOMBIA: PROPIETARIOS Y SUPERFICIE DE PREDIOS MAYORES DE
2.o000 HECTAREAS, SEGUN DECLARACIONES RECIBIDAS EN INCORA, 1962
Categorias de Tamaflo Propietarios Superficie Total Promedio
(Hectareas) (Nuimero) (HectAreas) (HectAreas)
De 2ooo a 5.000 433 1.297.416 2.996
De 5.000 a 10.000 ioo 756.566 7.566
De 10.000 a 20.000 50 720.193 14.403
De 20.000 a 50.000 30 931.774 31.059
De 50.000 y mas 23 3.368.121 146.440
T 0 T A L E S 6X 7.o2Zo
INCORA. (Divisi6n
Apendice P-9) .
Nota: Se ha excluido al Choc6 de la lista de las declaraciones.
I~
Fuente: CIDA basado en las listas suministradas por
de 'Control y Uso de la Tierra, vease Cuadro
for farms from 2000 to 5000 hectares is 2996, which is appreciably
higher than the limit of 2,500 in Table C.
Summarizing from this cadastral table we can
farm size property in Colombia:
Farm Size Number
From 0 to 5 hectares 1,020,500
5 to 50 337,372
50 to 200 61,268
200 & over 18,431
Percent
71.03
23.45
4.25
1.1
1,437,644
continue defining the
Extension
(hectares)
1,333,043
4,930,434
5,483,313
14,894,988
26,641,768
% of the
agricultural
'land
5.0
18.5
20.9
55.6
Now we can see the land problem in Colombia in a very simple way:
.71.3 percent of the agricultural people occupy 5 percent of the land,
and 1.1 percent, the landowners, own 55.6 percent of the land, and
there are 1,051,000 out of 1,368,000 agricultural families without
land.
While the masses live like rats, the lords divide the country among
themselves. Now we have seen in cold statistics, in what terms the
land problem stands in Colombia. The problem has arrived to this
point after the many reforms we saw before. But behind this cold
statistical data stands hunger and despair, and many powerless and
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resented human beings. Let us see now, what this new and radical
promise, the Social Agrarian Reform, has meant to the peasants of
my country.
The Social Agrarian Reform.
I have made a rather complete study of this institution we have in
Colombia.
It is the impression of very authorized observers and mine also, that
Colombia has, after Cuba, the most radical law of agrarian reform
these years; the big difference is that the Cuban law of agrarian
reform is of an imperative type, meanwhile the Colombian one is of
a permissive type; one is an instrument of the capitalists and oli-
garchs in power to send a smoke curtain over the problems of the
country, while the other one has had a real effect for the whole
country of Cuba.
There have been studies about the different possibilities of
modification of land tenure patterns in Colombia. Many people
argued in favor of colonization of new lands, but recent appraisals
indicate:
1. the high degree of difficulties of massive movements
of people to new areas in the country;
2. that the land in actual use, if done in a technical
way, could produce to give perfect nutrition to more
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than twice the actual population of the country;
3. the very high costs in building infrastructures
in new lands, far from the populated areas;
4. the knowledge that most of the actual lands
without colonization are thus faraway from the
actual technical knowledge and economic possibili-
ties of the country to dominate the environment;
5. the greed of the lords would obstruct any
"national policy" of colonization that were not
for their direct benefit and we know that this is
not possible. Another answer is agrarian reform.
Agrarian Reform Orientation.
The crucial orientation the agrarian reform is being given in
Colombia, starts from the convincement of the Agrarian Reform Insti-
tute, that Colombia does not have "latifundios," big extensions of
land in the hands of a few landlords. But we very easily demonstrated
what the truth about that is. They say that the agrarian law will not
take "well cultivated lands" away, (this is a very relative term,
because there is no comparison with productivity of other countries,
but only in a regional extension), unless the landlords want to sell
it to the state; we know that the big landlords, always for inertia,
will own the little agricultural machinery in the country and will
hire more workers at prices of desperation, and will present their
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lands as the "well cultivated ones," and the ones with the highest
productivity. They cannot be expropriated.
And then, as the Agrarian Institute knows how difficult new
colonizations are, and as they will not do anything against their
friend-landlords, the Agrarian Institute has decided to shift its
goal from the problem of social concern they were trying to face at
the beginning, the structure of land tenure which goes with social,
politic and economic power, to a matter of economic productivity
without breaking the actual system, and devoting the resources of
the institute to very highly expensive irrigation projects in the
short amouit of land disposible without conflicting with the land-
lords, in order to give very high productive lands to a very few
peasants and most of the time to the remaining landlords, forgetting
that agrarian reform is not only a problem of land tenure, that it
starts there, but this latifundio breaking is followed by housing,
education, health, credits, roads, electrification, irrigation,
resource studies, and forgetting that agrarian reform is not possible
to be measured in cost-benefit terms.
But, of course, the problem is not in the Institute of Agrarian
Reform. The problem is in the whole country. The problem is a
political, social and economic one, and we can not simply ask the
landowners to give away their economic power, which they use to bleed
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the country without getting away their political power; and this has
not been accomplished yet.
How is the land being acquired and given?
1. If the Institute of Agrarian Reform wants to acquire
certain land bigger than 100 hectares, or if the land-
owner wants to sell it, it is the landowner who sets the
price; the land is not acquired according to the cadastral
price plus 30 percent, as they thought it at the beginning,
but as the commercial land the landlord imposes.
2. Then the Institute of Agrarian Reform will subdivide
the land, make some improvements and give it to a peasant
who will have to pay the whole price for it (the price
the landowner through the intermediary, the Institute,
imposed).
3. Now this money is taken by the former landlord, and
two things may happen to it:
a. they take it away from the country, impoverishing
it more;
b. they put in some industry and once more dominate
from the new position the defenseless peasant, who
is left without a price mechanism, or credit systems,
or resources of any kind; and they reduce once more
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the peasants at their will, creating thus the
basis for an industrial reform.
It is thus very easy to approach a "radical" agrarian reform in
Colombia.
Accomplishments.
We know how big the problem is. What has the Agrarian Institute
accomplished? For the Committee of Nine of the Alliance for Progress,
the Institute stated as targets to allocate land to 35,000 families
in the first four years, and 100,000 families in the next five years.
After two years of Agrarian Reform, less than 2,000 families had
received land and they expected to give land to 25,000 families in
five years, with irrigation projects.
We are now in 1969. After eight years of "Social Agrarian Reform,"
what has happened? This false reform claims to have given land to
60,000 families.34 Although some time ago I got information from my
country that 20,000 of those families just received titles for the
land they were squattering already. Nevertheless, let us make some
calculations about this "Social Agrarian Reform": let us suppose that
34. Source: Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
February, 1969, Colombia,- A Case History of U. S. Aid.
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the "Social Agrarian Reform" continues advancing very fast and being
generous; let us suppose that if they gave land to 60,000 families
in eight years, let us suppose that at the end of the first decade
they will have given land to 100,000 families. Very well.
Supposing that the peasant population is static in Colombia, the
"Social Agrarian Reform" will have given land to one tenth of the
one million families without land in the country. With this number,
at this speed, the problem would take exactly 100 years to be solved,
in terms of land ownership, not speaking of credit problems, marketing
problems, price problems, agricultural problems, educational problems,
etc., etc.
But as the peasant population is not static in Colombia, but grows at
a pace of 250,000 people a year, and each family is composed of five
members, we would have 50,000 families each year. This 50,000 fami-
lies each year will absorb-the work of the "Social Agrarian Reform"
in almost more than five years.
So we know when this problem of land is going to be solved with
Social Agrarian Reform: never.
I have to accept that a fast program of this type is very expensive,
and besides my country may not be able to gather the necessary skills,
and overpass the bureaucratic problems under the present institutional
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forms. I think that this problem is impossible to be solved under
the present form of government the country has.
Here we arrive at the end of our analysis of a typical and very grave
problem in Colombia. We could see how the lords and landlords of the
country, telling and promising and ducking the storms, spend the years
and the hopes of the miserable people. From reform to reform their
promises went always farther and farther, changing in form, from mild
ones to radical ones, promising and deceiving, raising hopes and then
escaping, till the present-time.
Is there something else they could promise now?
I guess their opportunities are arriving at the end...
Could we say the peasants have improved their conditions up to now?
No, they have not. And if we go some pages back and read carefully,
we will notice that whenever any change happened to the peasants'
conditions, it was after they had exercised, in their desperation,
violence against the lords. In no instance do we find the signs of
peaceful evolutionary change.
Do we naively think the regime would have passed such radical laws
as the "Social Agrarian Reform" without having its stability seriously
menaced, even if they knew they would deceive the peasants?
We do know that the lords count in their power with very well-trained
lackeys, their counter-insurgency troops, and troops are easier to
deploy than laws, even fake laws.
-71-
Of another factor we can be completely sure, and that is of the
rising amounts of expectations the poor peasants have had with the
passing of each law, every time more radical; and also we can be
sure of their mounting frustration and disbelief in a regime they
cannot understand.
What do I actually know when I make these last affirmations about
the rising amounts of expectations, and frustration among the
peasants of Colombia? There have not been made to the present,
quantitative studies that show that that is happening in Colombia.
I base my affirmations on three very important factors:
a. the latest developments in information media systems
that are practically flooding the peasants every day
with large amounts of advertisements about products of
the consumer society of the cities. Their inability to
acquire many of these elemental goods must, I expect,
raise as more goods are circulated within the other
strata of the population and as information channels
reach farther into the countryside.
b. The second point on which I base my assertion is
the growing polarization of wealth in Colombia, with
the more acute impoverishment of the peasant popula-
tion, because of the fast subdivisions of the tiny
spots most of the peasants have, with the high birth
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rates among the peasants. Their inability to buy
those ever more expensive products that could help
them with higher productivity, tractors, fungicides,
fertilizers, better seeds, grows then everyday; the
gap between the poor and the rich then, widens more
and more.
c. The third and maybe the most important factor
for the growing expectations and frustration of the
peasants I call the external revolutionary agents.
Poverty has existed since the Spaniards came to
America; the indians have always been poor. Lands
have been scarce since more than two centuries ago,
as we saw when we were going over the background of
the problem. But the most important change has taken
place during the last ten years, when external agents,
revolutionaries, have gone to the countryside, and
have started talking to the peasants about their
poverty, and about their ways to avoid it by elimina-
tion of their lords. This is the new element in the
countryside in Colombia. And more recently indeed,
other agents that are only starting to act, will make
these gaps between the rich and the poor more evident.
These elements "are the growing dissident members of the
Church, especially activated during the last three years.
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If the elements of the Colombian poor people's environment have been
the same during these four hundred years, although these problems were
growing in proportion, without any large-scale revolts by the peasants
having occurred, the real new element able to stir up conflict in the
countryside is constituted by these new people with political and
economic and social new abilities that may appeal to the peasants.
These observations will become of extreme importance in a later stage
of our study, when we will discuss strategies to follow for implementing
social change in Colombia, under the present circumstances.
I guess we stop here with the talk about Mr. Hirschman's pacific
evolutionary changes in Colombia. May I now introduce my second theme
and hypothesis for this paper: I will show now the rest of the key
elements of the Colombian economy and how they operate in the same
fashion as the land problem.
But my hypothesis to demonstrate is a very critical one: that in the
absence of a truly peaceful evolutionary change in a country like
Colombia, this underdeveloped country -- in order not to precipitate
a chain reaction in other underdeveloped countries by being destroyed
in all its present structures by the resented population -- is taken
over by its major capitalist partner, the United States government
and private enterprise, and is converted in a plain colony, a mere
appendage to serve American interests.
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I know this hypothesis I will demonstrate here may hurt the
susceptibility of my American professors. I can do no more than to
honor the truth and try to present it, with honesty, humbleness, and
in precise terms.
My main material for this part of the exposition has been gathered by
myself here at M.I.T., under Professor Rodwin's direction, and also
I will draw heavily on this document: Survey of the Alliance for
Progress. Colombia, A Case History of U.S. Aid, a study prepared at
the request of the sub-committee on American Republics Affairs, by
the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
together with a report of the Comptroller General, February 1, 1969,
U. S. Government Printing Office.
This hypothesis I will demonstrate is what I called at the beginning
of the work, the "status" hypothesis.
It is of great importance that I clarify here, what are the relations
a. between the land problem and the rest of the elements
of the Colombian economy and,
b. the relation between all these elements and the
Colombian-U.S. relations that are going to be studied
next, because apparently there is no relation, or at
least, no harmful one.
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The connections between the land problem and the rest of the elements
of the economy exist because:
1. the main basis for the actual economy of the country
is an agricultural product: coffee. This fact repercutes
in the economies of the cities;
2. the patterns of ownership in the couhtryside are the
same ones as in the cities. The wealthy class of the
countryside is very often found the same as in the cities.
The same applies for matters of social or political con-
sequence.
The relation between the U.S. and the land problem and the rest of
the elements of the Colombian economy is less evident and more com-
plicated. Although the U.S. private enterprises, as we will see
later, hold a considerable part ot key Colombian assets, in industry,
mine exploitation, and agriculture, we cannot be simplistic and argue
an interest of the U.S. in Colombia as starting only from economic
reasons.
So, how can we start seeing the interest of the U.S. in Colombia?
We cannot say that the U.S. government is interested in my country
because private American enterprises hold long shares of the Colombian
economy, so the U.S. is interested in their protection, so they can
give more revenues to the American economy; that is a simplistic
appreciation.
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We cannot say that because of the tremendous administrative failures
of the Colombian Government, the U.S. Government has to step in, in
order to maintain the regime in its place, thus avoiding the possi-
bilities of violent and Communist revolutions; that would be a very
simplistic way of seeing the problem.
But our point is strongly explained if we look at all of these
interacting factors as an organic totum; political reasons, plus
economic interests, mutually reinforcing and inclusive, in a self-
perpetuating vicious circle, I give as the explanation for the
interests of the Government and the American private enterprises in
my country.
This is what we will see more in depth throughout the explanation
of the "status" hypothesis. We will also be able to see the degree
of intensity of interest the U.S. shows in my country, mainly during
the last decade, that led me to conclude that Colombia has passed to
be a social, political, and economic colony of the United States.
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Chapter Two. Demonstration of the "Status" Hypothesis.
The Key Elements of the Colombian Economy.
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Let us go inside the demonstration of our hypothesis that Colombia
has become, mainly during the present decade, a social, political
and economic colony of the United States. First of all, a very
important starting point: What kind of country is Colombia? Is
Colombia a feudal society? Had Colombia developed somewhat along
the paths of modern capitalism before the actual high input of
American capitalism? Are the American advisors and entrepreneurs
arriving with a new set of economic patterns of relations unknown
to the Colombians before?
Many people try to explain the social and economic organization of
the Latin American countries like a remnant from feudalism. Long
theses have been done to demonstrate that this is not true, and I
agree with them. These theses show that, since our countries were
Spanish colonies, the economies of these colonies were subject to a
very fast exploitation, with economies based on markets, with cash
exchanges, social relations based on vassalage, and with even the
Indians paying tibute in kind since 1549 and in cash since 1569;
our economies were devoted to export raw materials to Spain. I
refer the reader to an article written by Luis Vitale in Latin
America, Reform or Revolution?3 5 in which, among other things, he
35- Luis Vitale, "Latin America: Feudal or Capitalist," Latin America,
Reform or Revolution?, Fawcett Publications, Inc., New York,
1968, pp. 32-43.
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says how
...In three centur1ies Spain extracted twenth thousand
million francs in precious metals from American sources,
and the principal colonial cities were created for the
purpose of exporting raw materials to Europe. The
exploitation of labor during the colonization was not
feudal in character; black slavery was not a feudal
institution but a capitalistic enterprise, organized
with large amounts of capital...And the native laborers
on the encomienda, while in no way the typical workers
of modern industry, did receive a 'bastardized salary.'
I guess it is important to explain at this point about the past of
the Latin American countries, in order to know what is happening at
the present. Many writers and economists say that Latin America has
been until now under feudalism and that capitalism is now arriving,
and that that will be the thing of the future. While many others, I
among them, believe that on the contrary we, the Latin American
countries, are the natural product of the "liberal" and "enlightened"
capitalism.
After the three centuries of intense economic exploitation by Spain,
since our countries obtained their political independence from Spain,
the elites of our new countries assumed the economic role the
Spaniards had before. Under the disguise of liberal economic theories,
the "laissez-faire," modern capitalist enterprises devoted to exporting
raw materials sprang up, side by side with the old feudal structures
existing in many of the points of our society. Carlos Fuentes puts it
this way:
Thus capitalists turned us into single product countries,
exporters of raw materials to the occidental marketplace.
The utopia of those entrepreneurs was the following:
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because of the international division of labor, it was
appropriate for some regions to produce raw materials
and for others to refine them; such an exchange would
produce welfare for everyone. Now we know this is not
true; now we know that in a depression of the central
economy, those who suffer more are the satellite
economies, the producers of raw materials...
...If economies were complementary, as the classical
theory states, our standard of living should be equal
to yours. 36
Capitalism is then not so new in Latin America. After 1930, most of
the Latin American countries tried to industrialize their internal
economies through protectionist capitalism, but the leaders were only
interested in industry, and had forgotten forever the people not
belonging to the bourgoise classes; old feudal structures, mainly in
the countryside, were left untouched.
Fuentes says:
The minority society became richer at every turn,
face to face with a majority society becoming more
miserable at every turn. In the last two years, the
abyss between the two has done nothing but grow. 37
Power is not in the countryside of Colombia any more. Power is in the
banks, and industries and corporations. Elimination of the few feudal
remnants in the countryside would leave the balance of power intact as
it is now.
36. Carlos Fuentes, "The Argument of Latin America: Words for the
North Americans," Whither Latin America?, Monthly Review Press,
New York, 1963, p. II.
37. Ibid., p. 12.
Andrew Gunder Frank, an economist, says:
The measures which the Alliance for Progress wishes to
introduce and which it hopes will substitute capitalism
for feudalism, already have a century and a half of
failure behind them in Latin America.
...Latin America is a capitalistic castle with a feudal
facade. Breaking the facade would not accomplish much,
not even a land reform. 38
Luis Vitale also points out:
Feudalism was an agrarian economic system based on
barter, with no salaries, since services were paid for
in land, lodging and food. Its social structure was
based on relations of servitude, of vassalage, with
punishment for those who left the fief... 39
and talking about the purposes of the lords during our colonization:
The conquest had a capitalist purpose: the exploitation
and commercialization of precious metals. Despite the
presence of feudal manors, the colonial economy was not
based on a natural economy or the small scale production
of the feudal state, but on the exploitation of raw
materials for the international market on a relatively
large scale and through the employment of large numbers
of native workers. 40
The existence of what Luis Vitale calls "feudal manors" has not
interfered with the general purpose of converting my country into an
exporter of raw materials since the Spanish colonial times. On the
38. Andrew Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment.
39. Luis Vitale, "Latin America: Feudal or Capitalist," Latin America,
Reform or Revolution?, Fawcett Publications, Inc., New York,
1968, p. 33.
40. Ibid., p. 37.
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contrary, this is one of the most advantageous points for the help
of capitalist strongholds. This interrelation between the feudal
manors with the capitalist lords has been very well studied already
by the economist, W. Arthur Lewis.4k
This is a very important and strong point. Because nothing new in
terms of economic relations are the U. S. Government and U. S. Private
enterprises fostering in my country; enlightened capitalism is quite
old in Colombia. Great shares of the maldistribution, injustice,
waste, hording, and contradictions of our economy and of our society
are the natural products of capitalism. Something more advanced than
capitalism must be implemented in order for us to be able to solve
our problems. The theory of the American Government that what is
needed is more intensive capitalism is not valid, since then we would
not be seeing the inequalities and contradictions that beset the
American and the rest of capitalistic developed western societies,
like France and England. Theories like the Alliance for Progress,
fostering capitalist development of the countries of Latin America,
will tie us more to the United States, augmenting our burdens, instead
of giving us the freedom so badly required.
41. W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies
of Labour," The Economics of Underdevelopment, ed. A. N. Agarwala
and S. P. Singh, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963.
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But let us get into our demonstration of my hypothesis of the U. S.
present domination of my country as a colony; when I call on data
from the Congress Report, I will ildentify it with the initials "CR."
I will use extensive quotations from this document from the U. S.
Congress in this chapter, because I feel it is the most accurate
expression of the feelings of the U. S. Government towards my
country. This factor helps me to eliminate a great part of sub-
jectivity in my writing, given the deep involvement I have with
the issue. The Alliance for Progress time is for me the culminant
point of the U. S. process of domination of Colombia. Now we will
see the problems of Colombia being treated by the new manager of
the country, the A.I.D., accordingly with A.I.D. values, programs,
and goals.
Let us start with the U. S. aims when "helping" us with the Alliance
for Progress:
The U. S. foreign assistance program in Colombia has
achieved a basic political objective, but it has fallen
far short of the economic and social goals of the
Charter of Punta del Este.
From the first loan in April 1962, a primary objective
has been political stability and maintenance of
Colombia's democratic political institutions through
support of the succession of National Front governments.
This has been accomplished. 42
In these simple words of the CR, we can discover the whole complexity
of the relations between the U. S. and my country. What is called
42. CR, p. 3. 
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the Charter of Punta del Este is just a set of game rules which
stressed the necessity of all the countries of South America to have
"better" economic relations with the U. S. by being able to provide
better facilities for private American enterprises, and to avoid
revolutions by giving something of the wealth of our countries to
the poor. Unfortunately for us, more American enterprises under the
present circumstances are in contradiction with the urgent necessity
we have of giving to the poor.
And now let us see the accomplishments:
On theother hand, between 1961 and 1967, per capita
gross national product increased only from $276 to
$295 a year, an annual average rate of 1.2 percent,
compared to the Punta del Este goal of 2.5 percent.
The peso had depreciated from 8.50 to the dollar in
1961 to 16.45 to the dollar in August 1968. The
deficit in Colombia's balance of trade decreased from
$142.6 million in 1961 to $64.5 million in 1967, but
this improvement was more apparent than real, resul-
ting from severe import controls imposed in early
1967 after a deficit of $290.2 million in 1966.
An agrarian reform program, one of the earliest
under the Alliance for Progress, was enacted in
1961, but through 1967 it had provided land titles
to only 54,000 out of the approximately 400,000 to
500,000 landless families (N.B., I have demonstrated
earlier that this number is really twice the CR data),
whose numbers, furthermore, are increasing by 10
percent a year (N.B., five percent in our case).
Although the agrarian reform has received some U.S.
assistance, the major emphasis of U. S. aid policy
to agriculture has been directed to increasing pro-
duction for export. These efforts have achieved
some success, but until recently they concentrated
on providing credits and other assistance for large
commercial farmers at the expense of rural social
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progress. The education policies of both the Colombian
Government and the United States have vacillated from
an emphasis in primary education to an emphasis on uni-
versities, with the result that little progress has been
made in either. The literacy rate has remained relatively
constant, but the absolute number of functional illiterates
has increased from approximately 5 million to more than
6 million. Taxes have been increased, but not until 1967
were serious efforts made to improve collection. Colombia
has barely begun to tackle the problems of more equitable
income distribution, and the country's social structure
remains essentially unchanged, with close to two-thirds
of the population not participating in the economic and
political decision making process. 43
As we have just read, the "achievements" of the present decade do not
appear very brilliant. What the U. S. has achieved is to maintain
the regime in power; which must have been an extremely hard task.
The CR asserts that,
The aid program in Colombia has bought time for
Colombian political institutions to work out the
changes which almost everybody in a position of
responsibility in either country agrees must come.
But Colombians have used this time at their leisure. 44
It is very daring to affirm this of the Colombians. This cannot be
said of all the Colombians. The ones without any power? The
illiterates? Didn't it say before that there were (in conservative
terms from my point of view) "close to two-thirds of the population
not participating in the economic and political decision making pro-
cess"? Why not to say better, that it bought time for the elites?
43. CR, p. 3.
44. CR, p. 5.
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And at what price has Colombia, this time the whole Colombia, bought
this time for the political institutions to spend it at their leisure?
At a very dear one, indeed. At the price of subduing the country to
the United States domination. How has the U.S.A. bought the country?
With dollars, which are called aid and with the onerous conditions
they bring with them.
Let us first clarify what the U. S. "aid" means for a country like
Colombia. There is a very widespread notion in this country (the U.S.),
that the United States is every year giving millions of dollars as
gifts to underdeveloped countries, and that we, the countries of Latin
America, are milking the U.S.A. Without reckoning by now what the
U.S.A. is really taking away from our countries in terms of profits,
let us see the data about the economic "aid."
We will find out that a very high percentage of this "aid" consists
of commercial loans, which have to be paid back. There are grants,
too. All this of course only serves to keep running the elites in
government, and that in lurn serves the U.S. economic interests.
If we go through the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.),
files of the economic relations with Colombia during the Alliance
for Progress, we find the following table:
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Table 1. A.I.D. Loan and Grant Assistance to Colombia.
(in millions)
Project Assistance
Total _sIs__e Capital Technical
Fiscal year
1961 and prior:
Loans $ 25.0 $25.0
Grants 15.4 $15.4
Total 40.4 25.0 15.4
Fiscal year
1962 to
December 1967:
Loans 358.7 $305.0 53.7
Grants 31.1 31.1
Total 389.8 305.0 53.7 31.1
Total 430.2 305.0 78.7 46.5
1Includes cost 6f training Colombian officials and specialists.
Source: CR, p. 105.
We find out that from a total of 430.2 millions involved in the economic
relations, 10.8 percent of it, 46.5 millions, were grants given to
Colombia. The rest were commercial loans. If we then compare this with
the profits U. S. companies are getting out of Colombia, the story may
be totally different.
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And what have most of these millions of dollars in "aid" been used
for? They have served three purposes:
a. short range budgeting and balance of payments
financing of an obsolete administration and a huge
bureaucracy;
b. the U.S. being able to sell us merchandise at
very high prices, out of competence;
c. imposing on the country political schemes
favorable to the external policies of the U.S.A.
I will explain this.
First, with respect to the regime financing; this whole Congress Report
is devoted to lamenting how the regime, instead of asking for loans for
investing in the development of the country's infrastructures, and
developmental organizations, has spent the loans in financing just the
running of the governmental machine.
Further it appears that although the aid program
achieved some short-term successes with respect to
economic stabilization and in influencing the
Colombian government's fiscal and monetary policies,
the support which U.S. assistance provided at least
contributed to making it possible for successive
Colombian governments, especially that of President
Valencia, to postpone making more basic reforms in
such fields as public administration, taxation, local
government, education, and agriculture. 45
45. CR, p. 4.
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Starting in 1960, however, rising operating expenses
of the central government and failure of revenues to
meet expectations reduced public funds available for
a development program. The 1960 tax reform turned out
to produce less revenue in real terms from direct
taxes than the previous tax structure. Thus began one
of the major economic problems for the Alliance for
Progress period -- a large budget deficit with infla-
tionary financing. 46
...except for a period in 1965, the United States has
repeatedly succumbed to the short-term political
pressures against which Bowles warned. It has not
been willing to risk the political consequences of
refusing aid in the face of a strong plea that a
government would fall without such aid. Further,
the United States has generally been reluctant to
attach strong conditions to aid for the same reasons
which made aid necessary; that is, the tenuous posi-
tion of the current government which undermined its
ability to take strong reform measures.
This type of aid conflicts with long-term development
goals by facilitating postponement of necessary host
country reforms, a fact which has been demonstrated
in the case of Colombia by the chronic persistence of
the same basic problems throughout the Alliance
problems. 47
Heretofore, program loans had either been frankly
political with the purpose of tiding the country
over an electoral period (as in April 1962 and
March 1964) or had been primarily aimed at backing
up a stabilization program (December 1962). 48
I think we have had enough to prove this first point of my observations
of the U. S. aims when "aiding" my country.
46. CR, p. 9.
47. CR, p. 11.
48. CR, p. 24.
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Let us go to my second assertion, that these loans are used as a
means for the U.S. to sell us merchandise at very high prices, out
of competence; Americans call it "additionality." On pages 6 and 7
of the CR we read:
Two of the most troublesome issues with respect to
Colombia have been exchange rate policy and what AID
calls "additionality," that is, the use of program
loans to increase U.S. exports.
...The problem arises because of the United States'
own balance-of-payment deficit. In an effort to
reduce the impact of the foreign aid progrm on this
deficit, the United States first adopted a policy of
domestic procurement -- that is, of limiting the use
of AID dollars, with increasingly rare exceptions, to
the procurement of goods in the United States. Then,
the United States became concerned that countries
receiving program loans should not use them to buy
goods in the United States which they would have
bought in the United States anyway, while shifting
their own resources to procurement in Europe, Japan
or elsewhere. To meet this problem, AID has steadily
refined the list of U.S. goods eligible for AID finan-
cial procurement, the object being to limit these
goods to items which would provide the United States
with additional exports over and above what it could
normally export on the basis of its historic share of
a foreign market.
To the degree that the United States insists upon
additionality, it reduces the flexibility of program
loans both with respect to promoting economic growth
abroad and with respect to influencing the borrowing
country's economic policies. Lists of goods eligible
for AID financing are drawn up with a view to
increasing U. S. exports. These goods, of course,
represent a net input into the foreign economy and
are therefore useful, but they are not necessarily
the goods which would be most useful from the point
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of view of economic development. Frequently, too,
they are more expensive than similar goods purchased
elsewhere. There is an almost complete lack of data
on whether this is due entirely to generally higher
costs in the United States or whether it is due at
least in part to the administered prices (America's
own imperfect competition), encouraged by knowledge
on the part of American exporters that the goods
cannot be bought anywhere else.
... Thus as it has evolved over the years, the program
loan has become a device for subsidizing specified U.S.
exports. But the United States still tries to use this
device to influence foreign economic policies. To the
degree that a program loan is used to achieve one pur-
pose, its value as an instrument for achieving the
other is decreased. 49
I call this U.S. "aid" to my country economic imperialism. Then we
have the case of Mr. Chester Bowles, the President's Special Represen-
tative and Advisor on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs in
1962, when speaking before the Colombo-American Chamber of Commerce and
the American Society of Bogota, giving "Seven Critical Development
Criteria" for my country, which included a national plan, a wide
sharing of economic growth, taxation on the basis of ability to pay,
agricultural reform, incentives for private investment, efficient and
honest public administration and "a sense of national morale and pur-
pose."50
He spoke to the Colombians about "a sense of national morale and
purpose," when just the setting up of relations between Colombia and
49. CR, pp. 6-7.
50. CR, p. 11.
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the United States was on the basis of a sell-out of their country
by the same Colombians.
...By the end of 1963 only about 50 million had been
disbursed of the $65 million estimated inflow from
project and program loans. The main problem was com-
pliance with the requirement that at least 50 percent
of the gross tonnage of the goods financed by the loans
and transported on ocean vessels should be carried on
privately-owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels. Deter-
mination that U.S.-flag commercial vessels were not so
available had to be approved by AID. The documentation
which had to be presented to AID in keeping with this
agreement were the bills of lading and statements
indicating the U. S. origin of the goods being shipped. 51
With respect to the ground rules under which the loan
was to be disbursed, there were three issues --
additionality for U.S. exports, marine insurance and
forward procurement. 52
Forward procurement would allow AID to select the
categories of goods which it would finance and
thereby hopefully insure that AID financing would
result in U.S. exports. 53
I have calculated from the CR, p. 168, that Colombia, during the
period 1962-1966 imported an average of 45.7 of its necessities from
the United States. As we see, these conditions in its markets have
tied Colombia irremediably to be a United States servant in its
economic policies.
51. CR, p. 20.
52. CR, p. 25.
53. CR, p. 26.
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And now let us go to my third point, about the loans the U. S. gives
to Colombia as acting as a curtain for the U. S. imposing its will
in political matters, after it had opened the doors of the country
for the U. S. private enterprise. Besides controlling the economic
matters of the nation (see quotations of the CR below), from now on
the U. S. could determine policy in matters like education, land
policies, foreign investment, wage rates, etc., etc., in order to
condition the sense of "national morale and purpose" to the U. S.
convenience.
Here we have a show of the U. S. manipulation of the country with
the carrot of the U. S. "aid":
The first quarterly review sessions under the
May 1967 loan for $100 million were held from
July 17 through September 1. The review concen-
trated on examination of fiscal, exchange, export,
import, monetary, wage and price policies, as well
as on the preliminary agriculture plan and agri-
cultural price policies, coffee diversification,
and additionality for U.S. exports. Such questions
as import liberalization, industrial policy, and
education were left for subsequent reviews... 52
Let us see how decision making in Colombia operates:
The programming and management of U.S.-controlled
local currency was primarily a Mission responsibi-
lity, and little information other than the final
decisions on peso allocations was transmitted to
Washington. These allocations were originally
proposed to the AID Mission by the Colombian
Planning Office on the basis of an initial review
52. CR, P. 50.
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of requests from counterpart from the various
ministries and independent agencies of the Colombian
Government. An agreed AID-Planning Office proposal
was then submitted to the Ministry of Finance for
approval. Before forwarding the proposal to the
Ministry of Finance, USAID/Bogota requested the con-
currence of USAID/Washington which usually gave its
routine approval. 54
In addition, the new system required the Colombian
Government to prepare a total resource investment
budget, lumping together central government revenue
and counterpart (N.B., counterpart is Colombian
money controlled by the U.S. as parts of agreements
for loans) as a single founding resource. This plan
and the Colombian Government's proposed distribution
of counterpart would then be reviewed by USAID, a
procedure which involved USAID more intimately in
the total Colombian budgetary process. 55
So I guess we have seen enough proof of the real political, economic,
and social powers which dominate Colombia now, and that have made of
my country a mere appendage of the U.S. wealth and of the U.S. poli-
ticians.
Let us look at the other main components of the social and economic
structure in Colombia. Of course it should not surprise us if we find
that these sectors of the nation sadly correspond to the classist view
of the people handling the regime, that blinded by their wealth and
fatness, not caring but for their bellies and their farms and their
54. CR, p. 69.
55. CR, p. 66.
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factories, have the patient people of the country starving, ignorant,
and apparently without hope, or that they reinforce our points of
view about the U.S.-Colombian relations.
When studying the characteristics of the land problem in Colombia,
we saw in it one of the main elements of the economic institutions
of the country. Going through different frustrations when observing
the different characteristics of the land problem, the high concen-
tration of land in hands of a few owners, the crowding of most of
the people in tiny plots, the low productivity of these lands, the
low levels of technology in cultives, we had just started seeing the
real problems for most of the Colombians. Because coupled with
these specific problems of the Iands, we will find that these people
who work them, the same as the people who do not have lands and that
have migrated to the cities to live in slums, have to stand a miserable
life, with miserable housing, no medical services, starvation levels
of food, without schools to send their children to, with no credit
services from the banks to improve their lots, forgotten and condemned
to a wretched existence.
And these elements of these people's environment, reinforce each
other in order to produce a total mass of hopelessness for these
people. Because the little advancements in solving one side of the
problem are always absorbed by the other sides of the same problem.
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In some cases, advances in one of the sides of the problem do but
worsen the situation of the peasants, i.e., advances in preventive
medicine make for peasants with their huts full of little children
without food, when they cannot control their environment, confronted
with an authoritarian Church that forbids birth control measures, and
discourages sex education, and confronted with the elite class of
landlords who exploit and force them into poverty. But this circle,
this vicious circle, of problems in the economic level -- if we make
a tremendous abstraction, and call the before enumeration of prob-
lems the economic level -- constitute only one of the wheels of
underdevelopment. Because the other two, also internally self-
reinforcing, and externally linked to constitute the machine of
underdevelopment, are constituted by the social institutions and the
political institutions. (But underdevelopment is not for everybody;
if some individual is born with wealth, the economic wheel, or if
he belongs to the upper social class, or if his family is in govern-
ment, he will make it in Colombia. He will have house, school, recrea-
tion, servants, doctors, job, position, power. If the same person is
born outside of the elites, surely he will not have any of the things
said before.)
The economic wheel, to a certain point, only gyrates, because of the
force transmitted to it from the social and political wheels, but at
the same time reinforcing the power of the other two. This image of
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the wheels is just an abstraction I have created to explain the
phenomenon. In reality there exists a continuum between the three
of them. There exists also, a continuum between the muscles that
generate the power to move three wheels: men.
The elements that constitute the elite in one of the wheels of this
classist system, will automatically constitute part of the elite in
the other two. The ones who constitute the impoverished mass of the
people in one of the wheels, will do so in the other ones too.
The term, underdevelopment, in the case of Colombia, will be easily
understood in the rest of this chapter when we will observe the dis-
crepancies between social-want formation and social-want satisfaction,
in the three orders, social, political and economic, when viewed in
the light of the potential technological advancements of this century,
applicable to the case of Colombia. The negation of the leaders of
the wheels to accept the introduction of these changes, that would
disturb their peace, constitute the most severe problem to the
superation of underdevelopment.
if we try to summarize our study since the beginning until now, we
will find that the four most important points made are:
1. Taking the land problem as an example of the way the
important problems of the other sectors of the economy,
with its social and political implications, are handled,
we concluded that:
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a. land reform has been illusory;
b. the situation is getting worse in spite of
claims to the contrary.
2. Colombia has been and is capitalistic and not feudal.
American programs mean more of the same.
3. Colombia has become during the last decade a social,
political and economic colony of the United States.
4. Colombia is caught in a self-reinforcing circle of
social, political and economic contradictions which are
more than a burden, a growing disgrace.
Let us observe those elements of what we abstracted before, and called
the economic wheel of Colombia. The social and political wheels will
be examined in the chapter about Camilo Torres. The relations between
the most important of these sectors and the U. S. enterprises will
become evident now.
Colombia. The People.
1. Cities with more than 100,000 people.
The next is the list of the cities with more than 100,000 people,
according to the 1964 census.
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Annual
Growth
City 1951 1964 % increase Rate
Medellin 362,054 772,887 53.0 6.0
Barranquilla 281,891 498,301 44.8 4.9
Cartagena 130,016 242,085 48.98 5.4
Manizales 127,199 221,916 43.74 4.4
Monteria 77,591 126,329 38.21 3.8
Bogota 723,929 1697,311 67.74 6.8
Sta. Marta 47,880 98,386 52.0 6.2
Pasto 81,478 112,478 28.0 2.5
Cucuta 88,334 175,336 50.0 5.4
Bucaramanga 113,380 229,748 51.0 5.6
lbague 99,394 163,661 39.11 3.9
Cali 287,411 637,929 55.0 7.6
Pereira 115,342 188,365 39.0 3.8
Palmira 80,957 140,889 42.5 4.3
Armenia 78,380 137,222 42.9 5.4
Cienaga 56,854 113,143 49.8 5.4
Buenaventura 100,000
One of the main differences of Colombia with the rest of Latin America,
is its organic urban growth distribution which we can observe as a
statistic result of the census and in the maps indicating the geo-
graphical situation of these cities. Colombia now has more than 17
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CENSO DE POBLACION DE COLOMDIA LI:,VANTADO EL 15 DE JULIO DE 1964,
SEGUN SECCIONES DEL PAIS Y CIUDADES CAPITALES
SECCIONES DEL PAIS
TOTAL GENERAL.
DEPARTAMENTOS
Antioquia..................
Atlantico.................
Bolivar.................
BoyacS...................
Caldas....................
Cauca....................
COrdoba...................
Cundinamarca.............
Choco... .. .............
Huila....................
Magdalena.................
Meta.....................
Narifno..................
Norte de Santander........
Santander.................
Tolima.. .... o..........
Valle del Cauca . . . .
Sub-Total.. ......
LNTENDENCIAS
Arauca... .. o............
Caqueta. .. .. .. .......
Guajira if .. .. .. .. .. .. .
San Andres y Providencia.
Sub-Total........
COMISARIAS
A .azona .... ,... .. ......
Guainra.. .. ,, .. .......
Putumayo .. .. .. .. .. ....
Vaupes... .. .. ...... ....
Vichada. .. ., ..... .. ..
Sub-Total.. ......
CrUD.\ DES
CAP ITA LES
2.477.299
717.406
1.006.347
1.058. 152
1.455.872
607.197
585. 714
2. 817. 43
181.863
416. 289
789.410
165.530
705.611
534.486
1.001.213
841.424
1. 733.053
17.094.302
24.148
103.718
147.140
16. 731
291.737
12.962
3.602
56. 284
13.403
10.130
96.381
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Medellfn.. .. ..
Barranquilla
Cartagena.
Tunja . .......
Manizales.
Popava1n . .
Monte rr;...
Bogota D.E.
Quihdo .. .
Neiva.......
Santa Marta
Villavicencio.
Pasto....,..
CGcuta
Bucaramanga.
Ibague
Call..........
Arauca .. .. ..
Florcncia.
Riohacha .
San Andres
Leticia.......
Satn Felipe
Mocoa
Mitu ........
Puerto Carrelo
Habitantes de Resto del
las Capitales Departamento
Nrimero Ntmero %
5.430.0061
772.887
498.301
242.085
68. 9051
221.916.
76. 568
126. 3Z9
1.697.311
42.926,
89.790
104.471
58.430
112. 876
175.3361
229. 748
163.6611
637.929'
5.319.469'
7.9651
30. 445
31. 897
14.413
84.720
4.013
1.090
13.059
6.206
1.449
25.817
31.20
69.46
24.06
6.51
15.24
12.61
21.57
60.24
2;.601
21.57
13.23
35.30
16.00
32.80
22.95
19.45
36.81
32.98
29.35
21.68
86.15
30.96
30.26
23.~0
46.30
14.30
12.35b2.414
1.704.412
219.105
764.262
989.247
1.233.956
530.629
459.385
1.120.125
138.937
326.499
684.939
107.100
592.735
359.150
771.465
677.763
1.095.124
11.774.833
1 u. 183
7-.273
115.243
2.318
207. 017
8.949
2.512
43. 225
7.197
8.681
70.564
68.80
30.54
75.94
93.49
84.76
87.39
78.43
39.76
76.40
78.43
86.77
64.70
84.00
67.20
77.05
80.55
63. 19
67.02
70.65
78.32
13.85
69.04
69.74
76.80
53.70
85.70
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cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. At the beginning of the
century Colombia had 4.5 million people and at the end it will have
45 million.
The urban population increased from 1951 to 1964 from 39.10 percent
of the total population to 53.37.
The rural population decreased from 60.90 to 46.63 percent.
2. Racial Composition.
The racial composition was in 1960 as follows:56
Race Percent Number
Indians (natives) 1 150,000
Mestizos (native/white) 58 8,700,000
Negroes 4 600,000
Mulattoes (negro/white) 14 2,100,000
Zambos (native/negro) 3 450,000
Whites 20 3,000,000
3. Population Growth.
Colombia has a natality rate of 38.6 per thousand, a mortality rate
of 10, and an increase of population of 28.6, which is one of the
56. Source: W. 0. Galbraith, Colombia: A General Survey, Oxford
University Press, 1966, p. 17.
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highest in the world. Colombia adds 500,000 people each year to
its population.
With this growth rate I have calculated that, in 1973,Colombia will
have doubled its population. In 1951 that was 11,138,470. This will
be done in a very short term of twenty-three years and the trends are
to reduce this time. In 1980 the country will have 27,000,000 people.
4. Age Composition.
Colombia is a country of young people. This fact, very good if
profitted by strengthening the economic growth on it, may be a very
painful one, as it is happening, as the country's elites have not
been preoccupied with the educational and service programs for those
people. Also we have to notice the very low level of people with
ages over 65.57
Age composition:
% Under 15
1960 44.3
1975 42.6
5. Education.
Education in Colombia is a bad story.
% 16-64
53.0
54.3
% 65 and over
2.7
3.1
Education is one of the things
57. Source: U.N. Preliminary Study of the Demographic Situation in
Latin America. 
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we most lack in Colombia. Education for us is private business almost
entirely in the hands of the Catholic Church, which in Colombia is
held as the official national religion. Education is given to those
who can pay the prices they want to impose for it, and which the poor
people cannot afford. Let us see who receives education in my
country at the present, and what the future projections are:58
Projections of Age Groups 7-14, 15-19 and Total Population (000's):
1960 1965 1970 1975
n. % n. % n. % n. %
7-14 3,095 20 3,550 20 4000 19.5 4,560 19.2
15-19 1,490 9.6 1,790 10 2100 10.2 2,380 10.0
T.P. 15,468 17,787 20514 23,774
Growth Rate:
1980 1960-80 %
7-14 5,170 18.7 25.1
15-19 2,660 9.6 28.2
T.P. 27,691 28.3
In the percentages we find that probably the critical year with the
highest peak of potential students as a percent of the total popula-
58. J. Mayone Stycos and Jorge Arias, eds., Population Dilemma in
Latin America, Potomac Books, Inc. Washington, D.C., 1966.
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tion, has been 1965. From that year on, the percentage started to
go down, but we canrnote that the natural growth of population, the
real number of potential students, is always increasing, as the
table shows.
In 1960, only 54.1 percent of the potential students could attend
elementary school; this percentage represents 1,674,395 boys, but it
also represents that neither the Government or the Church gave
schooling to 1,420,605 boys between seven and fourteen years old.
My old sources indicated that in 1960, there were only 54.1 percent
of the children between seven and fourteen years old attending pri-
mary school. Now I want to use some of the material of the CR,
although we have to notice that the age level for primary school in
the CR table for 1961 we find 59.9 percent of the children going to
school, 5 percent more than the year before. Nevertheless, I think
we can follow the CR data, which I suppose is very accurate.
Primary School Education.
(in thousands)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Primary school-age
children (ages 7-11) 2,278 2,376 2,477 2,582 2,689 2,804
Primary school-age children
enrolled in school 1,364 1,476 1,574 1,667 1,714 1,951
Percent enrolled 59.9 62.1 63.5 64.6 63.7 69.6
Source: CR, p. 123.
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If in six years, from 1961 to 1966 the difference between the boys
who cannot attend school against the ones who can was reduced by
61,000 boys and as in 1966, the difference was of 853,000 boys, it
means that the primary school problem will take ailmost fourteen
years more to be solved nominally. I said nominally, if then we
look at the quality of schools we have, at the number of years the
boys are taught, and if we look at the rate of dropouts in primary
school.
I have to note that education has been one of the sectors where the
regime says it has been working harder.
Seymour W. Wurfel, in Foreign Enterprise in Colombia,58 says:
In 1960 of eight million Colombians fifteen years of age
or more, three million or 37 percent were illiterate.
This situation is aggravated by the fact that many of
the statistical literate are just barely so, that 40
percent of those in the seven-to-fourteen year age group
do not attend school, (N.B., 46% more accurately) and
that little has been done to prepare to meet population
explosion educational requirements.
The U. S. Army Area Handbook for Colombia59 has a pathetic relate about
this theme:
Types of elementary education are a five-year urban
program, a four-year rural program with separate schools
for boys and girls, and a two-year "alternate" rural
58. Seymour W. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombia, University of
North Carolina Press, 1965.
59. U.S. Army Area Handbook for Colombia, Department of the Army,
Washington, 1964.
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program in which boys and girls attend on alternate
days. A few rural schools in some of the departments
have a five-year program. The two-year alternate rural
schools have 188 days of school attendance in the aca-
demic year. Because of the alternate attendance,
however, boys and girls attend only 94 days, respec-
tively. Since each group of boys and rigls is further
divided into first- and second-year courses, each
course receives instruction for only 47 days, the
equivalent of 282 class hours. It is the system
operating in 8,760 of 11, 861 rural public schools.
In 1966 AID determined that of the 23,000 primary schools
in Colombia, only 20 percent offered a full circle 6f
five grades even though primary education of five grades
is obligatory under the Colombian Constitution; 12,500
of the schools or about 54 percent offered two grades
or less. The shortage of classrooms is more acute in
rural areas where only about 1 percent of the school age
population completes five grades. 60
A key problem identified early in the Alliance was the
relatively high dropout rate in primary schools. In
1963 AID determined that 90 percent of Colombian primary
school enrollees dropped out of school before completing
the fifth grade. An AID goal was to reduce the dropout
rate to 70 percent by 1968. In 1966 an AID study showed
the following dropout rates:
Grade Dropout Rate (%)
2 43
3 79
4 89
5 93
Of the 22,000 primary classrooms which were to be
constructed by July 1965, under Colombia's development
program, 5,150, or about 25 percent of the total,
reportedly were complete as of October 1967. 61
60. CR, P. 124.
61. CR, P. 17.
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... AID estimated that there was a shortage of 25,000
primary classrooms in Colombia in 1966, and has estimated
a shortage of 48,500 primary classrooms in Colombia by
1973. 62
Making some accounts, according to Wurfel, in 1960, the 37 percent
illiterate older than 15 years, represent 2,960,000 people, without
counting "that many of the statistical literate are just barely so;"
in 1960 we had:
Boys Not Going to School:
From 7 to 14 years old 1,420,605
Illiterate older than 15 years 2,960,000
Colombian illiterates 4,380,605
This represents 39 percent of the people who should know how to read;
but AID estimated in May 1967 that 44 percent of the population was
illiterate. 6 3 This percentage represents almost 8 million people
illiterate over a population of 18 million by that time.
Secondary Education.
The secondary educational opportunities are even less than the primary
ones. In 1960, out of 1,490,000 potential students between 15 and 19
62. CR, p. 124.
63. CR, p. 125.
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years old, only 19.2 percent could assist to school; this percentage
means 286,000 boys and also means that 1,204,000 people could not
find any kind of high school education in that year.
AID in 1963 established a goal of increasing the
enrollment in Colombia's secondary schools by 300
percent by late 1967. From 1963 through 1966,
enrollment in Colombia's secondary and vocational
schools increased by about 42 percent. The level
of such enrollment during the Alliance is shown by
the following schedule: 64
(in thousands)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Secondary school-age
children (12-18)
Enrollment in
secondary and
vocational schools
Percent enrolled
2,415 2,526
261
10.8
291
11.5
2,624 2,710 2,798 2,872
331
12.6
361:-
13.3
405
14.5
472
16.4
A large number of Colombia's secondary school
before completion of a secondary education.
that the dropout rate was about 75 percent --
80-percent rate experienced in 1963. The few
most
that
Let
students drop out
In 1966 AID estimated
a decrease from the
who go to school, in
cases, do it because their parents make big sacrifices to feed
monopoly which is almost entirely in the hands of the Church.
us see what Wurfel says:
Eighty-five percent of the students go to private
schools, either church operated or proprietary profit
institituions...The vested interests of the church
and of the owners of prifit-making schools are such
that they oppose extension of public secondary
64. CR, P. 124.
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education...Only 4.32 percent of those who enter
grammar school, reach secondary school, in which
there are six years of instruction. Nearly half of
the teachers have only a secondary education, and
less than one-third of the students who start are
able to graduate. By that time the survival rate
of the original 100 is 1.34 percent. The secondary
student enrollment in 1960 was 38,400. Those who
enter a university comprise less than one percent
of primary school entrants. 65
The next is the distribution of students by type of learning in
secondary school: 6 6
(See following table.)
65. Seymour W. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombia, University of
North Carolina Press, 1965., p. 19.
66. CIDA, p. 332.
-11l-
COLOMBIA: ALUMNOS MATRICULADOS EN ESCUELAS DE ENSENANZA
SECUNDARIA, 1958 y 1962
Alumnos 1958 Alumnos 1962
Tipo de Ensefanza Nuimero Porciento Nfimero Porciento
Bachillerato (general) 115.041 53,6 174.966af 56,0
Comercio 30.479 14,2 47.461 15,2
Normalista Superior 13.806 6,4 28.304b 9,1
Industrial y Complementaria 13.185 6,1 20.195 6,5
Normalista Rural 5.302 2,5 13.624f 4,4
Teologla (Seminario) 4.671 2,2 6.987 2,2
Artistica 4.823 2,3 5.386 1,7
Agropecuaria 2.822 1,3 3.487. 1,1
Hogar para Campesinos 1.791 0,8 2.5152/ o,8
Sin especificar y otros 22.670 10,6 9.466 3,0
T 0 T A L 214. 0 100 2100
Fuente: Para 1958: DANE, 1960; para. 1962:
117.956 hombres y
22.434 mujeres y
10.767 mujeres y
3.451 hombres y
Todas mujeres.
DANE, 19b4.
57.010 mujeres.
5.850 hombres.
2.857 hombres.
36 mujeres.
7
bJ
We can see the high degree of people studying commerce, and the low
level in agriculture when half of the population lives in the
countryside.
University Education.
In the area of higher education in Colombia, enrollment
is somewhat limited as shown by the following: 67
(in thousands)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Higher school age
youth (ages 19 to 24) 1,543 1,592 1,643 1,696 1,751 1,807
Enrollment in schools
of higher education 27 30 34 37 38 49
Key problems in the area of higher education include:
1. a dropout rate of 50 percent;
2. the small number of full-time professors;
3. limited facilities; and
4. an unbalanced misture of disciplines relative to Colombia's
manpower needs, there being a heavy emphasis on doctors, lawyers
and engineers, and not enough emphasis on the social and physical
sciences and other less traditional professions.
According to my data from CIDA 6 barely a 0.2 of the population is
receiving higher education. Fifty-six percent of the students go to
67. CR, p. 125.
68. CIDA, p. 334.
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pub ic universities, although the state education is decreasing in
favor of the business of the church. It has decreased from 73.9
percent in 1946, to 56.1 percent in 1964. Only one-sixth of the
students are women.
The next is the table of enrollment by academic areas in 1964:69
69. CIDA, P. 334.
C6LOMBIA: ALUMNOS 'IATRICULAD(,S EN LA ENSENANZA UNIVERSITARIA,
1v64, 19 6 y 1954
1 9 6 4 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 4
Especialidad Nfumero PNr- Nmero Por- Ntmero Por-
ciento ciento ciento
ingenieria 9.021 2491 2.514 1.980 16,5
a) Civil (3.968) (10,6) (1.333) (10,3) n.d. -
b) Quimica (1.648 ( 4,4) ( 410) ( 3,1) ( 213) ( 1,8)
c) Otras (3.405) ( 9,1) ( 771) ( 5,9) (1,767)a/ (14,7)a/
Derecho 4.735 12,6 2.279 17,6 2.306 19,2
cAUcacion 2.718 7,2 607 4,7 n.d. -
Medicina 2.609 7,0 3.044 23,5 3.186 26,6
:onomia 2.215 5,9 517 4,0 n.d. -
Arq.uitectura 2.086 5,6 1.137 8,8 943 7,9
i.ironomia 1.988 5,3 327 2,5 256 2,1
Ioiogia 1.357 3,6 n.d. - 127 1,1
OdCntologia 936 2,5 n.d. - 738 6,1
Veerinaria y Zootecnia 743 2,0 199 1,5 116 1,0
Administracitn Industrial y
Economia Industrial 902 2,4 7 - - -
Sociologia, Psicologia y
"Ciencias Sociales" 700 1,9 169 1,3 - -
Contabilidad Puiblica 529 1,4 121 0,9 - -
OtIas 6.923 18,5 2.057 15,8 2.344 19,5
T 0 T A L 37.462 10010 12.978 10010 11.996 1000
Fuentes: Para 1954 y 1956, Lebret et al., 1958: 321; para 1964, DANE, Bolet.n Mensual
de Estadistica N* 170 (mayo de 1965), p. 70.
af Incluye Ingenieria Civil.
-
Teachers.
Primary Education. In 1960, Colombia had a teacher-student ratio of
40.0, which represents 41,800 teachers. If we want to give education
to 98 percent of our children, let us say in 1980 we would have to
have by that year, with a student-teacher ratio of 25., 202,700
teachers.
Secondary Education. The Unesco made some calculations that countries
with a proportion of 10-24 percent of school attendance in 1960, in
1980 should have as a goal 45% of the sbhool-age boys in high school.
Colombia with 286,000 students, an attendance of 19.2% in 1960, would
have in 1980 as a goal 1,197,000 students.
According to data from Ocampo-Londono,70 Colombia had in 1965, a
student-teacher rate of 19, which is a surprisingly good one. I believe,
if we put that ratio at 20, we will need in 1980, 59,950 teachers.
This, if we only decide to give education to 45% of the potential stu-
dents.
University Teachers. In 1965, according to Ocampo-Londono,7I we had
37,900 students and 5,800 teachers and a ratio of 16.5 and a percentage
70. The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role, A. Curtis Wilgus, ed.,
University of Florida Press, 1967, p. 133.
71. Ibid., p. 132.
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of potential high school graduates passing to college of 10. If we
only try to keep up with this percentage in 1980, with a student-
teacher ratio of 16., we will need 10,200 teachers.
So we see that even in the most basic of the elements of the social
requirements for the economic infrastructure, even with the Alliance
for Progress, we are well back in time.
6. Housing.
We are now before another of the huge Colombian problems: housing.
Here is where the culture of underdevelopment demonstrates itself.
These mute statistics show the conditions the people of my country
are living in. Colombia spent in 1962, 4.2 percent of the budget in
public housing.72
The minimum annual needs in 1960 and projections for 1975 are: 7 3
Year
1960
1975
Urban
67,000
212,000
Rural
24,000
13,000
Total
91,000
225,000
This data represents a deficit of 1,365,000 units between 1960-1975
only in order to keep the 1950 percentage of families living in houses
or apartments. The projections for 1975 are by assuming housing
72. Population Dilemma in Latin America, J. Mayone Stycos and Jorge Arias,
eds., Potomac Books, Inc. Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 102.
73. Ibid., p. 119.
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ownership to 95% of the families and also assuming that the average
urban family will be 4 and 5 in the rural areas. The before was given
by Octavio Cabello in Population Dilemma in Latin America.
The U. N. Economic Commission for Latin America gives this other
interpretation according to Abraham Horwitz and Mary Burke in the
same work: 7 5
Urban Rural Total
Estimated Deficit 300,000 500,000 800,000
Housing Units Required
(annually to meet
population growth and
replacements) 72,000 28,800 100,800
Actual annual construction 40,000
Colombia constructed about 224,000 new housing units
from 1962 through 1966, or about 62 percent of the
AID goal of 360,000 units. This rate of housing con-
struction was about 5 percent greater than the
average annual rate of housing construction achieved
during 1960 and 1961 prior to the Alliance.
AID says that a key factor in Colombia's failure to meet its housing
needs has been a lack of available credit due, in turn, to:
(1.) Colombia's inflation problem which tends to limit
savings; and
(2.) the lack of an effective mechanism for channeling
savings into housing for the mass market.
74. Ibid., p. 119.
75. Ibid., p. 175.
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Colombia's high rate of population growth -- about 3 percent a year --
and migration from rural to urban areas increases the problem. At the
beginning of the Alliance, there was a shortage of about 277,000
housing units. This shortage had increased to about 375,000 housing
units as of 1966. Moreover, it was estimated in 1966 by Colombia's
Land Credit Institute that of the 778,000 available urban housing
units in Colombia, about 200,000 or about 25 percent were sub-standard.
In rural areas there was a shortage of an estimated 500,000 units as
of 1966. Colombia's Agriculture Bank estimated that, in addition,
about 400,000 rural housing units in Colomtbia were sub-standard.
Colombia's housing construction:
Year AID Goal
1962 20,000
1963 60,000
1964 80,000
1965 100,000
1966 100,000
Total 360,000
Total housing
units constructed
64,278
44,876
40,859
32,501
41,543
224,057
Shortfall
44,278
15, 124
39,141
67,499
58,457
135,943
Standards. If we want to see the standards of housing in Colombia,
let us look at the next item, health and sanitation, that shows how
rural housing, where half of the country's population lives, is.
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7. Health and Sanitation.
In rural housing, for 46% of the population, 8,060,173 people, health
and sanitation conditions at home are these: 75
68% of housing without floor
92.6% without running water
88.7% housing without w.c.
97.4% housing without showers
95.8% housing without electric power !!!!!!!
Galbraith says:7 6
Work was begun in 1962 on the national water supply
and sewerage plan to expand existing supplies and
sewerage schemes and to provide new services. It
does not include Bogota, Medellin, Barranquilla,
Cali, Cartagena, Manizales, Bucaramanga and Cucuta,
which have their own plans. It is reported that
348 projects were progressing in 380 localities at
the end of 1964. The Ministry of Public Health was
playing its part by its campaign for basic rural
sanitation and was constructing a number of small
water-supply projects.
This is our AID data about the percentage of urban population for which
potable water is available:77  Percent change
Prealliance period Alliance period
1957 1961 1966 1958-61 1962-66
66.9 72.6 77.6 8.5 6.9
Percent of urban population with sewerage systems:
52.3 56.6 59.5 8.2 5.1
75. German Guzman, Camilo, El Cura Guerrillero, Tercer Mundo, 1967, p.4 8.
76. W. 0. Galbraith, Colombia: A General Survey, Oxford University
Press, 1966, p. 27.
77. CR, p. 127. 
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This is the ten-year plan for water supply in rural and
in Colombia, 1961-1971! 78
Average number
Estimated Urban Without to be supplied
Population Water Yearly
1961 6,289,000 1,334,000 248,000
1971 9,437,000 4,482,000
urban areas
Annual cost of
construction at
50 per capita
12,405,000
Estimated Rural
Population
1961 8,663,000
1971 10,587,000
Without
Water
5,171 ,000
7,095,000
Average number
to be supplied
180,200
What a pity that this plan was made in order to have in 1971 9,237,000
over the expected population of 20,000,000 without water.
Also, according to the 1964 census, the shift in population was from
60 to 46 percent in rural areas, which is not according to this plan;
it will make water to be provided to the cities more expensive.
This is an idea of what the authorities of Colombia care for the most
elementary thing for people: water.
8. Medical Care.
Wurfel says7 9:
In 1960, over 50 percent of the population was under
twenty years of age, and less than five percent was
78. Population Dilemma in Latin America, J. Mayone Stycos and Jorge Arias,
eds., Potomac Books, Inc. Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 172.
79. Seymour W. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombiap. 26.
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10 p.c.
1,820,000
15 p.c.
2,703,000
60 or over. Comparable percentages in the U.S. are
32 percent over 20 and eight percent over sixty. The
infant mortality rate in Colombia in 1959 was 96.9
per thousand as compared with 26.4 in the U.S. and
58.7 in Venezuela.
The data about medical services is very alarming, mainly because there
are very few opportunities for people without money, the most, to see
a doctor:80
Percent change
Prealliance period
1957 1961 1966 1958-61
Number of physicians per 10,000 people:
3.5 3.9 4.3 11.4
Nurses trained annually:
57 79 107 38.6
Hospital beds per 100,000:
1.6 1.6 2.4
Life expectancy at birth (in years):
47 51 59.3 8.5
Death rate per 1,000 population:
12.4 11.0 9.4 -11.3
Infant mortality per thousand live births:
100 89.6 79.0 -10.4
Alliance period
1962-66
10.3
35.4
50
16.3
-14.6
-11.4
80. CR, p. 127.
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The physicians distribution throughout the country is very uneven.
Let us see it in 1962:
Colombian Physicians Number Ratio
Capital and cities from 500,000 3,784 7.4
Remainder of the country 3,669 3.8
This fact means that in four cities, Bogota, Barranquilla, Medellin
and Cali there were 3,784 physicians for 3,500,000 people, and in the
other cities and the countryside the unbelievable record of one
physician for 40,000 people; this is how the "civilized" live in a
different world from the miserable poor.
9. Labor Force.
According to the 1964 census, 54.3 of the population was between 15
and 64 years old. The population in that year was 17,482,420, which
means in the actual conditions a potentially active population of
8,416,500.
The Colombian Institute of Public Opinion calculated in 1962 an active
working force of 5, 010,000, with this distribution:8 1
(my calculation by sectors)
81. W. 0. Galbraith, Colombia: A General Survey, Oxford University
Press, 1966, p. 152.
Primary
Agriculture and related
Extractive industries
Secondary
Processing industries
Building and construction
Electricity, gas, water
Te rci a ry
Services
Commerce
Transport, communications
Other activities (N.B.-Government?)
These five million workers represent less than one-third of the total
population. Other facts we can notice in this table is how, while
more than half of the population is engaged in agriculture, only ten
percent of the labor force is in the processing industries, and thirty
percent of the labor force is in services.
The distribution of workers by economic categories is: 82
Percentage Number
Employers 10.3 516,030
Independent workers 23.7 1,187,370
Domestic servants 8.3 415,830
Employees 19.5 976,956
Laborers and handicrafts 33.0 1,653,300
Others 5.2 260,520
5,010,000
82. Ibid., p. 153.
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Number
2,760,500
65,100
2,825,600
Percent
55.1
1.3
56.4
501,000
175,300
15,000.
691 ,300
10.0
3.5
0.3
13.8
481 ,ooo
265,500
170,300
576,000
1,492,800
9.6
5.3
3.4
11.5
29.8
-I
We can observe the high proportion of people working in unproductive
work, like servants; the proportion of skilled workers is not in my
hands, but we saw how the processing industries, where the skilled
labor is, only occupies 10 percent of the labor force.
Antonio Montana, in Colombia, pais formal y pais real, states that:
According to studies by the National Planning Council,
there was in 1951 in the activities of mining, con-
struction and transports, from 42 to 52 workers by
employer; in commerce 121 workers by employer, and
in manufacturing, 14 workers by employer.
10. Unemployment.
If we find that the rates of employment are so low and distributed in
the way that fits more the elites of the country in order to give them
more profits and comfort, when we look at the data about unemployment,
we can imagine the painful situation the people of my country are
going through.
According to studies of ANDI (National Association of Industrialists),
84in Camilo, El Cura Guerrillero, by Guzman, in 1966, 225,000 new workers
needed jobs, but only 81,000 could find a place, and of this number,
83. Antonio Montana, Colombia, pais formal y pais real, Editorial
Platina, Buenos Aires, 1963, p. 258.
84. German Guzman, Camilo, El Cura Guerrillero, Tercer Mundo, 1967,
p. 49. (Bogota)
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industry only absorbed 8,467, and 144,000 young men could not find
jobs, and we know that the countryside, under the present circum-
stances is giving away more people. Is this supposed to be a
country in ways of industrialization?
The CR says that the actual rate of unemployment in Colombia is
20 percent of the labor force, and that in 1971 it will be 36 percent.
New jobs are created at about 50,000 a year, while
the work force is growing at a rate of 200,000 to
300,000 a year. 85
Many causes can be adduced for explaining the disastrous state in which
the elites have thrown the people of my country, but nothing will be
able to hide them any more, because it is very possible now to point
to them one by one; this state of hunger they are incubing in my
country, in a few years more, with 36 percent of unemployment, will
produce the elimination of the same lords that concocted it with their
greed. AID has seen the problem already:
AID has determined that the undertaxing of land in
Colombia and that periods of overvalued exchange rates,
due to the pace of inflation and Colombia's pegged
exchange system, which encouraged manufacturers to
import capital equipment, were factors that may have
contributed to unemployment in Colombia. With respect
to undertaxed land, AID reasoned that higher taxes on
land could lead to more intensive use of the land and
thereby reduce rural unemployment provided that capital-
intensive methods were not employed. 86
85. CR, p. 147.
86. CR, p. 148.
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11. Income Distribution.
It is very difficult to ascertain the truth about income distribution
in Colombia. Of course we may assume that it is very uneven, or better
put, that a few ones own the most, and that the whole of the people own
nothing. But even so, how much do the rich people own?
I guess through the income tables the regime elaborates for taxation
purposes, there is very little that we can know. We saw for example,
when analyzing the land problems, that just in 1963, it was discovered
that the landowners were smuggling from taxation more than 5,000,000
hectares in farms larger than 2,000 hectares each one. So, what kind
of precision can we suppose from the rest of the government data about
taxation?
In a fiscal study of Colombia made by the OAS and the IDB, that must
have been done in 1962,87 we find what we are talking about. The
official Colombian data indicates that the income distribution in 1961
is in these terms:
9.69 of the people, the rich, received 41.31 of the total income;
2.15 of the people, the rich, received 18.95 of the total income;
.91 of the people, the rich, received 12.44 of the total income;
64.54 of the people, the poor, received 26.16 of the total income;
11.06 of the people, the poor, received 1.92 of the total income.
There we can see the tremendous inequality.
87. Source: Study published by the Pan American Union, General
Secretariat of the OAS, Washington, D.C., Spanish Edition 1967,
p. 235.
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These income distributions are understood to be among the people who
work. So we know that among the poor people, mainly, these shares
will have to be distributed among the family, and we know that fami-
lies have a tendency to be more numerous among the poor. Besides
that, we know that unemployment hits just in the middle of the poor,
too. Here we are just counting those poor who manage to get a job.
Ramiro Cardona, a Colombian, in a newspaper supplement, writes that
in Colombia a worker must feed himself and three people more, while
in a developed country, each worker must feed himself and less than
a person more.
Nevertheless, let us go on. In terms of dollars, we know from the
OAS study we are analyzing, that while
64.54 of the workers earn less than 187 dollars a year,
2.15, the rich, receive 1,187 dollars a year, and
.91, the rich, receive 1,750 dollars a year.
No wonder that foreign companies like the same thing to continue, when
they can have a worker working for 187 dollars a year. But this is
not all. Some clues about the way the fine, educated, professional
elites in the cities are cheating in their income tax accounts: accor-
ding to a test administered among some professionals in Bogota, by the
88. Tercer Mundo, Number 50, December 1968, Bogota.
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OAS people, they found out that "this data indicates that doctors
and lawyers are hiding their income at least 50 percent." 8 9
I guess this is enough by now.
We will see more about the wealth concentration when we write something
about corporate ownership in Colombia.
12. Foreign Investment.
The CR says that:
AID established goals to encourage Colombia to establish
the incentives necessary to attract such investment and
to press Colombia to enter into a comprehensive invest-
ment guak'antee agreement with the United States. 90
We will see why later.
According to the CR, p. 152, American investment in Colombia during
the Alliance has risen from 435 million in 1961 to 576 million in
1966; American investment represented half of the foreign investment
in 1963. The 200 American industries are heys for the existence of
the country by now; tWo-thirds of them are 95 percent or more American-
owned.
The next table explains the recent allocations of American investment
in Colombia: 91
89. OAS Study, p. 100.
90. CR, p. 152.
91. Source: Wurfel (First National City Bank of New York: Colombia,
1964, p. 9.) 
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Primary Economic Factors
1950 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Total investment 193 401 424 425 455 465
Petroleum investment 112 225 233 229 257 246
Manufacturing investment 25 77 92 94 102 120
Trade investment --- --- --- --- 51 52
Public utility investment --- --- --- --- 27 27
Other 56 99 99 102 18 19
Earnings (total) 16 17 26 33 21 33
Transferred to U.S. 10 11 19 27 12 25
Reinvested in Colombia 6 6 8 7 10 8
% of total investment 8.3% 4.2% 6.1% 7.8% 4.6% 7.1%
New capital from U.S. -7 11 15 -7 21 -l
But here I find that the American capital seems not to be earning too
much: 4%, 6% and 7%. But American investment must earn much more;
we saw before how onerous American credit is for Colombia.
In the CR we read:
Publicly and privately, other Colombian officials
elaborated on this point. They felt that foreign
credits were cheaper than foreign investment because
they resulted in a fixed charge on the balance of
payments over a fixed period of time, while remittances
from foreign investment represented an open-ended
charge over an indefinite period of time. It was
noted, in this respect, that-foreign firms tended to
try to recoup their capital investment in periods of
only three to four years, even if they did not try to
rppatriate all of it in that period. In addition,
foreign investment was frequently made in ways which
minimized the inflow of dollars, and created additional
demands for domestic peso credit while increasing the
future potential demands on Colombia's foreign exchange
resources. An example would be a foreign firm which
brought in as few dollars as possible and borrowed the
balance of its capital needs on the local peso market,
sometimes to buy a going Colombian concern rather than
to establish a new industry. In such a case, the local
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concern would shift to foreign ownership with only
a very small, if any, net addition to the country's
industrial capacity. 92
German Guzman, a Colombian priest and sociologist writes:93
a. for each dollar of American private direct
investment in Colombia, there are extracted 2.27
dollars between profits and dividends. (Source:
Financial Statistics, October, 1966, p. 86.)
b. between 1951-61 for each dollar that North
Americans brought to the country, they got almost
four dollars by effect of non-equivalent exchange.
(Source: U.N. External Finance of Latin America;
New York, 1963, p. 53.)
c. only in 1965 for -each dollar that the U.S.
lent to us, Colombia had to pay U.S. $1.50 for
mortgages and interests. (Source: Contraloria
General de la Republica. Revista Economia
Colombiana. n. 82, p. 35.)
From Antonio Montana's Colombia, pais formal y pais real, I translate:9 4
The major investment and also the major drain of
economic "plusvalue" are represented in the oil
industry. Within the total of foreign investment
that between 1955 and 1960 reached an average of
6 million dollars, more than 60 percent corresponds
to inversions in the oil refineries. During this
same lapse of time, the yearly average of exports
was of 75 millions, which Value was not reintegrated
to the country in the form of dollars (divisas). In
the period between 1921-1957, according to ECLA, the
oil industry has brought 127 million dollars to
Colombia, and has taken away as profits 1,137 million.
92. CR, p. 53.
93. German Guzman, Camilo, El Cura Guerrillero, Tercer Mundo, ed.,
1967, p. 50.
94. Antonio Montana, Colombia, pais formal y pais real, Editorial
Platina, Buenos Aires, 1963, p. 50.
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The major contradiction that exists between the needs
for development and the dependence on imperialism, is
in that the oil imperialist monopolies have accumulated
one-third of the country as future reserve, 27 million
hectares, of which they only exploit 1,393,647. The
Colombian enterprise that starts to experiment the
excludent pression of the international monopolies, is
being left behind: 88 percent of the oil is in the
hands of the imperialist trusts and only 18 percent of
the oil belongs to the State enterprise. The internal
market of gasoline and derivates also is excludent of
(the State enterprise)...and we know that only 48.12
of the oil is refined in the country...
Let us see what happens to the oil revenues in one year, 1961:95
Total Production 53,246,516 barrels
Value in Dollars
(U.S. $2.62 a barrel) 139,505,571.92
Value in pesos 933,007,331,86
Value paid to employees and workers 198.570.434,59
Paid to the Country in Taxes
and Profits 57.258.084,63
Taken away from the Country 677.176.812,64
Colombia has the richest platinum in the world. It is 86 percent pure.
...President Alfonso Lopez in his Message to Congress
in 1935: "The big mines of gold, platinum, etc...are
controlled by foreign capital. Oil, given or not,
goes to his hands almost always. But even so, we make
reckoning in our balance of payments, as if it were a
Colombian export, of the gold, the banana, the oil, the
platinum, that do not give us any economic or fiscal
profit, more than paying for salaries and the income
tax. The economic game of those industries develops
almost all out of the country, their products are
transported in foreign ships, and the gold of those
sales do not come back to Colombia. Those are the
characteristics of the colonial industry, that do not
impede that we be considered as a Republic producer
of raw materials. 96
95. Ibid., p. 235.
96. Ibid., p. 272.
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13. National Industrial Development.
In Colombia there are 63 private corporations and seven banks, three
insurance companies and an investment company.
The corporations in the exchange list of Bogota are:
Net Worth
In millions
Activity of pesos
7 sugar and flour mills and food
processors 265
4 breweries and I soft drink producer 788
2 shoe manufacturers 49
2 theater chain operators 50
11 cement, brick and pipe manufacturers 440
4 tire and other rubber goods
manufacturers 127
4 pharmaceutical, match, fertilizer
and soap manufacturers 30
5 steel and steel products manufacturers 707
1 tobacco manufacturer 33
15 textile manufacturers 877
5 construction companies 79
1 furniture manufacturer 10
1 retail store chain 48
63 Corporations 3,503
This is wholly exclusive of all individual Colombian
enterprises and of the thousands of corporations and
unincorporated associations not listed on the exchange.
But I nevertheless think that this list is fair because it includes
the most powerful industrial sector of Colombia.
97. Seymour W. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombia, University of
North Carolina Press, 1965, p. 78.
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Aggregate Manufacturing Production. In this table we will find the
general aggregate by type of industry:98
Number of
Enterpri sesIndustry Group
Number of
Employees
In Thousands
Gross
Production in
Millions of
Dollars
Food
Beverages
Tobacco
Textiles
Wearing apparel
Wood, except furniture
Wood furniture
Paper
Printing
Leather, except shoes
Rubber products
Chemicals
Oil and coal products
Non-metallic minerals
Basic metal industries
Metal products, except machinery
and transportation equipment
Non-electric machinery
Electrical appliances
Transportation items
Miscellaneous industries
2,727
209
197
453
1 ,983
401
402
95
442
256
57
487
17
982
24
575
231
196
561
260
39
16
4
44
31
6
5
5
11
5
7
17
2
24
3
17
4
8
13
6
Totals 10,555 267
We can see how the most important industries are concentrated in:
344
126
38
203
69
12
9
29
31
20
30
103
71
59
68
47
10
34
25
23
1351
textiles, 203 million dollars, food, 344 millions, chemicals, 103
million dollars and beverages 126 millions.
Now, let us see in how many hands is this wealth concentrated. In fact,
149 people, enterprise managers, control 52 percent of the total economic
98. Ibid., p. 83.
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power and are tied very closely to the political power, as was
denounced in the same Senate of the Republic, in August, 1962. 0.16
percent of the shareholders, are owners of 53.93 percent of the shares,
while 63.83 percent of the shareholders only own 1.21 percent of the
shares, according to ECLA.9 8a.
14. Agriculture.
Agriculture as we know occupies half of the population of the country,
and coffee constitutes 65 percent of the external commerce of the
country (1965). Colombia is a one-crop country, where agriculture
produces 31 percent of the GDP, and we know the international market's
weaknesses that crops have, and all the problems for the producer
countries like Colombia.
Crop production capital is Colombian for coffee, cotton, sugar and
tobacco; but it is American for bananas.
Colombia is not self-sufficient in agricultural production; here we
have two tables of the Colombian agricultural markets:
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98a. Montana Cuellar, op. cit., p. 236.
COLOMBIA: VOLUMEN DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE PRODUCTOS AGRICOLAS, 1951-63
(Toneladas mitrioas)
I m p o r t a c i o n e s E x p o r t a c i o n e s
A r t cu1o s 1951 1955 1960 1963 1951 1955 1960 1963
1. Animales vivos (menos mariscos)
2. Lecho y productos de la lecheria;
huevos y miel
3. Legumbres, plantas, raioes y
tub~roulos alimenticios
4. Banano y otras frutas comestibles
5. CafS, to y especies
6. Cereales
7. Semillas y frutos oleaginosos;
plantas industriales y medici-
nales, paja y forraje
8. Azioares y dulces
9. Cacao
10. Tabaco
11. Maderas y produotos
12. Coroho y produotos
13. Lana, crines y pelos
14. Algod6n
15. Textiles vegetales
146 7.350
1.541 5.732
10.841
858
313
60.732
35.021
1.319
7.361
564
2.210
476
2.962
16.688
290
2.323
2.027
310
59.537
72.453
2.197
10.680
265
5.021
1.545
4.705
3.652
443
876
436
47
107
157
92.875
39.291
6.807
3.773
413
2.361
1.906
3.730
749
364
150
90
80
348
247
98.690
16.460
712
5.906
224
571
1.823
6.896
1.815
146
4.432
5
154.572
290.519
76
51.649
4.223
5.614
2
4
97
3
33 284 913
*--
1.214
209.622
355.015
80
40
190.813
359.325
951 59
27.801 150
4.563 6.401
45.398 64.478
7 16
121 26.093
0 56
3.559
202.595
371.092
3.464
36
43.100
20
11.432
113.380
19
34
22.230
181
Fuente: DANE, Anuario de Comercio Exterior, VolUmenes
* Cantidad inferior a la mitad de la unidad.
Respectivos a los Anos Indicados.
I~
COLOMBIA& VALOR DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE ALGUNOS PRODUCTOS AGRICOLAS 1951-63
(En miles do d6lares)
Ia p o r t a o io n e s E x p o r t a a i o n e s
A r t I a u 1 o a 1951 1955 1960 1963 1951 1955 1960 1963
1. Animales vivos (enos marisoos) 438 8.478 1.982 424 1.129 40 107 269
2. Leche y productos do lecheria;
huevos y miel 1.219 4.197 157 32 4 0 - -
3. Legumbro, plantas, raices y
tubiroulos alimentiolos 1.130 496 13 20 * 122 6 119
4. Banano y otras frutas comestibles 343 785 68 201 8.784 16.850 13.692 13.257
5. Caf$ to y especies 463 423 200 308 359.780 487.387 332.249 303.005
6. Cereales 7.800 6.027 8.351 9.160 - 7 406
7. Semillas y frutos oleaginosos;
plantas industriales y medici
nales, paja y forraje 10.702 16.211 10.799 4.757 777 851 315 324
8. Azticares y dulces 346 472 229 262 7.935 2.385 20 5.606
9. Cacao 5.588 8.556 2.461 3.576 - - 16
10. Tabaco 1.402 880 1.379 720 2.052 2.156 2.398 7.210
11. Maderas y productos 853 1.435 459 262 239 800 2.198 3.473
12. Coroho y productos 483 1.260 1.289 644 0,9 - 8
13. Lana, crines y polos 15.232 16.797 10.559 10.521 10 59 26 87
14. Algod6n 24.595 6.332 802 1.292 158 673 12.876 12.532
15. Textiles vegetales 433 333 201 163 2 * 9 70
Fuente: DANE - Anuario do Comeroio Exterior, Colombia.
* Cantidad inferior a la mitad do la unidad.
The special problem of coffee exports is its price fluctuation in
the international market.
Up to 1955, the high price of coffee had an expansionary
effect but the fall in the price in the 1956-1958 period
caused inflation when the resultant drop in foreign
exchange earnings coincided with a high demand for
imports. It is estimated...that a fall of ten percent
in the price of coffee in New York is sufficient to
cause an immediate reduction of 1.5 percent in the
national income without taking into account the secon-
dary effects. 99
Very slow diversification of production is nevertheless taking place
and there seems not to be any possibility of a serious regulating
price mechanism with the intervention of the buying countries.
Livestock. The livestock number in Colombia is "over sixteen million
head of cattle and seven million of sheep, pigs, goats, horses, mules
and donkeys."100 But there is neither an internal high or external
productive market organized and the ownership problem is similar and
parallel to land ownership.
Fishing. Fishing is not a developed industry in Colombia. Only
1.5 million dollars of shrimp are exported a year.
99. W. 0. Galbraith, Colombia: A General Survey, Oxford University
Press, 1966, p. 96.
100. Seymour W. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombia, University of
North Carolina Press, 1965, p. 43.
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Forestry. Colombia exports to the United States and Britain 2 million
dollars of logs and lumber and paper is made from sugar cane waste.
Colombia, where the "Social Agrarian Reform" is being used with so
much fanfare about change, demonstrates that:
a. Colombia's per capita agricultural production has
declined during the Alliance;
b. the average daily per capita intake in Colombia
has decreased during the Alliance, below the 2,500
calories required for an adequate diet;
c. the augment in production of food and crops during
the Alliance, resulted mainly from expansion of areas
under cultivation. Production of five of the six most
valuable crops were less in 1966 than production before
the Alliance.
According to AID, the factors adversely affecting the agricultural
production of Colombia are:
a. problems in planning;
b. maldistribution and inadequate utilization of land'
c. lack of agricultural credit;
d. insufficient availability of fertilizers and pesticides;
e. lack of marketing and distribution;
f. insufficient storage facilities.
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Colombia has about 275 million acres of land, of which
about 65 million acres were in agricultural use in 1966.
Of the 65 million acres, about 9.4 million acres were
under cultivation and the balance in pasture and fallow.
In 1967, between 40 and 45 percent of Colombia's labor
force was employed in agriculture. Colombia's agricul-
ture sector accounts for about 30 percent of the
country's GDP, which makes it one of the most signifi-
cant sectors in the Colombian economy. 101
table shows that per capita agricultural production
the exception of crop production:
Index of Per Capita Agriculture Production
is decreasing,
(1957-59 = 100)
1960-64 1964 1965
Overall
Food production
Crop production
Crop production, excluding coffee
Livestock production
Based on
Source:
preliminary data.
U.S. Department of
101
101
102
107
99 97 97
99 102 100
100 98 98
111 106 112
97 95 93 94
Agriculture and AID.
Average daily per capita caloric intake has declined during the Alliance
into proportions below the 2,500 caloric limit for a normal person:
Year
Caloric Average
1967
2,525
1961
2,466
1966
2,428
Source: CR, p. 122.
101. CR, p. 122.
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This
with
19661
The AID mission director informed us in November 1967
that the shortfall in caloric intake, although
increasing, was not considered critical. This view
differed from the mission's food-for-peace officer,
who pointed out that the above averages did not reflect
the wide variance in the caloric intake between
Colombia's high and low income groups or the protein
deficiencies in the diet of Colombia's low income
groups...In this regard a mission study estimated, in
December 1966, that one-third of Colombia's population,
principally that located in the less prosperous urban
areas, had a caloric intake of only 1800 calories a
day. 102
This table shows the diminution in yields per hectare in four of the
six most important agricultural crops:
B rown
Coffee Rice Sugar Sugar Corn Potatoes
Total production
(thousands of tons):
1957
1961
1966
Yield (tons per hectare):
1957
1961
1966
365
450
456
0.46
.54
.56
350 234
474 363
700 386
1.84
2.00
1.86
4.4
5.8
4.2
480
610
650
2.6
2.8
2.4
1.2 11.4
1.1 11.5
1.0 10.2
Source: Department of State and AID.
Credits. According to AID, 600,000 agricultural families do not qualify
for bank credit, but I find this data very low.
102. CR, p. 111.
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Year
698
758
895
682
551
832
... About 15 percent of bank loans in Colombia are
agricultural credits. It has been reported by a
leading United States commercial banking institu-
tion that these funds are channeled to large farmers
who have the resources and ability to use the funds
effectively. AID informed us in November, 1967 that,
at the close of 1966, the loans outstanding in
agriculture amounted to 36 percent of the total loan
portfolio in Colombia. 103
I have included this long portion of the CR because of the evident
interest it has in our study, for showing how the most elementary
requirement of a person, food, is fulfilled in Colombia, and how
the problem is seen by the AID.
15. Colombian International Trade.
Colombia for foreign trade is dependent on primary products: coffee,
crude petroleum and bananas, coffee being the most important one.
This dependence has led Colombia to balance of payment problems, caused
by the augment in prices in imports of capital goods as sophistication
augments in those products, and deterioration of prices of primary
products augments, principally by the lack of effective stabilization
price mechanisms.
According to Wurfel, 04 the process my country follows, very clearly,
is:
103. CR., p. 116.
104. Wurfel, op. cit., p. 84.
1. Colombia has a chronic balance of payments shortage.
2. International lending agencies will not indefinitely
underwrite this shortage and they insist that corrective
measures be taken.
3. The rest of the world does not pay a price for coffee
which will cover Colombian expanding import requirements.
4. This compels us to restrict needed and desired imports.
5. In spite of the drastic curtailment of imports by
licensing, their value continues to exceed that of tradi-
tional exports.
6. The ultimate solution is to diversify and expand
exports.
7. These circumstances impel us to use our abundant
resources to manufacture for export so that our terms of
trade will be more favorable.
8. We must sell in the world market. Thus, foreign trade
is a burdensome necessity rather than a spontaneous under-
taking.
Of course, these points of view do not say anything about who owns
the means of production. It assumes that the same people should con-
tinue forever accumulating wealth in their hands, and these points of
view do not say anything about the measures to be taken for the people
who are starving now, and for the measures to be taken in order that
the profits of the foreign companies do not impoverish the country more.
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Colombian Balance of Payment Status. 10 5
The International Trade of Colombia
Millions of Dollars
1962 1963 1964* 1965* 1970*
Exports 492 521 555 600 660
Imports -517 -529 -572 -600 -670
Trade balance - 25 - - 17 0 - 10
Net service transactions
and transfers - 95 -140 -140 -125 -220
Balance on goods, services
and transfers -120 -148 -157 -125 -230
Private long-term capital,
net 10 15 2 20 35
Private short-term capital,
net - 15 5 - 2 10 10
Official long-term capital,
net 80 97 152 160 185
Net errors and omissions - 2 1 --- --- ---
Deficit or Surplus - 47 - 30 - 5 65 0
*Projections
Source: Wurfel, p. 85.
As we can see, Colombia is kept running now by the official long-term
capital loans from the U.S.
Wurfel gives as an immediate and long-term policy for reducing the
balance of payments deficit, some measures that apparently seem very
sound:
1. exports expansion and diversification;
2. developing tourism;
3. continued import restrictions;
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105. Wurfel, op. cit., p. 85.
4. domestic production of import substitutions;
5. avoidance of short-term debts and austerity and
consolidation of outstanding obligations by long-term
lower interest rate refinancing.
These, as I said before, may be just some of the measures for
stabilizing problems of that part of the Colombian society that is
living in the twentieth century, and which needs industrial products.
But this is not, it cannot be, the answer for that part of the popu-
lation -- the most -- who live not only in another century, but in
another world. Solving the balance of payments problem would leave
them starving as always.
In the next table, of Colombian foreign trade, we can see the very
high dependence we have on the U.S. trade for imports and exports.
This is given to the fact that the economic ties of my country with
the U.S. at the present time are imposed on us in such a way, under
terms like additionality, that give the impression that my country
would not be able to survive without the U.S. "aid"I
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COLOMBIAN FOREIGN TRADE'
(IN MILLIONS
EXPORTS: OF DOLLARS)
Coffee
Crude petroleum
Raw cotton
Bananas
Sugar
All others
Total
To the United States
To EEC
To EFTA
To LAFTA
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
355 363 334 308 332 303
65 73 80 68 61 78
13 11 16 9
16 14 14 14 11 13
5 7 6
25 24 25 29 36 37
461 474 466 435 463 446
319 321 298 260 267 232
66 71 89 86 95 98
23 40 35 41 39 29
3 3 5 6 7 6
IMPORTS:
Machinery & equipment
Chemicals & products
Iron & steel products
Vehicles & parts
Paper & manufactures
Fuel & derivatives
All others
Total
From the United States
From EEC
From EFTA
From LAFTA
101 103 161 174 165
67 68 79 88 72
45 41 55 50 39
22 46 62 74 42
20 22 26 28 23
13 12 14 16 16
132 124 122 127 183
400 416 519 557 540 4672
238 245 294 279 278 242
79 66 98 112 105 85
41 44 57 66 66 49
7 9 7 10 13 19
1. Data derived from First National City Bank, New York, Foreign Information
Service, Colombia, June, 1964, p. 9.
2. 1963 import figures are estimates.
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During the last years, however, the share of imports from the U.S.
has decreased somewhat:
United States
Western Europe and Japan
South America
Communist bloc countries
Central America
All others
Total
(In Percent)
1957-61 1962-66
53.9 42.4
35.5 41.5
2.2 5.9
.7 1.8
3.7 4.5
4.0 3.9
100.0 100.0
Decrease Increas
11.5 ----
---- 6.0
---- 3.7
---- 1.1
---- .8
-1 - -
Source: CR, p. 169.
But I do not know how much Colombia is buying from American industries
in the other countries.
In the table of exports by principal products we can see the actual
percentages of the products we export and the importance that coffee,
oil, cotton and bananas have in our economy; but we know that in
reality the oil, bananas and platinum are not ours. Finally, in the
table of imports we can see which items should have a vigorous sub-
stitution import policy, in order to accelerate the industrial development
of the country: machinery and apparatus, chemicals and products, metal
and manufactures, vehicles.
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E
COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS
(Percentages of total)
I I T
'953
81 -6
3-5
0-4
o'3
o-r
12-4
1954
83'3
3-
0-4
0-3
0-3
10-7
'955
81-3
3-9
0-4
0-1
0-3
01I
10-3
0-4
1956
70-9
4-2
0-5
0-2
0-3,
0-2
10-4
o-6
'957 | '958
67-3
3-7
0-4
0-2
0-2
0-1
12-5
0-1
67-3
3-0
0-4
0-2
002
002
12-6
1959
66-9
2-6
0-4
O-3
002
0-4
13- 5
1960 I 1961
64-5
2-7
0-5
2-5
o-3
0-2
o-4
15-5
70-8
3-2
0-9
2-6
0-5
o-4
o-6
15-
1-2
- I
Coffee
Bananas
Tobacco
Cotton
Wood
Platinum
Cement
Crude oil
Sugar
1950
76-6
3-8
0.5
0-4
0-2
16-2
0-5
'95'
76-7
3.5
0-4
0-3
15.4
'.7
1952
78-2
3-6
0-3
0-4
0*
15.5
0-1
1962
71-6
2-3
1-2
4-O
0-5
0-2
0-4
13-1
1 -6
1963
67-8
3-0
1-6
2-8
o-6
0-4
0-4
17-3
1*-2
SOURCE: (I950-60) Plan general, pt. 1, p. 309; (1961-3); Bank of London &. S. America, Fortnightly R., xix/728 (1964).
I
co
COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS
1961 1962 1963
US$ US$ US$
m. m. m.
TOTAL 557-1 100-0 540-4 100-0 5o6-0 0oo-o
Machinery &
apparatus 174-4 31-3 184-4 34-1 150-3 29-7
Electric machinery 45-3 8-1 45-7 8-5 40-0 7-9
Chemicals &
products 87-8 15-8 87-4 16-2 79-6 15-7
Metals & manufac-
factures 64-6 11-6 62-6 11-6 51-6 1o-2
Iron & steel, & mfs. 49-6 8-9 470 8-7 4-1 8-1
Vehicles & equip-
ment 74-2 13-3 46-1 8-5 46-8 9-2
Road vehicles &
parts 53-2 9-5 37-9 7-0 36-1 7-1
Paper & manu-
factures 27-6 5-0 26-3 4-9 20-4 4-0
Textiles and manu-
factures 21-6 3-9 20-2 3-7 17-7 3-5
Wool & animal hair 13-2 2-4 10-2 1-9 9-9 2-0
Rubber & manufac-
tures 9-9 1-8 12-3 2-2 12-4 2-5
Fuels & derivatives 16-4 2-9 16-7 3-1 12-0 2-4
Cereals & prepara-
tions 25-2 4-5 14-6 2-7 9-2 1-8
Others 55-4 9-9 69-8 12-9 io6-o 20-9
sOURCE: Bank of London & S. America, Fortnightly R., xxix/ 7 28 (1964).
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Ten-Year Development Plan for Colombia.
Colombia does not have a comprehensive development plan to guide its
economic and social development.
In December 1960, Colombia published a four-year public
investment plann.. .that consisted of investment plans
submitted by various ministries and other government
agencies without regard of overall national priorities...
that plan was only a statement of statistical goals; it
included no strategy or procedures for achieving the
stated goals and it did not constitute a workable develop-
ment program. 106
Key factors relating to Colombia's problems in pdenning efforts
during the Alliance, according to the CR, are:
a. lack of political and financial support;
b. attention addressed to immediate rather than
long-range problems;
c. lack of coordination between the department
of planning and the planning of sections of the
various ministries and public agencies;
d. lack of sufficient basic data for sound
policy formulation and long-range planning;
e. lack of qualified personnel.
In early 1965, it was recognized that there was, in fact,
no Colombian development plan to support. 107
106. CR, p. 136.
107. CR, p. 137.
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The only comment I have for this problem of the national planning is
that, under the present circumstances, it will be very hard to have
"national goals" as the CR hopes for. The elites of the country
seem so blinded in their egotism, that they would never agree with
any "national goal" that has to do with giving part of the wealth of
the country to the poor people. This represents giving away part of
their self-taken shares. That helps to explain the failures of
planning under the present regime...
This problem of national planning constitutes one of the elements that
go into the economic circle of underdevelopment. Breaking it may
prove to be as hard as having the leaders of the country departing from
their views about what society is, and from their views about what the
ends of wealth are. As we can see, the levels of complexity of the
problem approximately correspond to the other sectors of the Colombian
economy.
More Planning in Colombia?
1. Colombian development corporations. Colombia is a
fanatic country for planning; there is a national
planning body -- the National Council of Economic Policy
and Planning; there is the Administrative Department of
Planning and Technical Services, with its famous Ten-Year
Plan for the Alliance for Progress; there is also a
National Civil Service Commission, an Administrative
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Department of Ci, lI Service, and a Civil Service
Chamber of the Council of State; each ministry has
its own planning body and besides has lost all the
effective power, giving it to autonomous bodies, each
one with its own planning body. And besides that, we
have three regional planning bodies like the TVA.
2. We have all the international planning agencies:
UNICEF, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ICAO, IAEA, ITO, ITU, WHO,
WMO; OAS organizations, CEPAL missions, BIR missions,
IFC missions, IDB missions, SPTF of the US, IMF
missions.
3. The Alliance for Progress.
4. Private programs: CARE, CARITAS.
5. Regional Development Corporations.
6. And the list of decentralized institutes doing
planning which I have included in Appendix A.
But Colombia does not have planning.
With this impressive quantity of planning bodies working accordingly,
Colombia should not be going through the times it is going through now.
Colombia's Savings.
Here we will find out what has happened to the general projections for
investment Colombia had in the Ten-Year Development Plan.
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Colombia's levels of savings, during three of the first four years
of the Alliance, failed to meet what AID calls "minimum marginal
savings requirements." Colombia's marginal savings were more than
1.1 billion constant 1958 pesos below the minimum levels required
by AID criteria. In addition, Colombia's gross national savings, as
a percent of GDP, declined substantially during the first four years
of the Alliance, compared with the pre-Alliance period of 1957-1961.
Accordingly with AID, the best measure of a country's success in
improving its domestic capital supply available for investment is
the proportion of additions to GNP which it saves; that is, its
marginal savings rate; a minimum of 20 percent of annual increments
to GNP should be saved, and in serious development efforts this
ratio often goes over 30 percent.
Table showing that Colombia's average annual marginal savings rate
during the first four years of the Alliance was a negative 4.7 percent:
(In millions of constant 1958 pesos)
Total, 1962 1963 1964 1965 Total,
1957-1961 1962-65
Gross national product 108,420 24,909 25,785 27,342 28,141 106,177
Increase in GNP 4,289 1,120 876 1,557 799 4,352
Gross national
savings (GNS) 21,166 4,453 4,422 3,809 4,486 17,170
Increase in gross
national savings +1,063 -239 -31 -613 +677 -206
Ratio of increase in GNS
to increase in GNP (marginal
savings rate) ...percent..+2 4 .8  -21.3 -3.5 -39.4 +84.7 -4.7
1GNS is the total savings minus net foreign trade balance (imports
over exports) and factor income from abroad. Net factor income consists
of the net receipts from the rest of the world of investment income,such
as interest, dividends, and branch profits; of earnings of residents
working abroad; and of other factor income of normal residents.
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We notice that the rate for the four years previous to the Alliance
was 24.8 percent.
Colombia's development program established that the level of
investments, financed to a large extent by savings, would be increased
from 20 percent of GDP in 1960 to 26 percent by 1964.
Table showing that investments were 18.2 percent of GDP in 1964,
rather than the 26 percent planned and the total investment as a
percent of GDP has declined during the Alliance:
(In millions of constant 1958 pesos)
Average, 1962 1963 1964 1
1957-61
Gross domestic product 22,043 25,400 26,200 27,800 28,
Total investment 4,479 4,805 4,780 5,058 4,
965 Average,
1962-65
700 27,025
899 4,886
Total investment as a
percent of GDP 20.3 18.9 18.2 18.2 17.1
The increase in investments, accordi
should rise from 18 percent of GDP i
ng to the
n 1960 to
Colombian Development
23 percent by 1964.
Table showing the 1ow levels of saving during the Alliance; an average
of 15.9 percent. Less than before the Alliance:
Gross national savings
as a percent of GDP
Average 1957-1961 19.2
1962 17.5
1963 16.9
1964 13.7
1965 15.6
Average 1962-1965 15.9
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18.1
Plan
The CR says that the factors contributing to the shortfall in
Colombia's gross national savings and the low marginal savings rate
were:
a. low interest rate: 4 percent paid by savings
institutions, compared to 14 to 24 percent charged
by lenders;
b. limited success of tax reforms;
c. inflation, that encourages spending in durable
goods, that tend to increase in value: the value of
passenger automobiles imported by Colombia during the
Alliance was more than double the value of passenger
automobiles imported during the 5-year prealliance
period;
d. increase in private consumption expenditures.
Table showing the high levels of private consumption expenditures in
Colombia:
(in millions of 1958 pesos)
Average, 1962 1963 1964 1965 Average,
1957-61 1962-65
Private consumption
expenditures
Gross domestic product
Private consumption
expenditures as
16,190 18,924 19,744 21,706 21,714 20,522
22,043 25,400 26,200 27,800 28,700 27,025
a percent of GDP 73.4 74.5 75.4 78.1 75.7 75.9
Savings are one of the most pervasive problems Colombia has; as there
cannot be a general purpose agreement on the needs of the country, in
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order to share between the ones who have, and the ones who do not,
then what to save for?
Inflation in Colombia.
After we saw the low savings and investment rates in Colombia, one of
the keys for the low pace of development of the country, now we will
see another of the points of the vicious economic circle around which
my underdeveloped country gyrates; as we saw, AID thinks that one of
the main causes for the low savings rate is the high inflationary
process operating in Colombia.
Inflation as experienced by Colombia in recent years,
tends to suppress the mobilization of resources needed
for development by discouraging domestic savings and
foreign investments, which are ingredients of paramount
importance in any development effort, while encouraging
capital flight and spending of durable goods which tend
to increase in value. 108
Table showing inflation rates in Colombia; preAlliance period 9.8
percent, and Alliance period, 15.1 percent of average annual rate.
The goal for the Alliance period was of 10 percent.
Year Rate of Increase (%) Year Rate of Increase (%)
1957 14.5 1962 2.5
1958 14.9 1963 32.3
1959 7.0 1964 17.1
1960 3.7 1965 3.7
1961 9.0 1966 20.1
1967 (8 months) 7.5
Annual Average: Annual Average:
1957-61 9.8 1962-66 15.1
108. CR, p. 149.
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The CR attributes the 1963 high rate of inflation to the Government
decreeing a wage increase of about 40 percent to both private and
public sectors, coupled with the monetary effects of a large govern-
ment deficit in 1962.
The CR attributes also the high rate of inflation in 1966 in part, to:
1. the devaluation of the exchange rate covering imports;
2. a substantial wage increase for the public sector;
3. heavy borrowing by the National Coffee Federation;
4. higher tariffs on prices of imported goods;
5. increase in.public utility tariffs.
We understand that other factors contributing to Colombia's
inflation have been the extent of central Government d6ficit
financing due, in large part, to the failure to increase
government revenues bdequately, by a combination of new
taxes and improved tax administration, and to the increase
of domestic credit.
The CR says that:
1. the Colombian Government's deficit financing amounted
to an average of 1,077 million pesos per year during the
Alliance period 1957-61, and
2. domestic credit has increased an average of 19.2 percent
per year during the first five years of the Alliance com-
pared with an average increase of 15 percent per year during
the five years preceding the Alliance.
-157-
See table:
Yea r
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Annual average,
1957-61
Annual average,
1962-66
(In millions of pesos)
Government Domestic
Surplus (+) or deficit (-) Credit
-95 4,139
-37 4,641
+83 4,911
-162 5,461
-1,296 6,762
-1,243 8,340
-940 9,577
-543 11,181
-1,397 13.078
-1,263 16,247
-301 5,183
-1,077 11,685
Annual percent
of increase
domestic credit
21.9
12.1
5.8
11.2
23.8
23.3
14.8
16.7
17.0
24.2
15.0
19.2
As we saw throughout the study, no mention was in the AID analysis of
the causes of inflation in Colombia viewed from the point of view of
the "structuralist" position we revised in Chapter One, and that
relates the problem of inflation in underdeveloped countries with the
low productivity in agriculture, with the patterns of land ownership,
with the terms of trade with industrialized countries, with the
exbrbitantidifferences in income between the rich and the poor, and
the rest of the inequalities inherent in our present regimes and that
"attempts to hold down the expansion of the money supply through bank,
credit restrictions, fiscal discipline, or wage and salary stops ire
in this view di rected "merely" at the symptoms of the disease, not at
its real cause. They may do more harm than good because, with the
structural factors continuing to exert their influence on the price
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level, a decision not to validate these pressures can lead to a
decline in growth, output, employment -- and to serious trouble in
the streets." 10 9 And this is what the regime is doing; trying to
solve the problems, the effects of inflation cause, but without
looking at the causes of inflation. The CR says about the measures
the government takes:
...the Colombian Government.. .adopted new monetary
measures which raised the legal reserve requirements
of commercial banks.
AID gives also as conditions for the loans to Colombia conditions "as
wage freezings" which put the load of the inflation on the workers. 110
...a new monetary commission was created as the policy
body on monetary, credit, and exchange policy.
Capital and Human Flight.
As a result of the inflationary process in Colombia, another point in
this vicious circle of underdevelopment is found: the rich people get
their money out of the country, and the technicians go to work in
other countries. This, at the same time contributes to aggravate the
problems more. To this, we have to add the capital the foreign com-
panies each year are taking out of the country.
AID evaluated the problem and estimated the amount of
capital flight in two of the first five years of the
Alliance. The AID-estimated capital flight from
Colombia in 1962 amounted to about $35 million and
109. Albert Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress - Studies ofEconomic
Policy Making in Latin America, Anchor Books, New York, 1965, p. 284.
110. CR, p. 149.
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in 1963 amounted to about 82 million. AID made no
estimate of the amount of capital flight in 1964...
A member of the consultative group reviewed the
problem in 1965 and estimated that the bulk of an
estimated 47 million decline during the first half
of 1965 of Colombia's international reserves was
accounted for by capital flight. 111
AID warns Colombia of not touching the flight of the capital exploited
by American "enlightened capitalism" because "establishing definite
and stable norms that govern remittance of profits and principal of
foreign capital investment may curb capital flight to a major extent
but that these controls will also restrict foreign investment which
is needed for accelerated economic development.1 1 2
About the human flight we saw that just in 1965, 800 professionals
from Colombia came to the U.S. as immigrants: "physicians, engineers,
nurses," etc.ll3 But I think that if we are an economic, social, and
political colony of the U.S.A., the most natural thing for a pro-
fessional is to try to live where the elites are, and not to bother
himself, having to work with the ignorant Colombians, who are not able
to pay the bills.
Government Expenditures.
On the average, the percent of GNP in relation to
Colombian Government expenditures has risen slightly
during the Alliance, although the 1961 percentage
was not again attained through 1966. In addition,
during the Alliance the Government has spent a larger
proportion of its available funds for development
111. CR, p. 166.
112. CR, p. 166.
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purposes. We also noted that at least 6 percent of
the 1966 expenditures represented subsidies to various
public and private organizations. 114
Central Government expenditures ratio to GNP, 1957 through 1966:
(GNP and expenditures in millions of constant 1958 pesos)
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 5-year Average
GNP 19,786 20,267
Total Central
Govt. Expendituresl,498 1,673
As a percent of
GNP 7.6 8.3
21,791 22,787
1,728 2,001
7.9
1962 1963 1964 1965
23,789
2,811
8.8 11.8
21 ,684
1 ,942
8.9
1966 5-year Average
GNP 24,909 25,785
Total Central
Govt.Expenditures 2,561 2,566
As a percent of
GNP 10.3 10.0
27,342 28,141
2,483 2,833
9.1 10.1
1Estimated by AID.
Central Government expenditures by functional distribution:
Function Amount,
period
1957-61
Local and national
defense
Transportation and
communi cati on
General administra-
tive expenses
Public debt service
Social welfare and
public healtn
Education & cultural
Water, sewer, and
other community
services
2,545
1 ,667
1 ,53
911
755
721
343
Amount,
Percent period
of total 19o2-66
26.2
17.2
16.3
9.4
7.8
7.4
3.5
3,277
1 ,03
1,344
2,230
1 ,2214
1,683
318
Percent of
Increase or Decrease
Percent (-) during
of total 19b2-66
24.0
13.9
9.8
16.3
9.0
12.3
2.3
-2.2
-3.3
-6.5
6.9
1.2
4.9
-. Z
-16 1-
30,0961
3,227
10.7
27,255
2,734
10.0
Other economic
development 339 3.5 231 1.7 -1.8
Mining and energy 328 3.4 494 3.6 .2
Agriculture and
forestry 311 3.2 648 4.7 1.5
Housing 169 1.7 240 1.8 .1
Inaustry 40 .4 77 .6 .2
Total 9,712 100.0 13,669 100.0
We have to notice the huge amounts of money the regime spenas in the
repressive apparatus, for killing peasants of course, when compared
for example against what tne government expends in schools.
Public Debt.
Anotner or the surprising things is to see how the "Public Debt
Service" is going so high these years. It is because the government,
composed of tne rich, has made the poor people pay in order that the
rich acquire more wealtn. It has converted commercial debts or the
rich into "National Debts." Let us see what Montana Cuellar says,
just about one case during the 1958 devaluation: l1
But soon,-things started to looK clearer. Because of
the pressure of tne high financers, the fix change that
had been operating tor twenty years was substituted for
free exchange. The exchange rose up from 4 to 8, and
the active in dollars put outside Colombia by the coffee'
contrabandists, by the ones who earned by double
accounting, rose up by 200 percent, the ones who had
obtained licenses for buying dollars at 2.50, were in
debt of nothing. They had paid its value to the "banco
de la Republica."
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114. Montana, op. cit., p. 224.
But the country now was in debt for U.S. $497,u47,000. The first
thing for the National Front was to convert the debt into a Nationai
Debt, giving it to the Colombian people.
the next financing was made:
Internal Credit
Fondo de establizacion
Banco de la Republica
In order to pay that debt
U.S.
105,735,000
225,332,000
External Credit
Emision de pagares
Prestamo de Bancos comerciales
norteamericanos
Emprestito del Import and Export Bank
Total U.S. $
79,400,000
26,5b0,000
60,000,000
497,047,000
Source: Montana, p. 225.
In Colombian money at a value or 6.4, percent average
of the price of exchange certificates, the debt was
now of $1,323,413.
In order to pay for it, there was created a 15 percent
tax on exports and 10 percent on imports. Thus the
"commercial debt made by the merchants and exporters
fraud was assumed by the Nation.
At the same time, Carlos Lleras Restrepo (ii.B., the
actual president or Colombia), politician and financial
advisor to the oligarchs, proposed to the Houses the
Amnesty Law, tor fiown capitals in order to have them
come back. Thus the fraud was legalized ana capitals
exported at 2.50 percent, came back to the country at
an exchange or 8, wnile the coffee producers and the
consumers paid for the ficticious commercial debt with
the 15 and l percent taxes.
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According to the AID, Colombia's external debt service burden has
almost doubled since the beginning of the Alliance, from approximately
34 million in 1961 to about 67 million in 1966. As a result, tne
percent of Colombia's export earnings needea to service its external
debt increased from 7.b percent in 1961 to 13.1 percent in 1966.
Colombia's gross foreign assets declined from an annual average of
191 million during the pre-Alliance period 19 8-1961, to an annual
average of $14z million auring the first five years of the Alliance. 1 15
Colombia's External Debt Service. External debt
External debt service service burden as
Year burden (in millions U.S.$) percent of exports
1961 $34 7.8
1962 36 7.d
1963 51 11.4
1964 64 11.7
1965 58 10.8
1966 67 13.1
Considering the level of exports devoted to cover the debt service, CR
says that
...a difierent member of the consultative group had
determined earlier that to require the use of 12 percent
of export earnings in Colombia to service its external
debt would be high and that a ratio of 15 percent would
be unsafe.
The debt service payments to AID, however, will increase significantly
after 1972 due to (1) expiration ot grace periods for repayment of loan
115. CR, p. 132.
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principal and (2) increased interest rates which become effective
after the expiration of the grace periods. in this regard of the
$264 million AID loaned to Colombia during the period 1962-66, the
repayment of principal on $233.6 miilion is to start in the 1973-77
period. In addition, interest rates on $147.5 million of the AID
loans wiil more than double after 1973.
What worries me more is what is Colombia going to do for paying this
debt during the 70's. The people cannot be squeezed more, ana they
have not seen the loans in investments which could pay back for
themselves. The loans were for the "National Debt" and for running
the apparatus, army, friends, and sharers of the regime.
And in this way we are arriving to the end of this analysis. From
pain to pain, we have been discovering the reality or what my country
is. From promise to promise the leaders have gone, using words and
words, the soft being replaced by the radical ones; in this way we
find Colomoia today, with a lot of non-accomplished vital promises.
Not oniy with respect to land problems the people have been deceived;
we saw what the situation was witn respect to schools, hospitals,
housing, income distriDution; I did not include in this work analysis
of how the earnings of the workers have been each year less, of how
the rich people hoard money in industrial revenues, ano some other
important aspects of the economic infrastructure of the country.
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Nevertheless, I positively know that they would make darker the
Colombian reality.
On the other hand, we saw how a country, the U.S.A., has converted my
country into one of its appendages through its domination in all the
orders of the national structure. We saw the terms in which the
so-called "aid" is given to us; dnd toe terms in which private and
official businesses with American concerns are carried out; and the
ways our economy is drained out and suffocated by the continuum of
this business profiting only one way: the foreign.
And if we want to proceed from now on, after seeing the reality, only
one thing comes- to our head: that this thing must stop, that this
thing must be stopped; that this thing must be changed.
We have to stop this violence which is being exercised against the
people for many years; the economic violence each day exercised on
the people; the political violence during the last twenty years by
using the army and the police, with its 200,000 deaths and its
American advisors; the social violence exercised on these people by
keeping them ignorant, and in this way converting them into servants;
the drainage in our economy by the U.S.A. The time for promises is
gone and we know how the pacific waiting of the poor in my country
only produces more hunger, death, despair, and promises, and deceiving.
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We have to ask ourselves, in front of this long list of failures
by the poor to obtain their rights being taken into consideration,
and after having talked or organizing, conflict, self-defense: what
to do?
On Violence.
Because now a new word comes to our lips, and that is violence. We
love peace, but does violence have any meaning to us? Could we think
of the poor people of Colombia as having to resort in implementing
their self-defense to that which has so largely been used against them
by the elites, namely violence? Because certainly vilence has been
widely employed against the poor people.
By violence I do not mean only the physical force, but I enlarge the
meaning of it, to comprise the psychological violence, and the social
violence by exclusion, and the economic violence by deprivation of
the opponents exercised by some group-or groups within a society. These
types of violence may be organized in a conscious or unconscious way.
Although the ways these types of violence are exercised may not be of
physical violence, body hurting, the ends are always body hurting; for
example, when a person or a group are subject to violence of the
economic type, let us say by deprivation of that person of a job, and
so that person does not have the access to food because he does not
have money, this type of violence is apparently not body hurting, but
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the product of this violence, hunger, is as painful, and as body
hurting as a knife. This is only if we talk about the physical product
of this apparently not-violent violence; but violence by hunger has
intellectual and psychological effects on the person that goes through
it; in the case of hunger, degeneration of the person, physical inability
to work and mental retardation are the products of it.
In my country, when we start seeing it nearer throughout the study, we
discover that violence exists in daily and great amounts, and that we
can recognize four types of it; great amounts of this violence are
used by the elites for trying to avoid change. These types of violence
are:
a. Oppressive violence from the rulers of the country
that exercise it on the poor people who dare to speak
for their unrecognized rights; this violence may be
exercised:
1. by economic means, by a few people earning
huge quantities of money while the majority of
the people starve;
2. violence exercised on the people by cultural
deprivation, by keeping the people illiterate
and ignorant, and by keeping the-people away
from the most elementary rights, these people
working for fattening the stomachs of the rich
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deserve health facilities, housing facilities,
food, land, rest;
3. by legal means which are used to terrorize
those of the poor people who dare to speak for
themselves; jails and a puppet legal system in
the hands of the rulers are used as instruments
for keeping people in their places;
4. military means which are used in terms of
the most modern counterinsurgency and anti-
guerrilla methods of the world, for fighting
and killing peasants. This fact has produced
more than 200,000 peasants dead since 1948. The
people in power are responsible for this violence.
b. Violence among the members of the ruler class for disagree-
ments when distributing the spoils of the country. This type of
violence involved for many years the peasantry following the
rulers, but it seems arriving at its end.
c. Violence as a defensive means used by the peasants when they
see themselves attacked by the army of the rulers.
d. Violence that may be called "exercised from outside," and of
which we recognize three types as existant:
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1. violence which is implemented by countries
that back the rulers, by countries like the U.S.A.,
which consists in providing arms and training and
"advisors," for the country counterguerrilla
operations, and for the police, especially. This
type of violence is also reinforced with the con-
tinuous menace of "continental forces," marines.
2. violence from outside, from countries that
back the rulers, and that is of the economic type,
by means of pressures and implicit menaces of
cutting credits and grants if some conditions, let
us say, facilities for foreign monopolies' opera-
tions are not given.
3. violence from outside countries, that oppose
the rulers of Colombia. This violence may be of
two types:
a. violence which is not exercised
inside Colombia; for example, the Cuban
revolution brought very fast responses
in countries like mine, that by fears
of having it at home, passed a law of
social agrarian reform, and in countries
like the U.S.A., organizing the Alliance
for Progress. This type of violence is
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likely to repeat if other neighboring
countries have revolutions of the
socialist type.
b. violence'which is exercised inside
my country and that consists in giving
help, arms, money, and training to
guerrillas fighting in my country.
Couldn't we use some elements of organized violence for defending the
poor people in such a desperate case?
And what do the scholars say about violence as an agent for social
change? Going over the actual trends in opinions about violence, the
causes of it, its effects, its relations with processes of social
change, I found very different and controversial theories about it.
Apparently we know nothing about violence; just a knowledge of its
existence.
Let us go, as an example, through one of the most comprehensive
analyses of violence and its relations to social change:l16
1. Bienen points out with respect to the causes of violence, the
existence of many mutually contradictory theories that try to explain
it. The two main streams of thought are:
116. For a more detailed explanation, see: Violence and Social
Change, University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 99, by Henry Bienen.
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a. an explanation of violence in a so-called
structural approach, deriving it from social con-
ditions, viewing violence as the product of a very
low ratio of social-want satisfaction versus social-
want formation;
b. a deviationist position that tries to focus on
behavioral and personality factors of the indi-
vidual, based on the reason that explanations made
on social conditions can be cut in so many ways.
Bienen does not fail to notice that these approaches
that "try to measure anger, frustration, and
aggression and are characterized by reliance on
quantification, and factor analysis, always deduce
them from the social conditions..."I11
2. With respect to revolution, revolution is almost always defined
in terms of violence; but this does not get us any further because
"it amounts to explanation by definition." 1 1 8
3. On insurgency, we have once more two streams of thought:
a. the one held by Debray, Mao, Lenin, that "sees
violence per se as functional for modernization, as
a purging force that makes men modern and makes them
whole, thereby preparing them for life in a modernizing
society."1 19
117. Ibid., p. 99.
118. Ibid., p. 100.
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b. the second one "which represents a response by
American theorists, e.g., Rostow, considers espousal
of violence as an end in itself to be a fundamentally
irrational response to the challenges of modernization
by a generation of romantic revolutionaries that is
passing from the scene. This irrational response is
correlated, in this view, with frustrating condi-tions
which have stymied development and is the cry of
leaders who have been unable to cope with them. Thus,
it can be explained as the violence of the "transi-
tional" period."
But the American literature on counterinsurgency is peculiar in one
respect: those who talk about the "transition" also talk about masses
apathetic to some degree, as when they espouse a "high military
strategy" of withdrawing or making costly "inputs" needed by
guerrillas who they assume are operating in a context of mass apathy.
Yet the same people talk about a "transition" that is defined by an
increase in political participation by the masses. Thus, we see the
paradox of holding to a view that sees increasing participation by
the masses while simultaneously believing that insurgents can be
dealt with on their own terms, abstracted from social conditions.
This literature also contains the notion that perhaps we should slow
up social mobilization, since it may be "dysfunctional" for a society.
This view leads to a turning away from a concern for social reform,
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at least in the short run, on the ground that reform may exacerbate
conditions or "disequilibrate" political systems, thereby leading
to violence.
There are also the works by Mosca and Machiavelli concerned with the
uses of violence by elites in order to innovate without losing their
positions in society.
4. When revising tne writings about ghetto violence, Bienen sees them
plagued with the same characteristics found when talking about counter-
insurgency, seeing violence in industrial society as anachronistic, as
the acts of peoples in "transition" from an underdeveloped to a
developed state and hence suggests that it can be treated as we treat
.120insurgency in the new nations.
5. Tne relations between violence and constant innovation or
modernization as system-transformation are revised by Bienen uider
totalitarianism: "terror is seen as being used in a conscious way
by the ieaders for system-transformation, leading to the use of such
concepts as "permanent revolution" ana "permanent purge" (Arendt,
Brezezinski,..Friedich)."
Bienen finishes by saying that "there is no body of knowledge that
one could confidently recommend to American policymakers who now
confront violence in America and abroad. We would be hard put to tell
120. Ibid., p. 101.
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them whether or not they are in an internal-war situation at home.
We would be as hard put to recommend strategies, or even tactics to
deal with the violence they confront, and which confronts them." 12 1
He also states that although violence and change must be linked, they
must not be treated conceptually as contingent concepts because some
of the most fundamental change does not result from violent revolu-
tion. But at the same time bienen fails to say when fundamental
change should be linked to violent revolution.
And here my question comes once more to the forefront: could not we
use some elements of organized violence to defend the poor people in
Colombia from the elites, and for pushing reforms of the social
structure?
We tind ourselves in front of a crossroads of opposite sets of
theories, clearly identified before, in which, if we take the side
of the ones who see the adoption ot violence as a means to self-
defense, and as a means for changing the social structures, we will
be adopting the side and we will be labeled as socialists.
But if socialism means the opportunity for the poor in Colombia to
have houses, education, jobs, health facilities, hospitals, food,
land, security, justice, a more even distribution of income, no
exploitation by nationals or foreigners, I am all for it.
121. Ibid., p. 103.
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If violence means houses, schools, hospitals, land, food, security,
justice, no exploitation of the poor people in Colombia, the end to
the exploitation by foreigners, I am all for it.
If socialist means and ends will bring all this good to the people
of my country, I am all for them. I firmly disregard the name of
"irrational" given to the use of violence in this desperate occasion
my country is going through.
But some people will come to me and say, "But why change through
violence; why not change peacefully?" And I would answer: well, by
conflict, violent conflict, I cannot exclude the fact that it may
happen through blood, by killing people in an organized way. But
violence, even if it is not bloody, will have to be exercised over
the elites in power in Colombia. We saw already how, for example,
the changes in land relations in my country, even the absolutely
meaningless laws, have occurred, because of violence exercised by
the peasants. These changes, of course, have been of a very partial
and short character, because the real power -- the guns -- have con-
tinued in the hands of the elites and the peasants' organizations
did not prove very effective at the time.
And still, I know, these people will come back, and tell me: "But
listen, you cannot guarantee that the leaders will not understand,
even if it is in the last eftort by the people to convince them, and
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will not become conscious ot the debts they have to the working class
and will not give away their riches." And I would say to them: no,
they, the elites in power, are lost, they have lost..their opportunity;
the last time they could have received a big help for doing this, the
help of the U.S.A., is gone. John F. Kennedy is dead and the Alliance
for Progress is dead, too. He wanted to give them money, dollars,
compensation for the riches they were going to pass to the hands of
the poor, and they took the money but they did not give the riches
to the poor. Their chance is lost. For four centuries the peasants
have waited. Do you believe thattthe elites are now going to give
their riches away, now that nobody is going to compensate them for
them?
I would propose to give recognition to and to help coordinate those
valiant men who are in the mountains of my country already trying to
change by force of arms the fate of their land, in order to learn
from them.
Let us go into our third chapter; the 'form of it is to see
Camilo Torres' story; and the content of the chapter is to see
through his experiences and failures, the most elementary needs of
a revolutionary type of work in Colombia. His case I guess, will
serve our purposes very well because as we will later see, his under-
standing of the causes of the problems of Colombia were very much
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like mine. He understood that social change is not occurring in
Colombia; he understood the rotten causes of the status quo for
keeping us under underdevelopment of all sorts; he dared to defy the
regime in all its different strata, went from not bloody to bloody
conflict and was killed with the guerrillas in 1966. He did not
change the government, but his ideas changed the mentality and opened
the eyes of many Colombians. The great difference that I see between
bamilo and myself in respect to the perception and attack of the prob-
lem, is that he started in a form of pacific reaction to the daily
crimes of the regime, experimented through many ways of "democratic"
competition with the regime, and step by step went radicalizing his
ideas, entered into the area ot conflict, and at the end went to the
guerrillas and there he was killed. i see myself in a different posi-
tion than he was, because I think I have learned from his experience
already, and because I am very aware that a revolutionary type of work,
in a country like Colombia, cannot be developed just as a responsive
system of action to the crimes and violence of the regime. It has to
be an offensive, creative, decisive, flexible, and disciplined action.
It has to be a movement able to organize itself in an economic, social,
and political way, the new one, which encourages the undecided to join
it; it must be able to take the lead in the action, and cannot be some-
thing gradually from total peace to total war, accordingly with the
institutionalized tactics of the regime, first bargaining and then
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conflict, but must be able to use conflict or bargaining indiscriminately,
as the circumstances ask for it.
Camilo represents the prototype for the violent change that I think
has to occur in Colombia. His ideas are being felt already throughout
the lanas of South America, wherever concerned men start working for
their land. He died just three years ago.
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Chapter Three. Camilo Torres.
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Military Communique No. 007.
The command of the V Brigade informs the citizens of the following:
As a consequence of the ambush that an armed group in approximate
force of 25 men produced on February 15th against a patrol of this
operative unit in the place called "Patio Cemento" of the "Corregimiento
de El Carmen," in the Municipality of "San Vicente de Chucuri," with
the aftermath that in its opportunity was given to public knowledge, it
was proceded to the identification of the corpses of five subjects
downed by the patrol's immediate reaction to the cootact, with the next
results, when it is still necessary to confirm definitely some of them
by the tecnic method of necrodactilia:
1. Camilo Torres Restrepo;
2. Aureliano Plata Espinoza;
3. Salvador Afanador, alias "Saul" or "El tuerto," who
participated in the assault to Simacota and was the
material author of the death of the first agent of the
National Police that lost his life in that opportunity;
4. Paulino Rodriguez Sandoval, alias "Policarpo" who
actively participated in the assault to Simacota;
5. N.N., without being identified.
Among the arms recuperated by the troops that intervened in the action
there is a gun model M-1 caliber .30 that belonged to one of the soldiers
that perished by the hand of the bandoleros in the assault of Simacota
the seventh of January of 1965. That gun, distinguished with the
number 5.088.554, was found in the hands of whom afterwards was identi-
fied as Camilo Torres Restrepo, with technically probed signals of
having been shot moments before its capture.
The corpses of the persons enumerated in the above list were buried in
a place located within the general area where the referred armed clash
occurred.
Bucaramanga, February 17, 1966
(signed)
Colonel Alvaro Valencia Tovar
Commander of the V Brigade
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What we read before, a literal translation of a Colombian regime's
communique from the armed forces, one of the common, daily military
communiques in my country, is the theme of this chapter, in which I
will develop the one that may be the most complicated work I ever
undertook. Many branches of the social sciences in which I would
not boast of dominance I shall use in this chapter.
Before we start on Camilo, I want to go back and see for a moment who
the responsible people, the elites, the ones in power are. They are
the ones to be blamed, for all that has happened, for all that is
happening to my country and for all the violence we will have to use
to oust them from their entrenchment. These are the people Camilo Torres
tried to engage himself against and they will be necessary for our under-
standing of the notion of organizing conflict in Colombia; they will
be the other party.
The Actors.
Let us give a look to the actors on our stage, Colombia. Some of them
like the political parties have been acting for one hundred and fifty
years, and at best they have been a continuation of the colonial times
under the Spanish; others are of more recent arrival, but nevertheless
manage and contribute to the conditions we could observe in the adjunct
study.
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In order of age, and real power-and-guns-and-dogma, the ones who have
played the key roles, and have been the core of the game are:
The Church
The (traditional) Parties:
Conservative
Liberal
The Government
The Executive
The Senate
The Courts
The Police and the Army
The Information Media
The U.S.A.
Now those actors without so much power and guns Let's imagine
these actors as the ones who have occupied until now, the less
organized, less effective strata, in the outside of the core, but
potentially more active:
The Abstentionists (non-voters)
The Students
The Peasants
The Workers
The Communists, and Other New and Little Parties
The Guerrillas
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Other outsiders, less influential, but each day more active in the
game in my country have been mainly spectators, but may change their
roles:
The U.S.S.R.
Cuba
Communist China
The Other Countries in Latin America
Comments on the Actors.
Before starting to write about the actors, in order to avoid the
naivete of believing the actors as being of homogeneous composition,
let us remember that being in government does not necessarily mean
detenting power, and power is a matter of very exclusive concern in
Latin America; real power has been traditionally very entrenched in
the hierarchies, a very usual fact in the Spanish tradition of power.
Mao Tse-Tung has a similar approach when, in his "Methods of Work of
Party Committees," he states: "In all mass movements we must make a
basic investigation and analysis of the number of active supporters,
opponents and neutrals and must not decide problems subjectively and
without basis.'
This way of appreciating the bureaucratic bodies will be of high value
when the moment of policy making comes, for any movement of social
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change, in order to look for different strata of dominance and
allegiance within the institutions in government.
The Church.
Traditionally, the Church has had to deal with all the supernatural-
divine and those nastier -- material -- affairs and goods in my
country. Because of a special agreement between the Pope and the
Spanish Kings' during the colonial times in Latin America, the Kings
had the power of electing the mandatories of the Church, and the
Church was rewarded by privileges and protection. After the indepen-
dence of most of the countries in Latin America in the early eighteen
hundreds, the same positions of predominance continued in the hands of
the Church.
But with the French revolutionary ideas leaking into Latin America --
and let us not forget that by that time, and I am afraid still now,
France and not the United States was considered the best place by
the elites of my country to send their children culture-absorbing --
we had the situation, that at the birth of the first political parties,
Clericarism -- the union of State and Church was one of the fundamental
issues of party fighting and the French liberalist ideas one of the
main forces in action.
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This situation sometimes arrived at such stormy times, that the
Jesuits were expelled two times out of the country during the last
part of the nineteenth century and twice they came back and still
remain there. Of course, in time this situation has receded, the
parties seem to have forgotten forever their discrepancies, and now
the Church represents the National Religion in my country.
In order to keep its position, the Church fought its way back with
equal wrath to opposing parties, and has participated, in a natural
fashion, in one of the biggest genocides in the history of Latin
America, in my country, the killings that have produced more than
200,000 deaths since 1948. Of examples of the encouragement of these
acts, from the pulpits, there are many:
Bishop Builles in a 1943 letter to his parishioners, when his party
was not in government: "The gravest is that the rajority of the dead
have fallen by the official bullets and the assassins will continue
shedding the blood of their brothers because there is no sanction."
Martinez Madrigal, another bishop, wrote: "What is happening in the
countryside by the hands of a gang of wrong-doers devoted to all
classes of crimes is but a putsch of the communists that aspire to
enslave our country." 1 22
122. Guzman, et al., La Violencia en Colombia, Tercer Mundo, eds.,
1964, p. 433.
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Economic Assets. The Church participates with its interests in the
economic power of my country; besides owning 85% of the educational
system, it dominates great portions of economic assets; according to
a conservative newspaper, "El Siglo," 12 3 the Church is worth five
billion pesos, cadastral price, without counting the lands of the
Church or the personal property of priests and monks.
The biggest worker's union of the country, the U.T.C., is also in the
hands of the Church.
Number of priests. According to the U.S. Army Special Warfare
Handbook for Colombia, pp. 182-83, there is one priest for 3,650
people, proportion only superated in Latin America by Chile, Ecuador
and the Guianas; this percentage represents approximately 5,400 priests
and Robert Dix, in Colombia, the Political Dimensions of Change, esti-
mates that half of them are foreigners.
Class Composition of the Church. The Church, of course, has classes
inside itself. In the same way as the actual Cardinal, chief in
Colombia, is the son of a President, the sons of peasants will be in
little parishes, but among the most enlightened of them, we are seeing
cases like Camilo Torres, one who challenged the hierarchy, and many
others who are active in Colombia now.
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123. El Siglo, June 22, 1965.
Church permeates the life of all Colombians during all their lives:
Church-parents-marriage-birth-baptism-Church-confirmation-two rites
of childhood-kindergarten-Church-school-Church-college-Church-marriage-
Church-no divorce-Church-death-Church-heaven or hell-Church; there is
no escape.
Summarizing about the Church, I would like to transcribe here what a
young Brazilian priest, Sergio Zanella, says of it: "The Church of
these days has become an economic enterprise as is General Motors,
the Esso Company, the Shell Company, and the rest...The Church inside
I live is rotten. It has deceived Christ, as a faithfui wife becomes
a prostitute, the lover of the State and of the favorable conditions
to its opportunism.,,124
So, we must consider the Church, I propose, with its deeds and its
allegiances with power and wealth in Colombia, one of the main ele-
ments and objectives that should be considered, outside any theological
discussion, when considering a program of social change, because of
its entrenchment and power, and size.
Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that lately, especially during 1969,
very encouraging signs are coming from the Church. A bishop and
sixty priests for the first time have issued a communique of non-
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124. O'Cruzeiro, September 14, 1968.
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agreement with the oligarchy... 125 When Camilo Torres was alive three
years ago, he was the only one...
The Government.
Let us say some words now, about the elements of "Government" in
Colombia.
The Traditional Parties and the Administration. Not only the
Presidency, but the Congress and Courts are shared equally by the two
traditional parties, Conservative and Liberal; they have been on stage
for more than a century now.
The structure of the parties is a vertical one. In the top there
stay the few leaders of the chosen class. Highly educated, economi-
cally powerful and very passionate for maintaining their leadership;
then comes the less than medium-size middle class and the ignorant
and the miserable, the pueblo. The pueblo is the majority.
If the issues of discrepancy between the parties had any significance
in the past, they do not any more.
The Conservatives were pro-Church, pro-centralists in government and
interventionists in economic matters. The Liberals, all the contrary -
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125. El Tiempo, March 7, 1969.
separationist wiith the Church, federalists, and liberalists in
economics. Actually, the country became centralist, pro-Church, and
a mess in economic matters.
The two parties (the leaders), as I said before, have been at peace
since 1958. They reformed the Constitution, excluded other parties
from government until 1972 at the beginning, then until 1974, and
now until 1978, and seem to have a good time, with this array of
things. But actually, this was not the norm before. Many civil wars,
daily intrigue and strife was the rule. From 1948 on they, I mean
the leaders of both parties, started one of the most infamous crimes
in the history of my country by pushing, and counselling, and arming
the poor ignorant peasants in both parties, to kill themselves; there
have been more than 200,000 deaths since then.12 6
What was the motive of all this? The leaders were playing power.
Playing to be or not to be presidents, and ministers and lawyers. In
1958, after a military dictatorship, the leaders decided to end the
peasants' war. From then on, they declared delinquents those who dared
to remain in arms, which they had done by instigation of the leaders.
From then on, it seemed as if the Saint Spirit, having descended upon
them, having cleaned them, had given them once more eternal powers to
declare criminal or good guys, at their discretion.
126. Guzman et al., op. cit., pp. 287-93.
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As a final note, some words about the Liberal and Conservative parties;
we should say that by no means they constitute homogeneous groups. A
great deal of daily factionalism exists among them, always centered on
the fluctuations of will among the leaders towards the collaboration
in their National Front. But this factionalism seems to be of no
danger to the position these sub-groups occupy in the management of
the country. Even those among the different personalist intra-party
groups which belong to the parties of the National Front, Liberals and
Conservatives, and that are sometimes off the cabinet for petty disagree-
ments, nonetheless continue sharing of the goods of power. These
tactical moves should not be confused with the lessening of their real
economic, social and polttical power.
The Army and the Police.
The Army and the Police, like the Church, have not been indifferent
to the national killing; they have very actively participated. Although
in theory apolitic, they have been an instrument, since 1948 mainly
in the hands of the Conservative party, for killing women and men and
children, and burying, and devastating.
The officials of the Army for a long time have been trained by the
United States; they also participated in the war in Korea.
Army Integration. The Army is composed of 32,000 men now. The Corps
of officials of the Army in my country, with great similarities to
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other Armies in Latin America, is mainly composed of middle-class
elements; they of course have an elitist aspiration, a life of
"glory," and the business of defending a rotten, legitimated con-
stitution, imposed on the country by the leaders.
The soldiers, they are peasants. Good as cannon-fodder. They are
the ones that are forcefully taken from the countryside, given boots
and guns and sent back to the countryside to kill their brothers and
sisters. These soldier-peasants are used to fight their brother
guerrilla-peasants. The high commanders would not go to the ambush;
they do not need it. The guerrillas may kill forty soldiers; they
will draft eighty peasants.
My final thoughts about the Army are that, potentially, it is one of
the most powerful elements for constructive social change in my
underdeveloped country, if its qualities were in other ways understood.
As a highly organized institution, it has some things like discipline
and managerial skills which could be used in other ways than for
terrorizing peasants. Their machines -- machine is the wonderful word
in an underdeveloped country -- could be used for building. Their
barracks could be good for schools and colleges. But no,
their forces are for killing
and also,
oh I cannot forget;
they build latrines
for buying peasants' wills.
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The Associations.
The so-called Associations are a very effective continuation of the
people in government into businesses. They include all kinds of
elements of production in industry and agriculture; they include
people from both parties and their business is to keep labor rights
down and preferential tariff treatments by the government in their
international deals.
The most powerful Associations:
Colombian Association of Coffee Growers.
National Association of Industrialists - ANDI.
National Federation of Merchants - FENALCO.
Agricultural Society of Colombia - SAC.
And there are along with these, other Associations with not so much
power, but the same orientation. One of the interesting things that
happen among the Associations is that they do not clash among them-
selves, let us say agriculture versus industry or commerce; of course
they do not; its interests are so interwoven, and their members being
participant in different businesses at the same time, no clash occurs;
neither does the Government clash with them. On the contrary, the
Government usually is the implementer of their policy-making.
Worker Unions. Part of the Associations are the worker unions. There
are three main worker union centrals in Colombia: one of them belongs
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to the liberal party, the other one is managed by the Jesuits and
the third one by the Communists.
The C.T.C. of the liberal party, according to the Dix estimates, has
150,000 members.
The U.T.C. of the Jesuits and the conservatives has 200,000 members.
The FEDETAV of the Communists according to the appreciations of Dix
has 50,000 members.
One of the most notorious things about this data is the very small
number of members in the Communist unions; there are many reasons we
could adduce for this, but I find it very difficult to give an ulti-
mate reason with the very reduced information that I have now.
Nevertheless, I would like to state those factors I consider impor-
tant now for explaining the weakness of the leftist worker unions:
a. The worker unions may be weak because of the internal
disputes within the left.
b. The worker unions like the political parties until
very recently in my country were used to being identi-
fied in the liberal party as the extreme left; even the
liberal party's flag is red. Thus we have the case of
the two bishops in 1949 forbidding their parishioners
to vote for the liberal party candidates who "wish to
implant civil marriage, divorce and co-education, which
would open the doors to immorality and Communism."
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c. We cannot forget either that the violent methods
Stalin used for industrializing his country were very
well publicized in Latin America as the alternative
for those who advocated socialism or Communism.
One important factor we have to consider when making a plan for social
change is that the actual membership in the unions does not raise above
a level of 10 percent of the labor force (Dix, p. 331), including
those workers of agriculture. Undoubtedly many allegiances could be
forged around an organization aimed to work for the non-committed
workers.
The Information Media.
I cannot go on without stating some words about the role the
information media has in government in Colombia. As my country has
lived most of the time of this decade and the last one under a state
of siege, so the information media although with a face of freedom,
is under government hands. But there is not need of a state of siege
for this, because the newspapers, radio stations, TV stations (they
belong to the government), are owned by the same people in government;
this is one of the most powerful arms the regime has for keeping the
scene in their hands, as the information media is a very powerful one.
Any program of social change not aimed very carefully or prepared to
confront this, may be easily twisted, ridiculed and smashed by it.
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The U.S.A.
The government of the U. S. has a great stake in the perpetuation
of the actual regime in my country because that is good for the U.S.
government and industry, in the sense that very few underdeveloped
countries show so much servility towards the U.S. as mine, under
its actual conditions.
My country is not a banana republic (although the United Fruit
Company was there long ago); my country is a colony; we are a
coffee republic and the rest of cheap raw materials. One-third
of the industry is also already American.
But as most of my naive friends in my country see it, that is good;
it is good because, they say, that gives jobs to the people so they
do not starve. And that is true and fine. That is what the people
of my country get: jobs so they do not starve.
No matter how the si4tuation,is, how bad, and the U.S. government has
understood that, with no matter what palliatives like the Alliance
for Progress, no matter how much the U.S. wants to help the poor, it
will not be possible under the present regime, with the present
economic arrangements, which vociferously decret es itself as being
the keeper of democracy and free enterprise, when in reality what we
have is the absolute kingdomcome of the oligarchs and the free right
to be exploited by the rich of my country and the forbign enterprises
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mercilessly at their will and protected by the "Governments" -- no
matter how much interest the U.S. had in "helping" us, any real
help does and will arrive to the hands of the rich and the Army and
then it disappears.
On the other hand, besides the American economic help and the
American economic intervention, other kinds of American intervention
are not new in my country. When in 1903, Teddy Roosevelt "took the
Isthmus," that meant that my country lost a part of it...of'course,
we received 25 million dollars for Panama, afterwards.
Not a person interested in social change should be naive and think
that the United States is going to allow things to change so easily.
After the experience of Cuba, the United States now knows what is
going to happen in all the countries in Latin America to all the
American industry, if they allow that matter of disorder to continue.
And of implementing measures for keeping "order," and "democracy,"
and "free enterprise," we have very clear in mind the very recent
events in the Dominican Republic.
No wide program of social change may occur in any country in Latin
America, less in Colombia because of its strategic position, near
Venezuela, near Panama, in front of Cuba (oh, no, a Red Axis?) unless,
the capabilities of the U.S. intervention are taken in their proper
scale; this fact must be borne in the minds of those who want to change
their countries with little revolutions and short-range vision.
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The Lesser Forces.
Now let us look to the periphery of the system: those groups or
institutions with little cohesion or no power, but existent -- and
potentially activable as militant institutions or groups.
The Abstentionists.
In spite of the two traditional legitimated political parties, with
their traditional "democracy," and "freedom," and "free enterprise,"
we find that the people, the majority, are not with them and here
are the tests in the form of percentages of voters in the elections
during the last years. (See table which follows.)
Thus we can see that while during the last twenty years the number of
eligible voters has grown by almost five millions, the number of
voters has only increased by one million, remaining shamefully low.
These abstentionists are a hole, an empty void. We know it is there,
waiting, and we may hope that whenever the non-voters feel moved into
action, they will respond. This they will do when they can see an
alternative to the present conditions, if the new alternatives fill
their aspirations.
I feel this is a very fertile terrain for a social worker; and there
is nothing in the near future that can change the present atmosphere,
-199-
PER CENT OF THOSE REGISTERED ACTUALLY VOTING IN ELECTIONS, 1946-19660
Election
May 1946
(presidential)
March 1947
(Chamber)
June 1949
(Chamber)
Nov. 1949 b
(presidential)
Dec. 1957
(plebiscite)
March 1958
(Chamber)
May 1958
(presidential)
March 1960
(Chamber)
March 1962
(Chamber)
May 1962
(presidential)
March 1964
(Chamber)
March 1966
(Chamber)
March 1966
(presidential)
No. of Voters
1,366,272
1,472,689
1,719,440
1,140,646
4,397,090
3,693,939
3,108,567
2,542,651
3,090,203
2,634,840
2,261,190
2,843,450 e
2,593,705 c
Eligible Voters a
2,450,696
2,613,586
2,773,804
2,856,339
6,080,342
5,365,191
5,365,191
4,397,541
5,338,868
5,404,765
6,135,628
7,126,980
7,126,980 d
% Voting of
Those Eligible
56
56
62
40
72
69
58
58
58
49
37
40 (est.)
36 (est.)
50. For all elections except those of 1966, see Registraduria del Estado Civil,
Organizacidn y Estadisticas, 1964, pp. 134-36. Some of the figures in this table may
vary slightly from those in Table 7 since they are taken from different sources. For
the two 1966 elections see El Tiempo, March 28 and May 6, 1966, respectively.
a. Neither prior registration nor possession of a cedula was required for the 1957
plebiscite. In the 1958 and 1960 elections eligible voters included those in possession
of an identity document (cedula), plus those specially inscribed on the electoral rolls.
In subsequent elections a cedula has been required, as was generally the case during
the 1940s. However, the cedulazation process was then less advanced than it is today.
Thus while the percentage of those eligible who voted during the 1940s is nearly on
a par with the National Front years, the number of eligible voters was proportionately
much smaller.
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because the actual administrative system has its "legal" rights
of existence secure, at least until 1978, according to the last
National Front agreements.
The Peasants.
The peasants number half of the country's population and most of them
are very poor. They are only articulate as power groups in places
where the guerrillas are alive, as we will see below.
The peasants of my country have been the victims of "The Violence,"
the leaders' ordeal of killing, but they still do not have class
consciousness, mainly because of ignorance and hunger.
Some while ago I was reading some theories about the reasons why the
peasants in India did not rise against the backwardness and bad dis-
tribution of goods in their country and destroy the system by
creating a new one. Besides their traditional outlook towards life,
and also maybe because of their lack of leaders, it seemed that the
reason was that hunger was their main anaesthetic. Some people say
that hunger pushes people to rebel against it, but too much hunger
weakens and kills. I think this is also a very important considera-
tion for the understanding of the peasants' situation in my country.
But I also could adduce in another direction, how in some of the
studies about squatters in underdeveloped countries, it seems that
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those who defy the regimes and squatter in other's lands, are generally
those people who have already had a taste of their potentiality. Maybe
nobody has done any deed for the peasants of my country that demonstrates
to them the inherent forces existing in them -- what the American econo-
mists call "the demonstration effect."
The Peasants and the Agrarian Reform.
In Colombia, with a land tenure system in which 71.3 percent of the
peasants own 5 percent of the agricultural land and 1.1 percent, the
landlords, own 55.6 percent of it, and 985,000 of 1,368,000 peasant
families do not own the land, now, with the existence of "Agrarian
Reform," initiated after the fears of a new Cuba, one thing may
happen: as the land tenure structure is inherently attached to the
other institutions in my country, any wide change of this structure,
at the scale of the exigent conditions, is almost impossible to be
thought of because that would be the disturbation and autodestruction
of the system; but in a few years more, when this "Social Agrarian
Reform" that started in 1961 or 1962 gives evidence to the peasants
that it is only a token reform, this agrarian reform itself will be
the cause of destruction of the actual system. If someone is able to
tell the peasants the truth about it, the people will move to act with
desperation in their own behalf.
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Bienen in his book, Violence and Social Change, said that among the
characteristics of modernization, was the ability to innovate without
falling apart. 129
The elites in my country have had the formal ability to innovate in
a negative way, to create new explanations for avoiding change as prob-
lems arise. We have to recognize in this ability a dirty trick to fill
the peasants' minds with promises.
One factor is with us, though, and it is that speeches go to one point,
but an empty belly is very difficult to fill with speeches. The
peasants may be turned against their lords; if examples of economic,
social, and political ways of liberation are shown to them, the
demonstration effect. This is my hypothesis.
I think Colombia is a country where land is still the element which
raises the passions. Half of the population still lives in the
countryside and a great part of the people now in the cities have had
their past in the land. Colombia is still an agricultural country,
a crop producing country, and coffee is our best product. Land is
the element which provides wealth and prestige or poverty and slavery.
Land is the element through which a cross-section of the different
strata of the Colombian population have their relations. Land is
where the lords meet servants, and where the rich manipulate the poor.
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129. Bienen, op. cit., p. 169.
The lords in the land may have in th&ir minds and in their ways of
life the most modern gadgets the twentieth century can offer, while
their servants are still two or three centurti.es behind in their ways
of living. But land is also the point where, because of its almost
overall backwardness, changes occur, and changes may occur in the
most unpatterned fashion; changes are likely to occur without a
consideration of orderly timing, in big jumps, and changes are very
likely to become violent as we will see from the observation of what
has happened in recent years.
I think the countryside, more than for tactical, strategic reasons,
is where the demonstration effect should take place in order to show
the peasants that they can lead a different life from the miserable one
they have now. There is a precedent for a demonstration effect point
in the countryside, which was created by the peasants themselves and
that, if it were invigorated, could give us the main strongholds in
the countryside. This new element is called the "independent republics."
Independent republics are a creation of the peasants as a response to
the attacks by the army of the government. They are formed by farms
seized by the peasants in the mountains and where the Army cannot go
without risk. The peasants have created their own laws, their popular
tribunals, their own taxation system, their own armies and training
camps, their own agricultural production, and their new schools. In
Colombia ata3a time there were eleven of these republics, as we will see
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later when talking about the guerrillas during the last years. I do
not know how many of them still exist. The main handicap to their
existence has been their uncoordination to respond to the attacks by
the government in an organized way. The government has had the
ability to attack them one by one.
My assumption is that those independent republics may become the most
striking example of a new revolutionary way of living; not only as
an example for the peasants, but also for the people of the cities.
In order to be successful, this demonstration effect has to overcome
the handicaps of poor communication in a rugged country like mine,
where the mass media is in the hands of the government, and it has
to overcome the handicaps of poor and scattered organization.
There has not been a sharp sign of the awakening of the peasants in
Colombia, that these attempts at self-discovery are being made. I
expect that communication from one republic to the other could be
the turning point for a demonstration effect campaign, in a compre-
hensive way. The role, among the peasants, that a highly skilled
intermedium system must play in this case, is of paramount importance.
I wrote about the intermedium systems somewhere else in this chapter.
The Students.
The students are such a little group in my country! In Guzman, we
read: 
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In 1965 there were no schools for 50 percent of the
primary school-age children, neither for 86 percent
of the secondary sbhool-age group, and 97 percent of
the college age group. 128
The students in my country constitute, as we can see, a very privileged
group, and the system seems to absorb them badly, but it does it, when
they graduate.
The students are a quite politicized group, but we must notice that
"status" is such a lure to them (this is the existent demonstration
effect in this case), that in most of the cases the college time
rebellion fades away. It seems that Camilo Torres, the dead priest,
had a high stake in them for following him, to fight in the mountains.
They did not go.
Nevertheless, any attempt for a scheme of social change should count
on the students; but it would be very dangerous to have them as the
very core, alone, for a program of change, as experience demonstrates.
The Colombian student hopes in general129 to raise his status in
society; and he does it forgetting or stepping on the ones that remain
below. My hypothesis is that if there were any ways of showing the
128. Guzman, op. cit., P. 48.
129. See: Elites in Latin America, Lipset and Solari, eds., Oxford
University Press, 1967.
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students the kind of life their brother workers and peasants have,
while living in the same country and the students not knowing about
it, many of them could become instruments of social change.
The Guerrillas.
When talking about the political parties we saw how after 1948, the
violence the party leaders ordered in the countryside produced more
than 200,000 deaths; for this deed they used the army-peasants and
the Church, both conservatives and the liberal and conservative
guerrillas. This situation remained until 1958 when the leaders got
tired of this game, and decided to declare antisocials the ones who
did not want to surrender their arms; this, after having killed the
parents, brothers, sisters and friends of those peasants. From then
on, these peasants were called "bandoleros," a denegrating term; and
indeed, many of these poor ignorant peasants after having passed
through such atrocities became killers with lost reason, indiscrimi-
nantly accomplishing their deeds.
Many of them also became poiiticalized by the leftist and communist
groups, and today the facts are very different. From an initial
numberl30 of 158 guerrilla groups known between 1949 and 1963, 34 or
them conservative (plus the army), 7b of them liberal, 14 of them
communists and the rest unknown, today the situation has changed,
130. See: Guzman, La Violencia en Colombia, pp. 287-97.
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towards a different ideological angle. 13 1 We have 11 active communist
guerrilla groups, and 15 non-active communist guerrilla groups not
fighting but practising area defense. There are also 26 non-communist
groups divided into 9 liberal ones of which 6 are of the party's left
wing, 4 conservative groups of which 3 belong, alas, to the right
wing of the party and 7 groups of unknown allegiance. Now I explain
tne location of these guerrillas in the next map. (See next page.)
The leftist guerrillas now as we can see have duplicated and are in
equal number with other kinds (conservative and liberal) and this is
a great change from tne precedent situation; this fact has a lot of
meaning.
First of all and very important, guerrilla fighting has chanqed from
hierarchical parties' allegiances before. to an evenness, to a class
party allegiance, giving ; different kind of politicalization ideas
as occurring Pmona the DeasAnts.
I have read some studies that indicate how the guerrilla fighting,
bloody as it was, has obliged the peasants in a very cruel way, to
take part in a national life they do not understand, and makes them
awaken to the reality of Colombia.
Other things like taxation, legislation and education which are imposed
by the guerrillas in the areas they dominate, especially the communist
131. See Appendix B for a survey done by the Jesuits, Revista Javeriana,
April, 196-.
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ones, converting their lands in truly "independent republics" as they
are called, have permitted the peasants to grasp the idea that the
actual regime in the rest of the country is not convenient for them,
unable to give them the most elementary services, and also have
given the peasants the opportunity of feeling what a power group is.
I think this is one of the most formidable options for any person
interested in social change in Colombia; to try to deal with these
existent guerrillas, that although they seem to have no coordination
among the, any kind of organization is not impossible to be made, and
this could occupy high priority withinithe struggle for social change.
Although the work of a coordinator snould very strongly emphasize
these countryside fighters with urban links.
I remember Professor Schon at M.i.T. emphasizing that the demonstration
effect through an organized and coordinatea action in the different
indepenaent republics may be the main powerful tool for social change
in the countryside; these are the places where the new order will be
made by the peasants. Until now the Government has been able to give
blows to one after another of the republics without coordinated reaction
by them, but this can be changed when the different republics organize
among themselves. It is an organized "falling apart" of the country.
These will be the bases for launching efforts to take the countryside
and then the cities.
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The Communist and Other Minor Parties.
Tne Communist Party is not a big party. It may have according to Dix,
10,000 militants. Although the Communist Party is now divided into
the traditional Communist Party and a more militant faction, both ot
them sustain guerrillas.
The Communist Party has lasted for more than three and a half decades,
which provides them with fairly good skills in organization, although
Dix says "its leadership seems to have become bureaucratized and
unimaginative."
Other minor parties: the M.R.L., the left wing of the Liberal party,
is used by the Communists to get elected under the National Front as
liberals; the Christian Democrats, the National Democratic Movement,
a rightist nationalist group, the Anapo or National Popular Alliance,
which follows a military ex-dictator, Rojas Pinilla, draws votes from
the liberal and conservative party and exercises considerable opposi-
tion to the National Front, are the other parties.
Although most of the. with the exceotion of the Anppo, Are of very
small size, all of them, attuned with the rest of national life, try
to exercise their existence by very violent means. All of them "have
the truth," but the fact is that their interests are more centralized
in sharing of the bureaucratic gains of being in office.
Two of them, the M.R.L. and the Anapo (this last one is bi-partisan),
participate in elections as conservatives or liberals, and with this
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strange way of opposition and dealing, they participate of the
National Front goodies.1 32
The Leftist Groups' Failures.
Many are the sources of the leftist groups' failure to exercise a
more powerful r6le in Colombia. But according to Dix (p. 291), their
main handicaps are:
a. Their isolationism; each group putting forth its own
solutions to the problems of the country and each
expending much of its time and energy denouncing the
others:". .. each group has wanted unity in its own terms,
to keep its autonomy of action and to retain the leader-
ship of the resulting coalition."
b. It may also be relevant that in the great majority
the leaders of the opposition parties are intellectuals.
The importance they attach to words com pared with
pragmatic concerns merely accentuates what is already a
feature of the political culture.
c. Ihe intellectualism of the opposition leaders and
their elite, or at least upper-middle-class origins,
may also be responsible for the failure of most of them
to strike much of a response among the masses.
132. See table on the next page, for the data of vote drawing on
each party.
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POIMCAL COMPOSMON OF CONGRESS, 1958-1966 24
1958 1960 1962 1964 1966
SENATE
Liberals
Oficialistas
MRL
Linea Blanda
Linea Dura
Conservatives
Ospinistas (Unionistas)
Laureanistas (Alvaristas)
Independents (incl.
Alzatistas in 1958)
ANAPO
Total Membership
Liberals
Conservatives
CHAMBER
Liberals
Oficialistas
MRL
Linea Blanda
Linea Dura
ANAPO
MIL (Liberal Left
Movement)
Conservatives
Ospinistas (Unionistas)
Laureanistas (Alvaristas)
Independents (incl.
T
40 40 a 37
- - 12
10 C
26
4
80
40
40
12 c
28
31
16
- 2
80 98
40 49
40 49
74 56
-- 20
59
33
37
12
(9) b
(3) b
31
16
2
98
49
49
59
31
(23)
(8)
1
46
7
(7)
21
14
18
106
53
53
70
21
(21)
4
1
17
45
37
37
Alzatistas in 1958) 12 2
ANAPO - -
otal Membership 148 152
Liberals 74 76
Conservatives 74 76
a. Senate elected in 1958 before MRL existed.
b. No new Senate election had been held since 1962
50
36
6
184
92
92
65
1
26
184
92
92
38
24
1
32
190
95
95
but the MRL had divided in
that year. Due to fluctuating affiliation figures are approximate.
c. Alzatistas and Independents had generally become identified with the major
factions by 1960. Conservative factional figures for 1958 are approximate.
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d. Moreover, coupled with intellectualism and elitism-
has been a lack of attention to the prosaic minutiae of
organization.
Tnese are the main elements of weakness among them and I agree with
uix' statements, but none of these failures seem to be imoossible to
overcome.
The Outsiders.
Let us see now, what influence countries like China, Cuba and the
U.S.S.R. have in the future of any scheme of social change in Colombia.
Although it seems that all of these countries have different policies
towards what they consider liberation movements in Latin America, all
of them seem to be fairly active. Thus we saw how in Colombia the
Cuban and Russian supported groups maintain guerrillas; the Chinese
faction is not strong yet in my country; according to newspaper infor-
mation I gathered, a strong guerrilla point they sustained in the
Choco State had been hard hit at the end of 1968, but once more they
are fighting. But I can see in the future a wider range of influence
from these countries to help the liberation movements with arms and
example. The demonstration effect of the socialist countries may be
very influential. For example, it is widely said that the Alliance
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for Progress was but an emergency response of the U.S.A. towards the
aevelopment in Cuba of a socialist revolution.
We can see how important it will be in the future to consider, for
any plan of action for social change, those countries as effective
instruments of help, not only during the peiTod of struggle for change
of power, but in the aftermath in the new economic organization for
the countries in Latin America.
The Neighbor Countries.
We cannot underestimate the role that the neighboring countries will
have in any event of social change in Colombia. We know very well
that the power structure is very similar in the governments of the
rest of Latin America, and that all of them seem to be engaged in a
rabid rightist race. Any change in any of the continental countries
in Latin America would be so dangerous for the present structures of
these countries that very few would send their troops to suffocate
the danger.
I have in mind the case of the Dominican Republic in 1966, where not
only the United States, but Brazil, Paraguay and Costa Rica sent
their troops to suffocate the rebellion. Colombia would not be an
exception; moreover, because of its continental strategic position,
it would be a "must" target. In the case of Bolivia, we also saw the
military men of Argentina and Paraguay getting ready to intervene
there.
My hypothesis is that any wide attempt of social change in Colombia
must have a parallel work in the neighboring countries, at least to
neutralize their potential intervention in Colombia.
Camilo Torres.
We finished seeing the most elemental truths about
power on the stage of our study; now we must pass
analysis of what Camilo Torres did in order to get
the elements of
to see a very short
killed in 1966.
I will not try to write a biography of Camilo. I remit the person
interested in this to the book written by the ex-priest, Guzman,
Camilo, el cura guerrillero; what I will do is to enumerate the
different enterprises Camilo got engaged in.
Camilo was a priest. He went to study sociology in Lovaine, Belgium,
in 1954. There he got interested in and began to learn the problems
of Colombia.
In Belgium he organized the "Colombian Team for Socio-Economic
Investigation," an elitist intellectual group, non-politicaily oriented,
-216-
rather on a "humanistic" basis as they said; this thing had contacts
in Rome, Paris, Lovaine, Madrid, Bonn, Berlin, London, Bogota and
some cities in the United States, and it failed mainly because the
components were "objective" scientists, Colombian students with no
ideological basis for observing the problems of the country.
Then Camilo went back to Colombia, in 1959, as a Chaplain of the
National University in Bogota, taught Sociology there, then went to
the "Superior School of Public Administration," as Dean of the
Institute of Social Administration and also went as delegate of the
Cardinal to the Agrarian Reform Institute, and also as an appendix
of the Institute of Social Administration he started the Unit of
Rural Action in the countryside; then he started a University Stu-
dents and Professionals Movement for Community Development, and then
at last a political movement which he expected would gather all the
left of the country for a takeover of power, and when this failed,
he joined a guerrilla group and was killed by the Army on the 15th
of February of 1966.
As we can see, Camilo Torres was in principle a reformer. Of course,
his reformist ideas brought him against the hierarchies he belonged
to, the Church, and against the institutions he wanted to change. As
we saw before, in touching one a chain reaction would be produced,
even against the people he wanted to help.
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One of the facts to note about the organizations for social change
he founded is that they did not have either electoral or armed power.
He had an intellectual tradition and his work was too intellectual.
At the end he understood the gravity of the problem he was trying to
solve and then he founded his extremist political group which failed
because of his organizational weaknesses, the same problems we notice
before when talking about the left in Colombia; then he became des-
perate and went to the mountains. It seems to me that the key for any
social worker who wants to work in such environment as Colombia, and
who wants to remain in the cities, is to build a base of popular
support before committing himself to any of the different active roles
he would adopt in order to change the institutions; this popular
barrier I consider very necessary as a way of defense against action
from the institutions and as a way of avoiding having to go to the
mountains, when his presence in the cities would seem indispensable.
Another factor about any program of social change in Colombia is that
the actual components of power, as we saw before, are so intermingled
within the different spheres of the regime that any attempt -- any --
to change the balances of power in any of the parts of the system will
necessarily produce a reaction in the others. Camilo Torres seemed
to have understood this, but according to my observations, he failed
to recognize the totality of the elements, that could have helped or
gone against him, even among the corrupt institutions, and even worse
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he had no notion of timing, and I think any person interested in
social change programs must be an artist in timing his acts.
Mao Tse-Tung wrote in 1944133 the causes of failure of Camilo in 1966:
To link oneself with the masses, one must act in accordance
with the needs and wishes of the masses. All work done
for the masses must start from their needs and not from
the desire of any individuals, however well-intentioned.
It often happens that objectively the-masses need a cer-
tain change but subjectively they are not yet conscious
of the need, not yet willing or determined to make the
change. In such cases we should wait patiently. We should
not make the change until, through our work, most of the
masses have become conscious of the need and are willing
and determined to carry it out. Otherwise we shall isolate
ourselves from the masses. Unless they are conscious and
willing, any kind of work that requires their participation
will turn out to be a mere formality and will fail...
There are two principles here: one is the actual needs
of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and
the other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up
their own minds instead of our making up their minds for
them.
Besides the higher and reactionary low hierarchy of the Church that
went against Camilo since the beginning, and that contributed the most
to isolating him from the ignorant masses, by menacing from all
pulpits any allegiances with him as meritorious of the hottest "Hell,"
the hierarchy against which Camilo spent a lot of his energies, he
chose to modify the structures of social relations of the people and
the elites in Colombia. Here we are only going to talk about his
organization to promote social change through political action; we
are explicitly not going to talk about his other organizations, the
ones without a political base because they did not represent any new
133. Mao Tse-Tung, The United Front in Cultural Work, October 30, 1944.
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idea, neither they had any power form of action in Colombia, and
in Colombia, "political" power grows "out of the barrel of the gun."
In Colombia very few people know how to read, but those who do have
spent most of the time of the country in futile contemplation and
words-playing. This observation does not rise from an anti-intellec-
tualist point of view in me, but from the observation I make that the
philosophers in my country, the ones who read, belong to the higher
social strata, and as we know, any change in the socio-economic or
political conditions of my country undoubtedly represents a loss of
the privileged positions of the ones who have them now and of course
the philosophers would not want it to happen. Marx very clearly
stated also: "The philosophers have interpreted the world in various
ways; the point however is to change it." So here, we are only going
to speak of the time when Camilo thought in electoral or gun power;
as we were saying before, his foes were:
1. not chosen but necessary: the high and low reactionary strata
of the Church.
2. chosen: within the
Government: The traditional parties: liberal
and conservative.
The Administration.
The Police and the Army.
The Associations.
The U.S. enterprises.
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All of these enemies were within the core of the regime. He did not
choose enemies at the pariphery of it, but he failed to see that
necessary enemies were:
The non-voters, extremely weary and apathetic by that time;
The majority of the students who are of bourgeoise extraction;
The leaders of the few peasant organizations;
The leaders of most of the worker unions;
The leftists divided in sub-groups;
The other minor parties not interested in change but in
demagoguery;
The guerrillas who were uncoordinated.
And among the outside strata,.the other countries, it seems to me that
he did not even have time to visualize the potentiality of the neigh-
boring countries as enemies.
This, in respect to his enemies, now remembering something about the
friends he chose, I want to observe:
within the Church: he failed to mobilize the low
echelons of the Church that could
have answered to his call.
within the Government: within the traditional parties he
found as friend the M.R.L., the
leftist liberal wing. He failed
to differentiate soldiers from
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officers in the army for an eventual
campaign of politization of the
soldiers and the police.
the U.S.A.: he did not have even the opportunity
of mobilizing the help of any of the
leftist organizations in the U.S.A.
We talked about his enemies he probably did not see within the inter-
medium sector, but nevertheless he believed that his friends were:
the non-voters
the students
the peasants
the workers
the communist and other new and little parties
the guerrillas.
Within the outside sector, I feel he did not know how to mobilize any
help from the U.S.S.R. or China or Cuba. His Catholic structure, I
feel, made him weary of those contacts at the beginning, and a little
later, when he understood that, it was too late for him.
As we saw, his foe was quite enormous, and his friends had many problems
and weaknesses.
Solving the Equations.
Let us see now, how he tried to solve his equations; and here I want
mainly to go through the very valuable framework of analysis I have
-222-
been able to learn with Professor Schon: First a few words about his
values and goals. Camilo essentially was a priest, a Catholic priest,
and he had all the Catholic moral values. Those are very well received
in Colombia, so he did not have any problem when working on this basis
although the Church did not interprete those values in the same way.
Even when working with Marxists, it can be said that Catholics find
many points in common, so he did not have in this point other foes than
the Church's interpretations of his idea. And this is a too powerful
foe.
His goals, and I have to say his, because he worked the most on the
basis of being a leader followed by the masses, were of changing the
socio-economic and political structures of the country to what I would
call a very rough and advanced, one step, marxist socialism.
This fact may have gone against him, because the peasants are not asking
now to share the land they do not have, and the food they do not have,
and the schools they do not have; they want land for themselves, food
for themselves, schools for themselves, for the first time in their
lives. I do not think they give a damn at this moment for any politician
who comes to tell them of passing the lands to the State, and the
markets to the State, etc. etc.
I feel one of the main difficulties for a policy maker is to understand
this fact and be in accordance with it. This may be one of the main
failures the communists have had in Latin America, in order to draw
more members among the poor.
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Strategies. Camilo had many opportunities for an organization of his
strategy because of the many possibilities of alliances and positions
one can adopt in Colombia for implementing social change. But we saw
since the beginning how it was quite difficult for him to differen-
tiate among the components of every institution; for him the army
was a foe, the Church a foe, etc., etc.
What positions did he adopt as a strategy? Let us observe his path
through the opportunities he had:
a. influencing the emergence of ideas in good currency;
b. effecting shifts in social policy;
c. carrying out a broad program of social change from
a central administrative base;
d. maneuvering among existing institutions;
e. designing and bringing into being a new
institution;
f. seeking to change an existing institution or
systems of institutions from the inside, adopting
roles as: manager, champion, guerrilla.
g. seeking to change an institution or social system
from outside, adopting roles as: expert, consultant,
therapist, advocate, organizer, revolutionary.
From this huge camp of possibilities Camilo chose a very interesting
and what I have considered the best choice, according to the preliminary
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situation of the country we saw before, although I feel compelled to
make many annotations in this respect.
According to my observations, he chose something like:
a. influencing the emergence of ideas in good currency,
by spreading his ideas;
b. designing and bringing into being a new institution,
a revolutionary movement;
c. seeking to change the social system from outside,
with a revolution;
d. carrying out a broad program of social change from
a central administrative base as a triumphant revolution.
In spite of the goodness of the scheme of action he followed, I doubt
he saw other opportunities he had as variants to the main program,
to which I do not see possibilities for alternatives. I want very
strongly to emphasize this point, because it seems that with the con-
ditions in the country, any attempt to coopt the actual system for
change will bring failure with it. Only the destruction of the present
classist system will bring about some definite change in Colombia. I
want to pass dogmatic on this; I consider that the time for mild answers
to this problem is already in history.
But what then, if this program of Camilo was so good, what happened in
order for it to fail?
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As I see the aftermath, the mistakes were:
1. He tried to implement the four stages at the same
time -- no timing.
2. He failed to see the weaknesses among his friends.
He started the creation of his movement by adopting what
we may call the intermedium systems in the form of the
communist and otherleftist parties. But he failed to
see that his friends were divided and as I said before,
the absence of timing made him try to build a machine,
have it work at its inception, without having tested it.
At last he got a movement bringing people from many
leftist factions with only nominal allegiances, a move-
ment without real power because of immense gaps of
communication, planning, procedure and structure in its
formation, that could but collapse.
3. Another of his failures, one of the main ones, was
that he failed to recognize the possibilities he had for
a program of social change from inside the institutions
as a parallel program to his outside revolution with all
the possible friends he had within the power structure.
His failure to differentiate among the members of the
institutions was great.
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4. His failure to see and employ the guerrillas as
an existent institution, inespite of the fact that at
the end he joined them, almost as an escape.
5. His failure to distinguish between armed struggle
and non-armed struggle and the combination and timing
of both of them, instead of giving a gradual escalated
response to the blows by the regime.
6. His failure to distinguish between the masses of
people and the core of a movement. A disciplined core
must be the base for any mass organization; not a
loose one.
And here I want to revise this concept: Camilo Torres did not have
an intermedium system as the core, the hard core for his movement.
In Vietnam we find a very clear example of the way people are
gathered in a movement. There is a patriotic front with people of all
kinds of backgrounds and institutions forming it: religious sects,
peasants, soldiers, natives, professionals, and at the center of this
popular front is the hard core, the party, the Communist Party. These
people are organized in men, women and youth groups; within these
groups there are hard cores of decisive forces, and these groups pro-
vide the elements for the different types of military organizations;
propaganda, fighters, food, shelter, information, etc., that are of
different ranges of action (geographically speaking). These main
groups of men, women, and youth, may belong to professional, or
religious, administrative, etc., institutions, and these allegiances
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are also kept alive. They constitute the groups for maneuvering
among the different existing institutions within the enemy, and
they also constitute new institbtions in liberated areas. Camilo
did not have them, neither had he the intermedium systems as we saw
before. The hard core, the party, is always in command of the workers,
women and youth groups. 13 4
134. See: Douglas Pike, Vietcong, The Organization and Techniques
of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, M.I.T. Press, 1966.
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Chapter Four. Some Alternatives I Would Propose.
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Would I change for a program of action of mine, some of Camilo's
steps?
After this analysis and if I were to organize a program of social
change in my country, I would follow very similar ways to the steps
followed by Camilo with some variations, and here is where I will
sketch my own ideas on how to proceed in this problem. My idea is to
follow determined steps of different action, with some which I con-
sider must be fixed points as a base and some variants that may exist
or not, as secondary elements. What I propose is to build a delicate
machine of human power, with tested effectiveness and able to go through
different stages of struggle for implementing social change in my
country. Many elements will be quite weak in my actual appreciation
of the problem, but I must say that this study is not yet a definite
one; so some other ideas and variations will come to mind with more
study on the same problem, and with testing in reality.
Values and Goals.
My values starting from the theories on socialism would differ from
Camilo's starting from the Catholic religion. My goals would be to
introduce a socio-economic and political socialist system in Colombia.
Strategies.
I would follow essentially the same strategies as Camilo. I would
follow them because I cannot see a better alternative in the historic
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moment of my country. These steps and the order they have I consiider
potentially very effective:
a. spreading the word; initiating this specie 6f crusade;
b. creating an effective, a disciplined movement among
the hard core of the discontent;
c. launching a very well planned campaign to take power;
d. implementing reforms of social change when power is
acquired.
They are, in this simplistic way, the steps to follow; could we see
them put in a different order like reforms before gaining power, or
taking power before a strong movement being organized? I am afraid
this is not possible and the reasons I stated before
But in order to follow those steps I would base my strategies on two
facts:
a. that there has been a revolution going on in the
countryside of my country for twenty years now, and that
is what we call in a mild way, "The Violence, " which is
an heroic and respectable rising to arms, not just sporadic
outbursts of violence, and that this revolution has now a
very strong ideological class base.
b. that Che Guevara's words of "two, three, many Vietnams,
that is the watchword" for Latin America, the revolutionists
are trying to follow now, by producing confusing acts of
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revolutionary fervor, outbursts like calling the U.S.
intervention for helping the "good guys" that are
increasingly being menaced by some few "bad guys."'
But I do not agree with that. No; I feel that in this
moment the conditions of Latin America are becoming
ripe for a kind of rise to arms of very vast segments
of the population in a very fast and effective way and
which do not give the opportunity for outsiders to
start wandering about helping the "good guys." I think
that frustration, mass frustration, will be enhanced in
the decade to come mainly because of two factors:
1. the speedy rise of population growth we
are experiencing confronted with the inability
for countries to cope with the problems of pro-
viding services to this new population. Latin
America, the same as the United States, has
200 million people now. In the year 2,000, while
the United States will have augmented its popu-
lation to 300 million people, Latin America will
have almost 700 million people. Colombia is
expected to go from 20 million now to 45 million
in the year 2,000.
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2. The famines that are expected to start
occurring during the next decade. Not that
people are not dying of hunger now. But in a
few years, this will take the form of mass
catastrophes.
Jn the case of a foreign intervention, a short size rise
to arms will not produce a Vietnam; it will produce a
Dominican Republic.
And I would add some few things I would have in consideration from
the experiences of Camilo:
a. A wider recognition of the weaknesses of my friends.
Discipline and patience must be wide, though. The use
of effective intermedium systems will do for it.
b. A wider recognition of the weaknesses and heterogeneous
composition of my enemies. Cooptation within the rank
and files of Church, Army, Police, Parties, Workers,
Abstentionists, Students and Peasants, and integration
of them into groups of men, women, and youth, at village,
town, city or regional levels, and with the political
and military training being given by the hard core.
hen When power is taken, these groups will provide the ele-
ments for the smooth implementation of socialism in Colombia.
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c. The necessity to instigate a parallel liberation
movement from inside the institutions, with the reform
from outside. The people who will get into the men,
women and youth groups, will form special sub-groups
for acting within their institutions dominated by the
regime.
d. An attempt to utilize those elements Camilo did
not utilize, i.e., similar movements and help from
other countries, and coordination of the guerrilla
action in the countryside with political and armed
action in the cities.
e. The insistence on a movement with a very
disciplined base of the leftist groups.
Program of Action.
As a program of action, and although I am not in the Communist Party,
I fully agree with and adopt the Communist Party of Colombia's Pro-
135gram, because I consider it completely fits with the ways I see my
country, with the exception of the allegiances to Moscow I do not have.
I have adopted this program in this way because I felt as if it were a
piece of my own invention. Sketches of my own that I have with me about
the same point indicate that I was trying to write the same program, but
135. Documentos del decimo congreso del Partido Comunista de Colombia,
1966, pp. 95-109.
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with less fortune. Although I consider that this program could be
much more refined, let us say in points like the one about urban
reform, I still consider that it shows to us a very comprehensive
path of action to follow. I know also of a slimilar program written
by Camilo Torres for his political movement, and I think this
Communist Program is totally fitting in its context, to my ideas.
Further extension of this program would only make this work inter-
minable. The work is divided into two parts. The first one is a
summary of Colombia that totally fits the analysis we have followed
through my study and that will be included at the end of the study
as an appendix. Although I found this program shortly before I con-
cluded my study, this analysis is very much consistent with the same
conclusions I had arrived at in my study. The second part is the
program itself. I will now translate and copy the program here:
6. Patriotic Government of National Liberation.
The deep anti-imperialist and democratic transformations that the
country requires, must be effected by the government that results
from the revolutionary struggle within the next program the Communist
Party gives to the consideration by the people.
The democratic and popular political regime.
1. Organization of a Popular and Democratic Republic based on the
principle that the people is the only font of public power.
2. The people with arms will form the base for the popular army.
The armed forces will be the expression of defense of the revolution,
peace, independence, and popular freedom. The armed forces will be
democratic and will be a factor of material and cultural elevation
of its member and of the society. The anti-popular repressive systems
will be liquidated.
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Foreign politics independent and peaceful.
1. Foreign politics independent and directed towards the preservation
of peace and pacific coexistence within nations, based on the respect
for the autodetermination of the peoples. Ending of all compromises
against the national sovereignty and aggressive interventionist blocks
against the independence of other peoples. Ending of the military,
technic, economic and cultural missions of the imperialim. Pro-
hibition of the war propaganda. Contribution to the general disarmament,
prohibition of nuclear arms and destination of the war budgets for
pacific means.
2. Diplomatic cultural and economic relations on the basis of
friendship and pacific cooperation, equity, mutual benefit, especially
with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp.
Collaboration and help with the countries of Latin America, Asia and
Africa struggling for their liberation.
Economic Independent Development.
1. Confiscation and nationalization of all the enterprises, concessions,
mines, transports, banks, insurance companies, financial corporations
and plantations exploited by the North American monopolies. Nationali-
zation of the North American shares in mixed enterprises. Annullment
of the external debts of the colonialist type. Guarantee to the foreign
capital favorable to the economic development of the country.
2. Confiscation of the wealth of the capitalists that deceive the
country and the Colombian revolution. Protection of the national
economy and of the industrialization favorable to development of heavy
industry and the amplification of the industries of consumption goods.
Amplification of credit facilities on the basis of work and national
conveniences to little and medium industry, commerce and agriculture.
3. Destination of State funds to electrification, and its utilization
for the planned industrialization of the country. Defense of all kinds
of national transports. Structuring of the railroads and roads into a
plan that favors the harmonic development of the economy.
4. Defense of the export products, especially coffee. Control of
foreign commerce and orientation towadds an independent development.
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5. Ending of consumers taxes, and private property. Taxes on capital
and benefits. Limitations on benefits. Monetary stabilization with
base in the national production and technical measures against infla-
tion. Industrial and commercial control in order to control speculation.
Democratic Agrarian Reform.
1. Democratic agrarian reform which gives land to who works or wants
to work it, ending of latifundio, elevation of production and of life
standards of the peasant population.
2. Expropriation of latifundios and confiscation of lands occupied by
Yankee imperialists. Confiscation of the lands of those owners that
deceive the national interests.
3. The distribution of the agrarian reform lands will be done according
to the conditions of the land, on the basis that part of the land will
be given to the peasants now without land or with too little; it will
be given with implements, to6ls and animals; part of the land will be
for cooperative farms and part will be for model state farms of
experimentation and that serve to solve the fundamental problems of
agrarian production.
4. Small and medium property will be respected and guaranteed, making
bigger the former and stronger the last, in the same way that the
property rationally &xploited of the rich peasants that accept the
norms on work, soils, and other defenses that the State establishes.
5. Small and medium farmers that occupy and work lands as sharecroppers,
"aparceros, poramberos," etc., or as colonos will receive the titles
to the lands on the basis of plans to guarantee rational and technical
exploitation. Norms of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation will be
liquidated, the same as the debts of the peasants with lenders and
speculators.
6. The agrarian reform will be done by the government through the
agrarian organizations by which the conditions and modes of execution
will be arrived at. Agrarian cooperatives will be stimulated on the
basis of education and voluntary affiliation.
7. Planned use of the lands in order to increment agricultural
production, cattle, forests, defense, waters, and soil. Guarantee
of minimum prices to agricultural producers and increment of produc-
tivity for the benefit of consumers.
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8. Protection of the Indians, helping them to progress, to incorporate
to civilized life, giving them land, their old properties, modernization
of seeding systems, education, health, and technical assistance. Help
to thei-r autonomous organizations and respect for their meeting forms,
customs, languages and art.
Urban Reform.
1. The state will provide for a building and urbanization plan and
for expropriation of big urban properties in order to guarantee housing
for the Colombian population.
Democratic guarantees and civil rights.
1. Civil rights and social guarantees of thought, meeting, association,
organization, manifestation, written and spoken news, for the people.
Full religious freedom with independence between Church and State.
Abolition of social discrimination against blacks, indians, and equality
for all. Suppression of the economic, social, and political discri-
mination against women, and guarantee for them in order to be able to
participate in equal conditions with men. Political rights for men
and women older than 18.
2. Home inviolability, respect and protection for the integrity and
human dignities, defense of life, honor and personal property of the
citizen, popular justice, oral, gratis, public, and administered by
judges popularly elected.
People's welfare and work guarantee.
1. The Popular Democratic State will impose the social obligation of
working and will give effective guarantee to all the citizens to get a
job paid according to the quality and quantity of their work.
2. The Popular Democratic State will have as the main task to
continually elevate the living standards and the work conditions of
the workers and peasants and medium strata, by establishing: vital
minimum salary according to the characteristics of each area; social
security extensive to all workers paid by the State and the enterprises
and controlled by the worker unions; progressive reduction of the
working time, and shorter terms of work in inhospitable lands and at
night; equal rights of sex and age to receive an education, to receive
equal payment for equal work, in equality of conditions, of capacity,
without sex, nationality or age discrimination.
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3. Peasant workers will receive the same benefits of the workers in
the cities, taking into account the peculiarities of each region.
4. Nurseries, maternity halls, and kindergartens in the city and in
the countryside. Protection of maternity and childhood.
5. Effective organization of public health, with medical centers,
health centers, hospitals, and preventive medicine. Free social
assistance given by the state. Protection for the elderly that cannot
work, retirement, health houses, and vacation establishments.
Development of education, culture, and sports.
1. Education in all its degrees will be a social service, free, given
by the State. Primary, secondary, university and polytechnic education
will be at the reach of all the population and there will be stipends
for students of professional technical careers. Massive literacy
campaigns. Vocational, technical and professional education in constant
relation to work. Democratic processes within the universities with
government formed by students, professors and alumni. Increasing of
scientific research. Creation and extension of popular libraries.
2. Promotion of the teacher life, better conditions of life and work
for them, massive construction of classrooms, schools, and research
centers, with adequate implements.
3. Defense and promotion of the national and democratic forms of
culture and art. Encouragement to the work of the artists of the people.
4. Promotion of physical culture and sports for all the people. Con-
struction of sport camps, stadiums, and rest homes for the sportsmen.
7. The Patriotic Front of National Liberation.
1. The inauguration of the patriotic government of national liberation
which will implement this Program will not be made by the will or action
of casual leaders, but it must be the fruit of organization, unity, and
struggle of all the people: workers, peasants, students, revolutionary
intellectuals, white collar workers, artisans, small industrialists and
merchants within a wide movement of patriotic front of national libera-
tion that superates the artificial divisions imposed by the dominant
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classes, and able to channel the democratic and popular hopes to
national independence, superation of backwardness and people's libera-
tion. This great united front will be able to obtain victory only if
it is led by the working class, the most combative and organized,
vitally interested in the changes that the country asks, and which
historic mission is identified with the future socialist society.
Because of this, the unity of the working class is vital to the
future of the nation.
The alliance of the proletariat with peasantry is the essential base
of this freedom movement. Workers and peasants have common hopes of
liberation. The peasants have shown their combative and democratic
spirit, defending themselves arms in hand, of the violence and
aggression of which they have been victims.
The medium sectors, students, intellectuals, artisans, and white collar
workers have a tradition of popular struggle since the days the Republic
was founded. Particularly the students play a very high role in the
freedom fights, in the process of the Latin American revolution.
In the historic course of formation of the patriotic front of national
liberation, sectors of the bourgeoisie will enter into contradiction
with the interests Of the North American imperialism. These sectors
may be gained or neutralized in the anti-imperialist fight, if these
contradictions are stimulated.
2. The politics of the patriotic front is the only adequate one within
the historic stage that our country goes through, because it allows to
recollect and to unify all the forces oppressed by the Yankee imperialism
and the internal forces it rests on. This movement is developed in a
superior plan, and it is a continuation, in the new conditions of
national and world struggle, of our best popular and patriotic tradi-
tions and of the frustrated hopes for the establishment of an authentic
democracy in Colombia.
3. The transformations this Program enumerates will only be fulfilled
with the taking of power by the patriotic front of national liberation,
that displaces the actual dominant classes.
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4. The Communists want these changes with the least possible
sacrifices for the people and the revolutionary forces and for this
reason we have looked for pacific ways for our revolution. But the
course things take is not in our wishes, but in the attitudes assumed
by the dominant classes when confronting the struggles of the masses,
for the revolutionary changes and of the correlation of forces that
participate in the struggle. The experience of our people teaches
that the dominant classes make use of armed violence against the
popular masses, when any important transformation is intended and in
the measure that the crisis of the system advances, closing the
pacific ways for revolutionary transformations. This asks for popular
selfdefense, which is a process of politization and mass organization
that conduces them to the conviction of the necessity of armed struggle
as a superior form of struggle, that opens the roads for revolutionary
developments by no pacific means. In the process of our revolution,
all the forms of mass struggle will be combined, according to the
circumstances, the stage of the struggle, and the attitude of the
reactionary forces. Without renouncing any form of mass struggle,
the armed struggle is converting itself each day in a more important
factor indispensable to the Colombian revolution.
8. The Communist Party, Vanguard of the People.
1. The Communist party, ideology and political organization of the
working class, since its foundation fighting intransigently for peace,
democracy, national independence and socialism, presents this Program
to all the Colombian people in the security that if it is taken into
their hands, and if the people unite in the struggle for its objectives,
the revolutionary changes that the crisis of the actual social structure
asks for will be realized. This program is not only the program of the
Communists, but of all the patriotic and progressive forces of the
country. Communists will always be in the vanguard showing that we
are the most abnegate and consequent fighters within the united front
in alliance with the other sectors and political organizations that
want to contribute to the struggle.
2. The way for the formation of the patriotic front of national
liberation is the accordance on one or various programmatic needs,
which urge the necessity for actions and common treaties and concrete
platforms that contribute to win the different battles to the final
victory.
3. The condition for the working class to become the van guard of the
great struggle is in the existence of a powerful Communist Party of
masses, identified with their interests, having in its files the best
fighters of the people, and armed with the principles of marxism-leninism.
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The strengthening of the Communist Party, its quantitative and
qualitative growth, and of its auxiliary organization, the Communist
Youth of Colombia, is a prerequisite necessary for the Colombian
revolution.
To the workers, peasants, white collar people, students, revolutionary
intellectuals, to all democrats and patriots that are looking to save
Colombia, and the welfare of the people, we invite to adopt these
programmatic principles and to contribute by all means to the
strengthening and development of our Communist Party.
Tactics.
I have not mentioned tactics when talking about Camilo before, because
I think he may have had a certain strategy in mind, but no tactics; or
if some, just what the politicians in my country do: to go to different
places and give speeches, and I feel that this is not productive on a
lone basis.
My tactics as I said before, must have a very careful, step by step,
acknowledgement of timing. Each step in the process of building this
power machine should be tested after its fabrication in order to prove
its effectiveness, and the different steps and order of them should not
be confused.
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First Step.
For starting I would put as a necessary precondition, a movement to
unite the leftist groups of my country on the basis of a very dis-
ciplined organization with fixed responsibilities for the members
and with a grade of autonomy for the sub-groups to continue existing
withint the movement.
I consider this step necessary, absolutely -- and without it, I would
not launch myself in a suicide movement. The alternative for a
failure in this movement of closing the gaps within the left and
launching myself to create a whole machine without intermedium systems
as a substantial help I see as very remote, very difficult, and not
realizable in a country like mine. That the Colombian Communist Party
could give me the elements for the intermedium systems, the hard
core, is my hypothesis now.
The union of the left, a very difficult and decisive step, must be
tried as a means of forging the core of the revolution; it should be
tested by some means I do not concoct now. The disputes between
pro-Chinese and pro-Russian leftists are very dangerous; the fact that
the pro-soviet Communists in Colombia support guerrillas, could be
helpful for us to think that it is not very difficult to form a popular
front with other leftists. But my guess is that for a definite assess-
ment of the group to coopt for an intermedium system, I need to go and
see the reality from within.
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Second Step.
The program of action should be in three stages:
1. Based at the beginning in no direct confrontation with the
regime, to organize groups of action outside the core of the regime
in three groups of people: men, women and youth.
2. Organizing groups of action within the core of the regime with
friendly elements: priests, soldiers, police, workers, etc.;
a. this is very important: creating since the beginning
among those groups, urban and rural militiae;
b. to utilize the core of the movement as coordinators
and instructors for the organized groups;
c. a huge insistence in the mixing of those groups
when possible: no students with students, but students
with workers and peasants if possible, or workers with
peasants. The men, women, and youth groups will do for
this.
d. a maximum of utilization of help from other countries.
3. In a more advanced stage, I would test the power of these groups by
coordinating urban action with guerrillas in the countryside.
Third Step.
The taking of power. The taking of power is a stage I would not be
able to write here: the rythym, moment, the final blow-up, and the
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time are things that escape from my imagination. It is almost
impossible to write more about it, and I challenge the reader to do
it. I can only say that having the proper elements of the play organized,
their efficacy tested and the enemy known, the plan will have to be con-
cocted on the spot.
Fourth Step.
Carrying a broad program of institutional change. The fourth step,
implementing social change, I permit myself to exclude from the present
study, considering it the theme of a very different work of study and
comparation with experiences of countries that are at the present going
through that stage, like Cuba, that I expect to do in the futurre.
Nevertheless, many people have asked me: "Well, how will you
implement your program for social, political, and economic change,
when a revolutionary movement takes over your country?"
I really feel amazed, in front of so many questions that a revolutionary
taking of power brings with itself. I have thought a lot, I am
exhausted now; I have read books, I have taken courses, assisted in
meetings, and my last answer is that I know too little about it. I
guess the difficulty stems from the fact that I do not know what the
conditions of the country will be like, after a takeover by a revo-
lutionary movement.
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How long will it take to take over the country?
Will there be foreign intervention not to allow this to happen?
How many people will the movement have?
How many people will the revolution kill?
How many people will the revolution alienate?
How many people will leave the country?
How many people will go live in the cities because of the revolution?
These are things I positively cannot answer now. There is no fixed
pattern to follow with respect to other countries:
China has still one big island, Formosa, with enemies.
Korea is now divided into two parts.
Cuba.is not divided.
Vietnam is still divided and at war.
Nevertheless, not knowing what will happen to the people and to the
country, assuming the worst difficulties, just assuming that the revo-
lutionary movement took over power, some elemental measures of economy
and political and social organization can be thought of.
In terms of political organization, it is evident that the victorious
fighters in the revolution will have in peace the command of those
political organizations in the country. If implemented through
socialism, this will mean giving the political decisive power to the
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people in the communities. This is omething not very difficult to
foresee. Under the actual circumstances, the government of my country
is organized in such a way that the people are totally away from any
kind of administrative political power, because under the actual Con-
stitution, when people vote and elect a president, he elects then the
State governors, and these governors elect the mayors in the cities.
Waht to say then about the 65 percent of potential voters that are
abstaining from voting? Giving the political decision facilities to
the workers will be done.
Social Organization. Social classes will be abolished. Opportunities
in life will cease to come from Daddy and Mom. The people, through the
State, will have guarantees specifically for education, health, recrea-
tion, jobs, and sharing the wealth of the country among everybody,
since the beginning of the revolutionary program.
It is evident that the country will be able, with good leadership, to
redirect the economy, even if it has been until now a capitalist
"enlightened" economy, like it was in Cuba before.
There are some differences between a revolution in Russia at the
beginning of this century, and a revolution like the Cuban, in the
sixties. There is not anymore the necessity for a socialist country
to direct its economy to a heavy industrialization for producing guns,
having the countryside people pay for it. Industrialization must
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come; the existing industries will have to be preserved at maximum
too. Some of them will be terminated, the ones producing luxury goods
for the rich, and new industries will be created, as in Cuba, around
the countryside exploitation. The countryside will give us the oppor-
tunity of reducing unemployment to zero, to feed our people, most of
them for the first time in their lives, and to provide goods and raw
materials to be processed for export. What kind of industrialization
will the country need, to quickly organize agricultural production?
Josue De Castro, in The Black Book of Hungerl36 gives us a list of
those industries necessary to have functioning around agricultural
production:
In reality, the catalogue of goodsand services required
by agriculture covers all the areas of industrial acti-
vity, especially if consideration is given to the products
necessary "before" and "after" the act of agricultural
production in the narrow sense.
1. Work preliminary to agricultural production: water
and land improvements; "background " industries: public
works.
2. Steps designed to obtain higher vegetable yields:
soil plowing, di'stribution of fertilizer, seeding;
"background" industries: agricultural machinery,
chemicals, development of selected plants and seed
strains.
3. Steps designed to obtain higher livestock yields:
stables and feed; "background" industries: construction,
cattle fields, food processing (by-products of grain,
vegetable oils, etc.)
136. Josue De Castro, The Black Book of Hunger, Beacon Press, Boston,
1967, p. 69.
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4. Means of protecting crops and livestock:
fungicidal, antiparasitic and similar products;
"background" industries: chemical products.
5. Measures necessary for the preservation and
storage of agricultural products: equipment for
preservation, storing, silos; "background" indus-
tries: public works, machinery.
6. Measures necessary for the transport of
agricultural products: means of transport;
"background" industries: vehicle manufacture.
7. Measures necessary for converting and processing
agricultural products: farm and food industries,
packing; "background" industries: manufacture of
equipment, paper, jute, plastics.
8. Measures necessary for the maintenance and
proper functioning of the basic structure: rail
and motor fuel, lubricants, spare parts, repair
facilities, etc.
The industrialization of an underdeveloped country
therefore implies a plan of orientation, the impor-
tance of which seems occasionally to elude some of
those countries as well as the majority of the
Western countries responsible for the spectacular
and largely useless accomplishments that are too
often encountered in their dependent territories.
The day my country has these industries organized around the countryside,
another, further step of problems will arise: more complicated tech-
nology will be necessary and the country will be ready to adopt it, with
its own technicians.
Timing.
As I said before, and I want to finish this work by stating it once more,
the most important condition for this program of social change is timing.
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A "good" idea may have a "bad" program of execution but with a well
planned timing of it, all kinds of mistakes can be recognized and
execution plans changed. Good timing might indicate that all the
alternatives I finish with here are just junk.
For arriving to the realization of this idea of bringing peace and
social justice in Colombia, this program I propose, even if it has
some central points which I consider invariable in their structure,
there must be many other collateral ideas and intermedium stages for
its implementation, that I cannot see now while having been writing
from a comfortable desk.
Nevertheless I consider this sketch as the basis for a further check
on reality and a confirmation or abolition of the present ideas about
implementing social change in my country.
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Appendix A
AUTONOMOUS COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT COR-
PORATIONS'
The 1963 government budget allocations for each decentralized
corporation, where available, is given in rounded millions of pesos.
Initials just before the budget figures indicate the ministry or department
primarily interested in the autonomous agency, as follows: A, Agri-
culture; C, Communications; CA, Civil Aeronautics; CS, Civil Service;
D, Development; E, Education; J, Justice; L, Labor; MP, Mines and
Petroleum; PH, Public Health; PW, Public Works; T, Treasury and
Public Credit; and W, War.
MILLIONS
OF PESOS
Acueducto y Alcantarillado de
Cundinamarca
Caja Nacional de Previsi6n
Caja de la Vivienda Militar
Compaia Nacional de Nave-
gaci6n
Compafia Colombiana de Gas
CAmaras de Comercio
Corporaci6n Proveedora de Ins-
titutos de Asistencia Social,
CORPAL
Corporaci6n Aut6noma Regional
de los Valles del Magdalena y
del Sind, CVM
Corporation Aut6noma Regional
de la Sabana de Bogot6, y de
los Valles de Ubat4 y
ChiquinquirA, CAR
Empresa Puertos de Colombia
Empresa de Cementos BoyacdI
Empresa Colombiana de Aer6-
dromos
Empresa Colombiana de Petr6-
leos, ECOPETROL
(Cundinamarca Aqueducts and
Sewers)
(National Social Payments
Fund)
(Military Housing Fund)
-(National Navigation Co.)
(Colombian'Gas Co.)
(Chambers of Commerce)
(Social Assistance Institutes
Provision Corporation)
PW
L
W
D
PW
D
L
(Autonomous Regional Corpo- D
ration of the Valleys of
Magdalena and Sind)
(Autonomous Regional Corpo- D
ration of the Sabana of BogotI
and the Ubat6 and
ChiquinquirA Valleys)
(Ports of Colombia Enterprise) PW
(Boyacd Cement Enterprise) D
(Colombian Airport Enterprise) CA
(Colombian Petroleum
Enterprise)
MP
1. The following list was derived from various sources, including a compilation made
by Senator Hernando DurAn Dussan, the governmental Manual de organizaci6n de la rama
.ejecutiva del poder pdlblico nacional, and from data furnished by the Office of Organization
and Inspection of the Public Administration in the Office of the President of the Republic.
It does not purport to be exhaustive.
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21
65
68
6
27
5
1
9
25
159
13
53
696
Instituto Behring de
Terapeutica Experimental
Instituto de Fomento
Algodonero, IFA
Instituto Colombiano de la
Reforma Agraria, INCORA
La Previsora
SENA, Servicio Nacional de
Aprendizaje
SENA, Seccional Cundinamarca,
Universidad Nacional de
Colombia
Universidad Pedag6gica de
Bogota
Caja de Previsi6n Social de
Comunicaciones
Fondo Nacional de Caminos
Vecinales
Fondo Rotatorio de la Armada
Nacional
Fondo Rotatorio del Ejercito
Fondo Rotatorio de la Fuerza
Adrea Colombiana
Fondo Rotatorio de la Policia
Nacional
Caja de Sueldos de Retiro de las
Fuerzas Militares
Caja de Sueldos de Retiro de las
Fuerzas de Policia
Instituto Nacional de Cancerolo-
gia
Corporaci6n Aut6noma Regional
del Valle del Cauca, CVC
Universidad Industrial de
Santander
Universidad de Antioquia
Universidad del Atlantico
Universidad de Cartagena
Universidad de Caldas
Universidad del Cauca
Universidad de Narino
Universidad del Tolima
Universidad del Valle
Universidad Tecnol6gica de
Pereira
(Behring Institute of PH
Experimental Therapy)
(Cotton Growers' Development A
Institute)
(Colombian Institute for A
Agricultural Reform)
(Retirement Fund) L
(National Apprentice L
Service)
(Cundinamarca Sectional L
Apprentice Service)
(National University of E
Colombia)
(Pedagogical University E
of Bogota)
(Communications Social C
Payments Fund)
(National Fund for C
Neighborhood Roads)
(National Navy Rotating W
Fund)
(Army Rotating Fund) W
(Colombian Air Force W
Rotating Fund)
(National Police Rotating W
Fund)
(Military Forces Retired W
Pay Fund)
(Police Force Retired Pay W
Fund)
(National Cancer Institute) PH
(Autonomous Regional
Corporation of Cauca Valley)
(Industrial University of
Santander)
(University of Antioquia)
(University of Atlantico)
(University of Cartagena)
(University of Caldas)
(University of Cauca)
(University of Narifio)
(University of Tolima)
(University of Valle)
(Technological University of
Pereira)
D
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
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3
60
388
1
57
12
109
28
20
53
1
9
1
10
69
16
9
136
7
6
2
3
3
3
1
1
5
1
Universidad Pedag6gica y Tec-
nol6gica de Colombia, Tunja
Instituto Colombiano de Seguros
Sociales, Seccional Antioquia
Instituto Colombiano de Seguros
Sociales, Seccional del Quindio
y Norte del Valle, en Pereira
Caja de Auxilios de los Ramos
Postal y TelegrAfico
Corporaci6n de Ferias y Exposi-
ciones
Corporaci6n de Industria Aero-
ndutica Colombiana
Fondos de Subsidio para el
Transporte
Servicio de Giros y Especies
Postales
Superintendencia de
Regulaci6n Econ6mica
Zonas Francas de Comercio y
Industria
Banco Cafetero
Banco Ganadero,
Caja de Cr6dito Agrario Indus-
trial y Minero
Consejo Profesional Nacional de
Ingenieria y Arquitectura
Escuela de Aviaci6n Civil
Colombiana
Instituto Caro y Cuervo
Banco Popular
Banco de la Repiblica
Caja Colombiana de Ahorros
Caja de Previsi6n de la Superin-
tendencia de Sociedades
Andnimas
Caja de Previsi6n de la
Superintendencia Bancaria
Casa de Moneda de BogotA
Cooperativa Agricola del
Magdalena
Comisi6n de Aguas de la Sabana
de Bogota
(Pedagogical and Technological E
University of Colombia at
Tunja)
(Colombian Social Security L
Institute, Antioquian Section)
(Colombian Social Security L
Institute, Quindio and North
Valle Section at Pereira)
(Postal and Telegraph C
Auxiliary Fund)
(Fair and Exposition D
Corporation)
(Air Industry Corporation) C
(Transport Subsidy Fund)
(Postal Draft Service)
(Superintendency of Economic
Regulation)
(Free Zones of Commerce and
Industry)
(Coffee Growers' Bank)
(Cattle Raisers' Bank)
(Agricultural Credit Bank)
D
C
D
D
A-T
A-T
A
(National Professional Council PW
of Engineering and Architecture)
(School of Civil Aviation) CA
(Cultural Institute of Language E
and Literature)
(Popular Bank. Financing small T
business)
(Bank of the Republic) T
(Colombian Savings Bank) T
(Superintendency of Corpora- D
tions Social Payments Fund)
(Superintendency of Banking
Social Payments Fund)
(Mint Museum of Bogota)
(Agricultural Cooperative of
Magdalena)
(Water Commission of the
Sabana of Bogoti)
T
r
PW
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14
48
13
A
Em presa de Ferrocarriles
Nacionales
Empresa Nacional de Teicco-
Iui1nicaciones
Empresa Colombiana de Turismo
Escuela Superior de Administra-
ci6n Ptdblica
Fondo IRotatorio Judicial
Fondo Universitario Nacional
Gran AMercado de Paloquemao,
Ltda.
Hospital Militar, Centro \16dico
Colombiano de Estudios para
Graduados
Industria de Concreto Centrifu-
gado Ltda., INCO
Industria Mecinicas Colombia-
nas, S.A.
Industria Militar
Instituto de Asuntos Nucleares
Instituto Nacional de Abasteci-
mientos, INA
Instituto de Cr6dito Territorial,
ICT
Instituto Nacional de
Aprovechamiento de Aguas y
Foinento El6ctrico
Instituto Nacional de Fomento
Municipal
Instituto Nacional de Foiento
Tabacalero
Instituto Nacional de Fomento
Industrial
Instituto Zooprofilictico
Colombiano
Instituto Colonbiano de Espe-
cializaci6n T6cnica en el
Exterior, ICETEX
Instituto Geogrdifico Agustin
Codazzi
Instituto Colombiano de Seguros
Sociales, Direcci6n General,
ICSS
Instituto Coloibiano de Seguros
Sociales, Seccional de
Cu1ndina1arca, ICSS
(National Railroad JW
Ent erprise
(National Telecommunications . C
Enterprise)
(Colombian Tourism Enterprise) I)
(College of Iublic CS
Administration)
(Judicial Revolving Fund) J
(National University Fund) E
(Paloquemnao Market Ltd.) )
(Military Hospital, Colombian
Medical Center for
Graduate Studies)
(Concrete Centrifuge
Industry, Ltd.)
(Colombian Mechanical
Industries, Inc.)
(Military Industry)
(Nuclear Affairs Institute)
(National Supply Institute.
Purchase of agricultural
products)
(Territorial Credit Institution.
I lousing construction)
(National Institute to Promote
Water and Develop
Electricity)
(National Institute of
Municipal Development)
(National Institute of
Tobacco Development)
(National Institute of
Industrial Development)
(Colombian Animal Hygiene
Institute)
(Colombian Institute for
Foreign Technical
Specialization)
(Agustin Codazzi Geographical
Institute)
(Colombian Social Security
Institute. General
Management)
(Colombian Social Security
Institute. Cundiniamarca
Sect ion)
W-PIL
D
D
WV
MP-D-E
A
D
D
D
A
D
A
E
A
L
L.
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502
113
6
3
4
7
1
14
1
1
36
3
433
456
129
232
6
45
10
12
28
30
84
Registradurfa Nacional del
Estado Civil
Centro Nacional de
Productividad,
Superintendencia de
Sociedades An6nimas
Superintendencia de Bancaria
Superintendencia de Comercio
Exterior
(National Civil Registration
Office)
(National Center of
Productivity)
(Superintendency of
Corporations)
(Superintendency of Banking)
(Superintendency of Foreign
Commerce)
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(ADRIl.1 A,; ACTTVAS CONUNISTAS:
IL Cabecdla:1 Faio N Vaquez Ctaio :a. Carlos Villarrealt. % ictor Manuel Me.
din. Moron a. Andris Sierra).
Efectiv on: 20 a 30O hombres enero 1968
Filiaci6n: EIN [jercito de Liheracion Nacional' de tendencias castristas.
Opera: Departamento de 'Santander: Rarrancabermeja. San Vicente. ;rea general
del Op6n. Cerro de tos Ande,. La Colorada v Cordillera de los Cob..rdes.
Observaciones: La unidad en conocida con el nombre de *Frente Josi Antonio
Galin-,. cImo primera en jerarquia dentro del apjrato del FLN.
2, Cabecdla: Ricardo Lana Parada a. Armando Lazo,.
Efectinos: aproximidamente diez hombres Enero 196W.
Filiaci6n: eELNi XUnidad dependiente de la anterior . conocida con el nombre
de iFrente Camilo Torres0.
Opera en: Mirgen del Rio Sogamnso, Cerro de La Piz: sitios de La Paz, Las
Pavsa, Marta, La Triga y Centenario, con desplaamieatos a El Conchal
line* del ferrocarril Satina de Turrc. Barr:acaerrneja.
J lamreatM cogno fue. en !%7. "a red urbana del L . sam d
coadrittas no han vuelto a dar mavcres setales de vida. Adewnas del nsor,-
adictrnamiento y politizacion de 1i blacion canwwsia. en Lis 1ite perst,
ten tdavia. sus prncipKc .'. : ik.J' c. n,%icron en va i a (a .de a.
taje a L-s instaa n m : : e' P.: '. L-Nii s de
policia, y secuestra en cicrtas 'oniN urb'anas.
3) CabeeRlh: Ciro Trujillo Castabo Manor Ciro'.
Efecties: 25 a 30 hombres
Filiacion: tFARC- Fuerzs, Armada. Resolufcinonas de Colombia'. de ten-
dencias presovjetics< % dependientes dire.:-amente del Comit# (entrul Jet
PCC
Opera en: Areas rurales de Ions municipios de Roncessalies. RUnira % Orteas. en
el Departarento del Tolima despazaraientos ocasionales hacia el mnun-
cipio de Natagaima -del m-imo denart.-nento -. % hacia el Quindio Te-
nia %u asiento anteriormentc en Riochiquimt. Departamento del Caca. N
llego a contar entonces con cerca de 250 hombres fuertemente armed.'.
4) Cabecilla: Rogelio Diaz a Teniente Rogeliol.
Efectivos: 15 a 20 hombres.
Opera en: Municiptos de Ros ira % Roncesalle Tolma), con desplazamiento
f-ecuentes al Departamento det \alle. especialmente a los municipios des
Sevilla v Cartago donde habia operado anteriormente.
5) Cabecil'a: Josi de Jes6s Rojas Rivas (a Cartagena
Efectivus: 20 a 25 hombres.
Filiacidi: FARC.
Opera en: Municipios tolimennc. de C haparrat. Olava lerrera. Ortega % su pe-
riferia con desplazamientos h ci.i et liepartanento del Quindio.
wn Cabecilla: Glicerio Con7alez (a. Ahanico'.
Efectivos: 18 a 20 hombres.
Filiaci6r.: FARC.
Opera en: Municipios de l.ibano. parte alta da Ins mlunicipios de Anzoitegui v
Santa Isabel regiones alcdaanas -l Ncyadio del Tolimi.
7) Cabecilla: Fernindo Cardona a,. Pielroiua
Efectivol 5 a 10 hombres.
Filiacion: Comunista (Linea Sovictica FARC.
'.0
U~s
c'.J
Opera en: Municipios de Salento (Quindio), Rovira (Tolima). Se ha venido mo-
viendo en Ia parte alta de Ibagui (nevado del Tolima), con desplazamientos
hacia el Municipio de Anzoitegui v 6ltimamente hacia Ia parte alta del Mu.
nicipio de Anaime.
6) Cabecilla: Pedro Antonio Marin (a. Tirofijo) jefe tFARCs.
Efectivos: 30 hombres.
3) Cawcilla: Reinel Camenano.
Efectivos: 10 hombres aproximadamente.
Teaencia: Prosoviatica.
Reg'en: Santa Marta (Alto Sumspaz).
4) Caboolfla: Gabriel Cortis.
Efectivos: 12 hombres aproximadamente.
9) Cabecilla: Januario Valero (a. Oscar Re~es). Tandencia: Pteaovietica.
Ekctivos: 50 a 60 hombres.
Filiaci6a: FARC.
Opera en: Municipios de Vegalarga, Alceciras, Tello, Rivera y Canpcalejre.
parte alta del municipio de Neiva (Ba!silas). en el Departamento del
Huila.
10) Cabecala: Roberto Loiada a. JoSeo).
Efectiso': 20 a Z5 hombres.
Filiaci6n: FARC.
Opera en: Regiones de El Carmen, Li Julia. Chapincro, San L.uis. Alpecito,
Praga y Aipe en el Departamento del fIluila % periferia de Marquetalia en
en Tolima.
11' Cabecilla: Pompilin Vera Ruiz (a. Joselito) dado de haja el 20 de febrero de
1968.
Efectivos: 30 hombres aproximadamente.
Filiacion: FARC.
Opera en: Parte alta de los municipios de laraya, Tello y periferia del Guayabero.
B) CUADRILI.AS INACTIVAS COMLaNiSTAS En nm.iembre de 1967).
1) Cabeeilla: Gerardo Gonzilez (a. Capitin Anzolaj.
Lugarteniente de Juan de Ia Crtrz Varela.
Efectivoc: 25 hombres aproximadimente.
Tendencia: Prosoviitica.
Regioa: Paquilo (Alto Sumapaz,.
Regiin: Santa Marta (Alto Sumapasz).
5) Cabtcilla: Ventura Rojas.
Efectivos: 8 hombres aproximadamente.
Tentencia: Prosovietica.
Regiin: El Tunal (Alto Sumapaz,.
6, Cabecilla: Jess Morales (s. Capitin Galvisi.
Efectivos: 20 a 25 hombres.
Tendenoia: Prosoviitica.
Regi6n: Salitre-Tunal-El Duda (Alto Sumapaz).
7) Cabecilla: Lizaro Castillo o Pedro Acosta (a. Ct. Tores).
Efectivos: 25 hombres aproximadamente.
Tendencia: Prosoviitica.
Region Santo Domingo-San Jran.l'aquillo (Alto Sumapaz).
81 Cabe:ila: Julio Rojas ta. Cabo JuliJ.
EIectivos a 12 hombres.
Tendencisa: (?)
Regiin: Manaure-San Jorge de Oriente-Media Luna.
9) Caberilla: Tomas Hernindez ia. Chipalo
Efect vos: 6 a 8 hombre.
Tendencia: Prochina.
Region: Riosucio (Cloct.
2) Cabecilia: Samuel Ardila (a. Cabo Ardila,.
Efectivo%: 8 a 10 hombres.
Tendoeia: Prosos.tines.
Regios: Peaas Blancas y Pueblo Nie>. (Alto Sumapazi.
10, Cabecilla: Julio Guerra. Luis Manco % Lobin Graisles (Capturado el ultimo de
lea nombrados).
:fectivos: 30 a 50 hombres.
cI
Tendencia: Prochina.
Regi6n: Alto- Sind 'Llanos del Tigre. Denartamento de C*6rdvba. Entro e, acti.
vided en enero de 1968.
11 Cabecilla: Arcenin Torres Sanchez i. Faenz:, l:erto por el ejercito en Sep.
tieml're de 1967.
Efectisos: 12 hombres.
Tendencia: Prosos tica antigiamente oper a noiire dCI partJo Iber. Cons.
titu'e su casu tin ejrmplo tipico de Its handokro oraidos por el PCC.
Regn6n: Nlunicipios tolimene- Je Calamarca. Rovir:!
12) Cabecilla: Fernando Cardna Giraldo a. Piclroja
Eiectivos: 10 a 12 hombres 'un.- guerrilla
Tendencia: Prosos itica.
Region: \luniIpios de Thagtus Ciajamarej. Pijto .ient,. efektuaindo despli.a-
mientos hacla el Derartamnente de; Omndoi \a"ecua a.
13, Cabecilla: Rosendt, Colmenarcs a. 'inuto,.
Efectivos: 15 hombres aproximadamente.
Tendencia: Prochina
Region:El Cano de la Hlermosa 1- ir rt en C.in rc I I \iento v l. prima-
vera en el Vichada.
14) Cabecilla: Joaquin I ernindez Dulce s. F! .arr;
Efectivos: 9 hombre,.
Tendencia: Prosoviitita.
Resiun: Zona .ledaitn j \.ntener, W Obando
NOTA: E~se bandolcro fie dJiJ de btjt en e'are .
15. Cabecilla: Albertino \ illarragit a. Cariio' o liteperro
Efectivos: 50 hombress aproximadamente.
Tendencia: Prosoviitica.
Region: El Duda. La Frat:cia % Sinat.
C; CUADRILLAS NO COM!Nisl \1
1 Cabecills: Josi Maria Echavarri.
Efectivos: 6 hombre.
Filiacitn: Liberal.
&*$Ma Yasopi, Topaipi 'se encuentra artualmente en receso,.
2) Cabecillt: Cen6n Bustos.
Efectivos: 8 hombres.
Filiaci6o: Liberal.
Region: Yacopi y Topaipi (se encuentra actualmente en receso).
3) Cabecilla: Rodolfo Rodrigut.c (muerto).
Electivos: 10 hombres.
Filiaci6n: Liberal.
Region: Llano Mateo-Teran Yacopi actualmente en receso).
4) Cabecilla: Pedro Beltran (a. Titin!.
Efectivos: 10 hombres.
Filiacion: Liberal.
Region: [andi (actualmente en recesoi.
5,.
5) Cabecilla: Agustin Bonilla (a. El Diablo,.
Efectivos- 10 hombres.
Filiacion: Liberal.
Region: Cuataqui y Puli (actualmente en receso).
6) Cabecilla- N.N. (a. Resortes).
Efectivoi 8 hombres.
Filiaci6n: Desconocida.
Regi6n: 'lariangola. Atanques. Pueblo Bello, Copey (actualmente en receso).
7) Cabecilla: Hermanos Granadillo.
Efectivos: 10 hombres.
Filiaci6n: Desconocida.
Regi6n San Juan del Cesar, Caracoli (acttralmente en receso).
W Cabecilla: N. N. (a. Caballo Grande).
Efectivos: 7 hombres.
Filiacion: Demconocida.
Regi6n: Valledupar. La Paz. Codazzi (actualmente on rece,.).
9) Cabecilla: Josi Gomez Higuita (a. El Migieo).
Efectivos: 12 hombres.
Filiaci6n: Liberal (MRL) lines dura.
Regis: Peque y Maritiea. Corregimicatos Urrve y Tabal (actmalesets M to-
ee).
Io
00i
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10) Cabecilla: N. N. (a. Cartagena).
Efectivos: 7 hombres.
Filiacidn: Dqasconocida.
Region: Corregimiento Altamira, Municipio de Betulia (actualmente en receso).
II) Cabecilla: Misael Torres Tama~o (a. Cap. Torres. capturado).
Efectivos: 15 a 20 hombres.
Filiacion: Liberal (MRL) line. dura.
Region: S3isa y Carepa Arriba (en receso).
12) Cabecilla: Caudrilla Jaime Guers Tamayo (a. Capitin Veneno).
Efectivos: 15 bombres dispersos en la zona de operiones.
Filiacitn: Liberal MRL.
Region: Segovia y Remedios en las zonas rrrales receso.
13) Cabecilla: Alvaro Villa (a. Cabo) ex-suboficial del ejircito.
Efectivoe: 12 a 16 hombres.
Filiacidn: Desconocida (Posiblemente de ANAPO).
Regi n: Mirgenes derecha Rio Cocorni. region de Pablonia y zone Iglesias (en
receso).
14) Cabecilla: Alfonso Jiminez Mira (a. Manano).
Efectivos 7 hombres divididos en dos grupos.
Filiaci6n: Conservador ANAPO).
Region: Municipios de San Carlos, Cocorns y San Luis (en actividad).
15) Cubecilla: Moisea Pacb6n Arias 'a. Viejo Negro..
Efeetivos: 6 a 8 hombres.
Filisoe: Conservador, presumiblemente de ANAPO.
Region: Margen derecha del rio Cocorni 'en actividad).
16) Cabeilla: Joss Guejia (a. Panels, capturado.
Efectisos: 7 a 8 hombres.
Filiacion: Liberal.
Regoi6n: Corinto >Miranda Cauca, en actividid.
7) Cabeeilla: Ferney Ramirez Giraldo fResortes).
Eectivos: Deosonocidos.
Filissids: Liberal.
des Fos ale de Ia cordillera do Buge y Cerrito (Departamento del Valle)
("m actividad.
18) Cabecilla: Julio Vergara y Evelio Gonzalez.
Efectivos: Vo hombres aproximadamente.
Filipeida: Deeonocida.
Region: Zone montaiosa de Jamundi (Villacolombia). Deembocadure del Rio
Nay*, tGuerilla Gaitins (en actividad).
19) Cabecilla: Mauricio Rjois.
Efectivos: Desconocidos.
Feliacion: Liberal (MRL).
Regi6n: Regiones de Caloto, Corinto y Miranda (Departamento del Cauca) (on
actividad).
20) Cabecilla: N. N.
Efectivos: 6 a 8 hombres.
Filiacioa: Dssconocida.
Region: Carretera Coeuta, Pamplona. Bucaramanga (en actividad).
21) Cabeeilla: LAis Rodrigo Sandoval Ortega.
Efectivos: 2 a 4 hombres.
Filiacinn: Lenservador.
Region: Municipios de Pamplonita. Sarare. San Jose de la Montaia, Toled., Co.
cutilla. Ragonvilla, Chinicota. Herrin y Arboladas (en actividad).
22) Cabecilla: Eliecer Arias Ruiz (a. El Diablo).
Efectivos: 8 ho3mbres.
Filiacion: Depeonoeida.
Regi6n: Municipios de Cabrera, Barichara. Villenueva, Curiti y San Gil (en ac.
tividad).
23) Cabecilla: dernardo Giraldo (a. El Tuerto).
Efectivos: 300 hombres aproximadamente.
Filiaci6n: Liberal M.R.L.
Region: La Playa. Canaguaro. Avichure. Puerto Caldas y San Juan de Arama
(an recea..
24) Cabecilla: Demsr Aljure (a. Capitin Aliuree (recientemente dado do buar).
Efectivos: 200 a 300 hombres aproximadamente.
Filiacion: Liberal ofiualia.
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Appendix C. Communist Party Analysis of Colombia.
Colombia is a backward country from the point of view of the degree of
exploitation of natural resources, the application of technical innova-
tions, the utilization of the labor force existent, and the social
organization in the camp of production.
In the countryside where the majority of the population lives, there
are maintained semi-feudal relations, and the violent eruption of
capitalism destroys materially and morally the lives of the peasants.
The industrial development within light and transformation industry is
jammed for the dependence on monopolist foreign capital, predominantly
North American, and also by the insufficiency of the demand from the
actual solvent population.
The great wealth of the sub-soil, the abundant natural resources and
land, are deficiently utilized, for the benefit of minor national and
foreign groups.
Most of the labor force works in unproductive or barely productive
occupations; the most generalized production means are irrational; raw
materials are not used economically , and in general terms there is a
great waste and mal-utilization of the productive forces of the society.
There is a big difference between what could be produced with full
utilization of the existent resources and the real production, and also
between what the population is consuming, and what it should in order
to satisfy essential necessities.
The cause of this situation of backwardness is not in the geographical
conditions, neither in the character or psychology of the Colombian
people, but in the character of the concrete historical development
determined by social relations based in the ownership of the basic means
of production by minority groups, "latifundists" in the first epoch and
now "latifundist" and bourgeoisie allied in the service of imperialism,
mainly the Yankee imperialism, that each day dominates more of the
material and spiritual life of the country.
A. The Yankee Imperialism Exploitation.
1. After the independence from Spain, and after the economic dependence
from English imperialism, Colombia, after the Second World War, fell into
the hands of the absolute domination of North American imperialism that
was penetrating since the second decade of this century.
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Yankee imperialism exploits the Colombian people in a direct and an
indirect way: it sacks our natural resources, deforms the national
economy, takes away most of the product, dominates external credit
and commerce, controls key positions in industry, public services,
transports, and imposes on us the prices for what it buys from us and
for what it sells to us.
2. More than 80 percent of the oil lands are in the hands of the
subsidiaries of the big international monopolies. Millions of hectares
of national territory are occupded by the oil companies and maintained
as unexploited reserves, aside from the Colombian economy. Sixty
percent of the oil production is for exports, but as it belongs to the
international monopolies, it does not produce revenues, while the 40
percent for the local refineries for national consumption takes more
money out of the country, no matter if it is from the Colombian sub-soil
and with costs paid fundamentally with Colombian money. The share of
the benefits that the oil companies pay to the State, are the lowest in
the world and income and patrimony taxes they should pay are ducked with
the systems of exemptions by depletion.
3. Gold and platinum are exploited by imperialist enterprises without
effective control by the State and they pay taxes that do not correspond
to the real value and volume of production.
4. Besides the sub-soil wealth they already dominate, foreign companies
are trying to get also the coal, iron, uranium, the energy's means of
production and other metals.
5. The direct North American investments and the mixed capital
enterprises have penetrated in the key points of industry. By those
inversions and by credit, the North American imperialism pressures and
subdues the Colombian bourgeoisie.
6. There is a clear dependence on the foreign commerce. At the same
time that the public external debt with enterprises and North American
banks grows, the value of our basic export product in the American market
goes down. Colombia has lost between 1954 and 1964 half of the :income
of sales in the external commerce. The external public debt has had a
huge augment within the last times as a sign of the way the dominant
classes have taken for capitalist development.
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The monopoly of the foreign commerce determines the dependence of the
Colombian money with respect to the dollar and isolates the country
with respect to the wide socialist markets. At the same time it con-
ditions the industrial development to the raw materials, equipment
and machinery of North American procedence.
7. Because of these reasons, and because of the each day more overt
North American intervention in our national life, in our institutions,
in our freedom, in our culture, North American imperialism constitutes
the main enemy of the Colombian people because it is the negation of
autonomous life and independent development. The main contradiction
is the one that confronts the popular classes and the progressive
sectors against the North American imperialism and its agents.
The end of the imperialist domination and the march to a full national
independence, represent a concrete perspective for struggle. The
victory of the Cuban revolution and the fact that a socialist society
is being built in the same doors of the Yankee imperialism, shows the
path the peoples decided to fight for their freedom must follow.
B. The Semi-Feudal Exploitation of the Land.
1. Maintained by the imperialist domination, the semi-feudal character
of the agrarian economy constitutes the other big root of the misery an-d
backwardness of Colombia.
The monopoly of the best lands by a reduced group of landowners that
hoard them by keeping them unexploited or irrationally exploited, leaving
without land most of the peasants, or in little unproductive spots with
the consequent misery, ignorance, lack of health, and servility of the
peasant producer; that is in essence the semi-feudal system of rural
ownership.
2. More than a million peasant families do not have any land; the huge
latifunds engender the minifunds where hundreds of thousands of families
vegetate without the minimum levels of subsistence. More than a million
agricultural salaried painfully work with salaries that cannot satisfy
the living necessities of nutrition, medical attention, hygiene, and
education. While the fertile valleys and the plain areas are devoted
to extensive cattle raising, the agricultural production takes place in
the hills and the slopes where mechanized work is so difficult; relations
of the feudal type subsist as the medianeria, the aparceria, the payment
of rent in kind, in work or in money; short term renting of plots and
the prohibition of permanent or large productivity crops are maintained;
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the cultives are started by putting fire to the lands, one of the
factors for the erosion that is the highest danger for the Colombian
soil; the life conditions of the agricultural workers are aggravated
by the necessity of migrating from one region to the other looking
for jobs, by the seasonal employment, the droughts, etc.
3. Feudal relations exist between the lords and the peasants, while
the former keep the authorities at their service to annul the workers
gains and to take away their civil rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the National Constitution.
4. Capitalism advances in uneven form in the countryside existing
at the same time as the backward forms of semi-feudal character, mixing
the capitalist way of production with the large patterns of ownership.
This adds to the semi-feudal serfdom, the capitalist exploitation.
5. The agricultural production for industrial and export ends (cotton,
sugar, fats), displaces gradually the production of food for the people,
without the country having been able to change from being a mono-exporter.
6. These circumstances lead to a progressive degradation of the
agricultural production, the development of which goes slower than
population growth and consumption needs. The couintry imports each time
more of its food and agricultural raw materials, expending huge quanti-
ties of money that could be used in investments in agriculture or in
industry. The foreign dependence on agricultural machinery, fertilizers,
drugs and other basic elements for the development of some industries
like avi-culture, slows the agricultural and industrial advancement.
7. If the situation in the production process is a dramatic one for
the peasants, in the exchange process it is much worse. Huge losses
of energy, of products; waste of work; high prices for consumers and
low and unstable ones for the producers. The growing poverty of the
peasants is an obstacle for them to obtain industrial products, reducing
the possibilities of industrial expansion and making worse the narrow
of the markets.
8. The illiteracy quota in the countryside is a huge one and so are
the differences between cities and countryside.
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C. The Uneven Development of Capitalism.
1. Capitalism has advanced although very unevenly especially durinq
the last decades. It haq developed in the creation of consumption and
service industry, with scarce foreign participation.
2. Although capitalist development implies the advancement of the
productive forces of the country and the gradual transformation of
the semi-feudal structures, the way taken under the direction of the
monopolist North American capital does not assume the elevation of
the people's standards of life, and it does not lead to national inde-
pendence. The actual system makes more acute the impoverishment of
the masses and slows the economic growth.
3. In recent times the big oligarchs in team with the imperialist
penetration make the monopolist tendencies heavier having the State
at their service, using the profits for conspicuous consumption and
for hoarding money in foreign banks.
4. The capitalist development in Colombia within the mark of imperialism
has been limited within the traditional imperialist formula which con-
sists in specializing the backward countries as food exporters, or raw
materials or processed articles and keeping those countries tied by
selling them products that only the capitalist countries produce.
5. Capitalism has not made the country develop in a harmonious way.
Part of the industry belongs to North Americans and part is in compe-
tition with these imperialist enterprises that take away from the
country high revenues, importing only the patents and finding national
credits for their financing.
6. The State enterprises have a rather important place within the
economy, and could constitute a break to the imperialist penetration
and they are destined to play a higher role as a base of the social
economy in the future.
But as the State is not representing the Nation but the dominant classes,
then the State ownership of enterprises is being fouled by now.
7. The development of capitalism has left some traits on the Colombian
bourgoisie. Through half a century this class is well entrenched, its
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interests in the banks, big industrial and commercial enterprises, and
the latifundios in the countryside. Inside the bourgeoisie, there are
the sell-outs to imperialism and the ones that sometimes conflict with
imperialism but without being able to work within the objectives of
national liberation.
8. The national bourgeoisie is limited in existence and development
because of the imperialist domination. In spite of this, it cannot
lead in the fight for national liberation. Although its interests are
in contradiction to imperialism it cannot fight because it is more
scared of a social revolution and of the liberation of the masses than
of imperialism.
9. For this reason and because the democratic anti-imperialist revolution
belongs to the socialist revolutions, the Colombian revolution only can
be effected by the popular masses under the direction of the working class
united to the peasants, to the revolutionary intellectuals, to the petit
bourgeois, and to the most progressive strata of the national bourgeoisie.
D. Political Regime and Historic Parties.
1. Power in the dominant classes makes it easy.for the North American
imperialism to exploit our people and makes the country more dependent
and backward.
2. The State is an instrument of the war politics of the Yankee
imperialism- With the secret signing of the bilateral military treaty
between the Colombian Government and the United States, national sovereignty
does not exist and the Colombian military forces are under the North
American military leaders.
3. The reactionary violence and militarism that have gotten hundreds
of thousands of victims from the people have filled the national scene
within the last times. The result has been the limitation or total
suppression of the civil traditions and democratic freedom in our country.
4. Within the armed forces there is a differentiation process: patriotic
soldiers and officers see with alarm the lessening of sovereignty and
independence and participate with repugnance in' repressing the people.
The more conscious sector of the armed forces, as the popular struggle
grows wider, will play a more important role in the fight for national
liberation.
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5. Our country does not have an international policy, independent
and peaceful. Its actual government and diplomatics act like lackeys
of the North Americans, bringing shame on the name of the country.
6. Colombia cannot have commercial and cultural free relations with
all the countries because of the systematic obstruction by the North
American Government. Free commerce with the socialist world would
change the circumstances and solve in part our chronic deficits in
balances of payments and commerce.
7. Capitalist influence invades the camps of culture, passing over
the best popular, pacific and democratic traditions. The radio,
movies, TV, newspapers, the literature and the educational institutes,
are utilized for preaching against the spirit of national independence.
All the cultural media are used for the war propaganda, the imperialist
violence and the slanders of the socialist countries. Universities
are gradually penetrated by financing means, behind which comes the
anti-national orientation and closing menaces if the line of submission
is not maintained.
8. Costs of living go always higher and real salaries go down. There
is disequilibrium between income and needs of the workers. The abusive
State's and oligarchic intervention within the work movement is a factor
of division and disorganization. The division of the working class is
imposed by the oligarchs and financed in part by the imperialist mono-
polies.
9. The intensification of the.effort by capitalist methods by incen-
tive, leads to unemployment and to the shortening of the workers lives.
Unemployment is a permanent phenomenon for hundreds of thousands of
workers.
10. New taxes, asked by the International Monetary Fund, fall on the
consumers, while the official budgets go to maintaining the army and
the rest of the repressive apparatus, and for paying the loans of the
Yankees.
11. Wide segments of the middle sectors see their income decreasing
and their difficulties augmenting. Even sectors of the middle bour-
geoisie are lessened by the restrictions in credit, by the importation
and dollars licensing for the import of raw materials and equipment.
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12. There is something peculiar to the Colombian political system:
the two ideologies of foreign origin, the liberal and the conserva-
tive, that went through many civil wars, still are in government*
without bringing a radical solution to the problems of the Colombian
people.
The apparition of new progressive forces in relation to the concrete
problems of the social classes, schemes solutions that the traditional
parties are not able to implement. Although the predominant ideology
is still that of the oligarchs, the working class has its vanguard
party, the Communist Party of Colombia which each day is more con-
sequent with the interests of the country. Differences between
liberals and conservatives are disappearing, because both of them
keep inside sell-outs to the Yankee imperialism, people from the
high pourgeoisie, and from the semi-feudal castes. Within the con-
servative leaders, there are the most reactionary sectors, the most
responsible for the violence of thepeople within the last twenty years.
Under the liberal influence are the sectors of the working class and
medium urban classes with the illusions of the democratic past of
this party.
13. The liberal and conservative oligarchs are unified for bringing
to the Constitution the bipartisan paritary system and the presiden-
tial alternation, to maintain their dominance and to isolate the new
political currents. The people, oppressed by this system try to
orient themselves to struggle for the revolutionary unity of the
anti-imperialist and anti-feudal forces of all the parties. As the
crisis of the so-called National Front of the oligarchs goes deeper,
new political forces take shape that are looking toward fundamentally
changing the Colombian life.
14. The crisis of the system is deep in all the sectors. Even
within the Church, there are new sectors favorable to revolutionary
changes. This is very significant because the Catholic Church has
been traditionally in Colombia an instrument of domination of the
oligarchs.
E. The Agrarian Anti-imperialist Revolution.
1. Our country needs a radical and revolutionary change to fundamentally
modify the economic and political structure to lead to liberation and to
lead to superation of backwardness. This radical change cannot be other
than the anti-imperialist agrarian revolution.
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2. The Colombian Communist Party has as objectives the victory of
socialism in Colombia and its superior stage, Communism, that is a
society without classes, without exploiters and exploitation, in
which the universal development of men, the productive forces, will
be able to realize the great principle of "From each according to
his abilities, to each according to his necessities."
The purpose of the Communist Party is to struggle at the vanguard of
the working class and within a unitary movement of all the national
forces to liberate our country from foreign domination and to effect
an agrarian and democratic revolution as a first step to the
socialist revolution.
3. This revolution of national liberation is the objective of all
the peoples in Latin America under the oppression of Yankee imperialism,
and as part of the socialist world revolution.
4. In order to make the agrarian anti-imperialist revolution, a necessary
condition is the revolutionary conquest of power by the popular classes
in order to have a government that effectively represents the popular
majority and the general interests of the country. This will be the
patriotic government of national liberation.
5. The proletariat with its class party at the vanguard must struggle
for being the leading force of that government as a necessary guarantee
in order that the revolution is not taken away from its ends, and goes
toward the building of socialism.
6. The fight of the Colombian people within international conditions
is each day more favorable. We are in the times of change from capi-
talism to socialism, of the victory of the world socialist system with
the Soviet Union at its lead, and of the construction of the material
bases for Communism. The advancement of the progressive and peaceful
forces stimulates the anti-imperialist movement of all the peoples
struggling against it, against colonialism and neo-colonialism, and
are solidly in the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
7. In Latin America the victory of the anti-imperialist revolution
and the building of socialism started with the glorious Cuban revolu-
tion, the process of which started the liberation of the peoples of
Latin America and adds more urgency to the necessity of advancing the
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revolution in our countries. The Cuban revolution proves that
imperialism is in its last epoch, that the revolution of national
liberation succeeds only through marxism-leninism and with the
socialist aid.
8. The peaceful forces have contributed to detain a third world
war because of the imperialist aggressions. The peaceful forces
are integrated by the powerful socialist camp, the free countries
of Asia and Africa, the national liberation movement, the pro-
gressive forces and the working class of the capitalist countries.
These forces united can impose peace and stop imperialism or defend
themselves from it. It is necessary to be aware; to stop imperialism
in time; to increment the national liberation struggle as the
highest contribution to the victory over imperialism. It is a response
to the forces to impede the peoples' liberation, to increment our
revolutionary activity and the solidarity with the peoples under
aggression fighting for their independence, as an affirmation of
the right of the oppressed peoples to their liberation.
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